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1 The development of the framework for assessing 
vulnerability and resilience within the Ensure 
research path 
 
In this section the basic assumptions that constituted the common ground for the project at 
its beginning are discussed, so as to make explicit what was the starting point, how 
vulnerability was addressed in the initial submitted proposal. The path traced in the latter 
has determined to a certain extent the project development and the aspects that have been 
focused upon.  
Since the proposal, ideas and positions regarding vulnerability have evolved and new issues 
have emerged.  The general vision on vulnerability has changed according to innovative 
literature that has been published in the very last years, after long discussions among 
partners, and the first applications of the methodological framework to the test case study 
areas.  
Changes and advancement with respect to the initial position taken in the proposal deserve 
to be shortly discussed, for two good reasons. 
On the one hand such an introductory part gives a potential reader the opportunity  to 
understand the project logic without necessarily go through all previous rather long 
deliverables and reports, on the other to clarify to ourselves the process we went through in 
the last months and the achievements we deem to have reached collectively. 
 
1.1 The project starting point 
 
The table shown in figure 1.1 represents the starting point of the project and was included 
in the proposal. It enlightens the recognition of the multifaceted, multidimensional, and 
multidisciplinary character of vulnerability. In the meantime it represents an interpretation of 
what is available in literature. In a rather instrumental way, some ―schools of thought‖ had 
been identified (represented in columns) as they offered definitions and assessment 
methods that were considered significant (summarized in the first large raw). In the lowest 
part of the table (the second smaller raw) weaknesses or constraints of the approach 
followed by each ―school of thought‖ or by some of its relevant scholars are briefly reported. 
With respect to the scientific and technical domain, the fundamental contribution of the 
seismic scientific community is acknowledged, while the tendency to overlap the two 
concepts of vulnerability and damage is depicted as a weak point.   
The second column reports some literature quotations taken from the geographical school 
that has always considered vulnerability as a key concept to differentiate between societies‘ 
ability to cope across regions and nations. Vulnerability is clearly linked to sustainability 
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issues, involving qualitative and quantitative aspects of socio-economic development. The 
major limitation to this kind of otherwise enlightening studies is that they do not provide 
parameters to measure differences among places (Cutter, 2000). 
The third column derives from systems engineering, at the core of industrial risk analysis, 
where failure and top events are considered as the result of long chains of minor failures, 
finding their way through latent vulnerable elements in the system. Interesting aspects of 
this approach relate to the need to consider human and physical elements as strictly 
interconnected and vulnerability as the result of interaction among various systems and 
subsystems. Furthermore, the notion of ―latent element‖ introduces the idea of ―slow onset‖ 
of disasters, any disaster, as mentioned by Lewis (1999, p.161). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Table showing the different interpretations of vulnerability considered at the beginning of the project 
The fourth column refers to ecological approaches that have recently developed into a more 
coherent and complete resilience theory, stating that biological and ecological systems have 
the ability to resist collapse, by enhancing their level of interconnectedness, complexity and 
diversity. This perspective has entered into risk studies through the scientific groups working 
on climate change. Turner et al., (2003) state: ―Vulnerability rests in a multifaceted coupled 
Scientific and technical Geographical and Systems Engineering Ecological field Climate change studies
domain sociological domain
Aa.Vv., Natural disasters Dow K., Exploring differences Giarini O., H. Loubergé, Gunderson L., C. Holling, J. Kasperson, R. Kasperson 
and vulnerability analysis. in our common future(s): the La delusione tecnologica. Panarchy. Understanding et al., The human dimension
 Report of expert group, Rep. meaning of vulenrability to I rendimenti decrescenti transformation in human of global environmental
Undro, July, 1979. global environmental change, della tecnologia e la crisi and natural systems change, MIT University
in Geoforum, vol. 23, n.3,  1992 della crescita economica, Island press, 2002 Press, 2003.
Petrini V , Overview report Mondadori, Milano, 1978.
on vulnerability  assessment Ramade F., Les catastrophes Perrow C., Normal accidents Holling C., Resilience and Turner B. et al., A framework
in Proc. of the V International écologiques , McGraw Hill, Living with high risk stability of ecological systems, for vulnerability analysis in
Conference on Seismic Paris, 1987 technologies,  Basic Books, Annual Review of Ecology and sustainability science,
Zonation, Nice, France, Oct. New York, 1984. Systematics, vol. 4., 1973 PNAS, July 8, vol. 100:14, 2003
1995, vol. III, pp. 1977-1988
K. Hewitt, Regions of risk. V. Bignell e J. Fortune, Folke C., S. Carpenter,
A geographical introdu- Understanding systems Resilience and sustainable 
ction to disasters,  Longman failures, Open University development: building 
Singapore, 1997 Series, Manchester adaptive capacity in a world
University Press, 1984. of transformation , Env.
Advisory Council, Ministry
J. Fortune e G. Peters, of the Env., Sweden, 2002
Learning from failure. The 
systems approach,  John 
Wiley &Sons, London, 1995
* Confusion regarding * The vulnerability * Vulnerability as the * Vulnerability as the * Vulnerability as the 
   vulnerability and    factor has to be consi-    result of systems    result of systems    result of systems 
   exposure factors   dered in spatial,   interaction   interaction   interaction
   should be avoided   regional and social terms
* Concepts of damage * Vulnerability with * Vulnerability compounds * Vulnerability compounds * Vulnerability compounds
   and vulnerability    respect to economic    physical, organizational,    physical, organizational,    physical, organizational,
   should not overlap   developoment and   functional factors as well   functional factors as well   functional factors as well
  underdevelopment   as managment failures   as managment failures   as managment failures
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system with connections operating at different spatio-temporal scales and commonly 
involving stochastic and non-linear processes‖. 
The last column widens the perspective to the climate change approach, where the notion of 
vulnerability has evolved significantly in the last years, shading light on fundamental aspects 
of coping, adaptive capacity of societies and individuals in the face of change. Within the 
climate change research, the concept of vulnerability blends together the notion of local 
sensitivity to an ―external global stress‖ and the idea developed within ecological studies that 
the capacity to resist and adapt to change requires much more than just being able to resist 
without being damaged. The dynamic adaptation to changes is considered essential not only 
for ecosystems but also for human systems. 
The first need arising from the description of figure 1.1 is in terms of integration. A large 
number of studies and vulnerability assessment proposals have been produced in the last 
decade in particular, looking at all the facets that are shown in the table. Yet, there is still 
the need to integrate social vulnerability with other types of vulnerability (economic, cultural, 
systemic and physical) into a single unified and satisfactory model. What seems to be 
predominant in the field of vulnerability studies is a net separation between ―soft‖ and 
―hard‖ sciences approaches. Here, social vulnerability stands alone, while civil and structural 
engineers are trying to develop parameters helping judge if and at what conditions a given 
building or infrastructure would be able to sustain the pressure of an extreme event. Such a 
separation should be avoided, by considering physical and non-physical aspects as 
components of the same environment. 
The need for integration derives from the principal scope of the project, which is developing 
a methodology and relative tools to assess the vulnerability of complex natural and built up 
environments, including rather than excluding the connection with social and economic 
vulnerabilities. All the dimensions searched by the various disciplines are essential to this 
main aim, as each provides a piece of the very complex puzzle needed to describe why and 
how an urban or a regional context responded to an extreme stress, like an earthquake, a 
flood or a volcanic eruption. 
In the historic development of ―disaster‖ studies, such response has been for long attributed 
to the severity of the stress itself, so that losses and damages were explained with the 
magnitude of the earthquake, the peak discharge, velocities and height of floods, or the 
grade on the explosive index for a volcanic eruption. As Weichselgartner and Obersteiner 
(2002) correctly put it in an article in which they analyzed the past and the future of risk 
research, a strong need to move from hazard oriented assessments towards more 
comprehensive approaches putting at the centre the vulnerability and resilience of exposed 
systems has been generally felt and not only among social scientists, traditionally more 
attentive to the response capacity of societies and individuals. 
Such a strong need is testified not only by the decision to choose vulnerability as one of the 
leading topics in natural hazards research for the VII FP, but also by its inclusion in even the 
most technically oriented conferences and in its increasing role in international organisations‘ 
documents. 
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It was clear to the Ensure project since the beginning that the several facets and the 
articulated interpretations of vulnerability constituted a richness and not a negative aspect: 
the challenge was therefore how to operationalize such complexity, how to build a method 
that enables administrations and any other interested stakeholder to carry out a vulnerability 
assessment providing a comprehensive and the most exhaustive possible picture of elements 
of strength and weakness in a given environment that could lead to failure or to successful 
overcoming of ―calamities‖. 
In this regard a couple of further preliminary assumptions should be introduced before 
proceeding in the description of development and results of the Ensure project. 
The first refers to the operational character of the tool that has been developed. Being able 
to operationalize the extremely rich and articulated interpretations of vulnerability was a key 
motivation for starting the project. A project milestone was the belief that proposed 
methodologies and scientific advancement in disaster studies should not be considered only 
per se, but should also serve the fundamental purpose of risk mitigation and losses 
reduction. In other words a fundamental question that is being asked along the entire 
project is how a given interpretation, a given tool, can be used for prevention purposes, how 
it may enhance the capacities of societies to avoid the most dramatic outcomes of natural 
extremes and to facilitate recovery. This is also the reason why the project attempts to build 
on previous knowledge, taking advantage of what has been already accomplished in the 
field, trying to embed as much as possible available results of risk and vulnerability 
assessment experiences, in the convincement that risk mitigation is inevitably a 
multidisciplinary, multi-stakeholders endeavour. 
Apart from being operational, the tool that we aimed at developing needs also to be 
―explanatory‖ in the sense it should help stakeholders understand why given damages occur, 
how they can be eventually reduced acting on the different components of the risk function, 
where R = f (H, V, E, ..) (H being the hazard, V the vulnerability, E the exposure). 
In this regard, since the beginning it was considered important to separate the expected 
damage from vulnerability, intended as a propensity to damage, as the compound of 
characteristics which make a given environment, a given society more prone than another to 
be severely affected by an ―external‖ stress. On the other end, vulnerability was kept 
separated from exposure, the latter defining the elements, systems and populations that are 
located in a hazardous place. Vulnerability implies how ―weak‖ or ―strong‖, how ―fragile‖ or 
―resistant‖ is the exposed system, element or population. Both have been included in the 
evaluation framework, though bearing in mind the just mentioned distinction. 
Within previous WPs, and particularly the first, devoted to the state of the art on the issue, 
the problem of definitions has been extensively tackled. Yet, there is the need to make a 
choice; the Ensure working group holds that a project, to accomplish successfully its task 
cannot simply remain at a definitional stage, comparing literature proposals; it must advance 
its own proposal, selecting, deciding on the interpretation that better fits partners‘ previous 
experience, the results of discussions during meetings and the analysis of case studies, both 
those used for gaining new insight and information and those used as test areas.  
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Some choices were already implicit in the way the proposal was constructed, other relevant 
issues emerged during the project development. The latter deserve to be considered before 
moving ahead to the description of the integrated framework.  
 
1.2 Logic connection between the proposed framework and results 
of previous WPs 
 
The framework that was finally proposed embeds, in fact, some fundamental theoretical and 
practical aspects searched in previous work packages, which will be discussed in the next 
paragraphs.  
 
1.2.1  The need to adopt a systemic approach  
The Ensure project adopted systemic approach to vulnerability and resilience assessment. 
Yet it is important to exactly define what ―systemic‖ actually means. In WP1 and WP2 the 
various facets of vulnerability (physical, functional, organisational) and the ―types‖ of 
vulnerability that can be found in literature (social, economic, territorial) have been explored. 
The framework was conceived as intrinsically systemic, in that various factors, systems and 
components concur to create vulnerability and resiliency patterns, both individually and 
through their multiple connections. 
More specifically, the framework adopts a systemic approach at three distinct levels: 
- first, the vulnerability and resilience of systems is appraised (natural, built environment and 
social) as it will be further explained in paragraph 2.3; 
- second, the term ―systemic‖ has been associated to vulnerabilities that arise as a 
consequence of systems interdependency and interconnectedness (paragraphs 2.1 and 2.3; 
- third, the question of how the vulnerability and resilience of different systems interact with 
one another across temporal and spatial scale has been addressed (paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3). 
 
1.2.2 Relationship among different vulnerabilities  
WP2 can be considered a sort of turning point in the project, as it permitted to extensively 
analyse and search the relationship between different types of vulnerabilities as described in 
the previous paragraph: between physical and systemic, between physical, systemic and 
social, between systemic, social, economic, institutional and territorial. The various types of 
vulnerabilities are not separated one from another, they actually influence each other. For 
example physical vulnerability is often the result of lack of good norms and regulations of 
the construction sector to build more resistant structures but it may be as well the result of 
poor inspection capabilities, of lack of compliance with existing rules and norms, no matter 
how well advanced they may be. Furthermore, as it was clearly raised during the 
development of WP2, the various types of relationships constitute an integral part of what 
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has been labelled as ―territorial‖ vulnerability. Referring to the concept of ―territory‖ in Latin 
terms serves to make clear that the vulnerability of a region, a metropolitan area or an 
urban centre is much more than just the sum of the vulnerabilities of individual 
constructions. It has to do with the way regions, cities and their assets and facilities 
function, perform and are used by people, agencies and organisations.  
 
1.2.3 Vulnerability in time and space 
The fact that vulnerability holds  relevant temporal and spatial dimensions is well recognised 
in literature (while it may be stated that the relationship among different types of 
vulnerabilities described in WP2, even though well documented, has not been at the core of 
most investigations on vulnerability until now).  
With respect to time, several aspects have been considered. First, it was recognized that 
vulnerability should be considered as a dynamic rather than static concept: vulnerabilities 
are shaped over time; vulnerabilities that we are able to assess today are the result of 
historic processes, shaping cities, communities, infrastructures in a way that builds their 
potential relationship with hazards. On the other hand, different types of vulnerabilities 
become more apparent and relevant at different stages of the disastrous event: at the 
impact, physical vulnerabilities transform into the direct physical damage provoked by the 
event; during emergency and recovery, systemic, social, institutional, organisational factors 
determine how slowly or how fast return to normalcy will be possible and at what conditions 
(for example with respect to the possibility/capability to reduce or increase pre-event 
vulnerability). 
With respect to space, two main considerations constituted the ground for analysis: on the 
one hand the relevance of space per se, on the other the concept of scale. 
As for the spatial dimension per se, we may found in literature since long ago, the distinction 
between places that are differently affected during the same event: the so called core of the 
disaster, its ―epicentre‖, where physical damage is more prominent, and the ―periphery‖ of 
the event, which is directly and/or indirectly involved in the disaster. In fact, different types 
of long distance effects can be considered: areas from where help will be provided and to 
where people will be temporarily evacuated in case of need enter into a new type of 
relationship with the affected areas. New or increased transportation will be required; a flow 
of goods, services and resources will reinforce and sometime create new linkages. It would 
be limiting though to consider only the connections arising for emergency and recovery 
management purposes: remote areas may be affected by the lack of services, by the 
interruption of major transportation routes or simply because economic relationships exist 
with the stricken areas and, some firms will be affected by interruption of activities in the 
impacted zone. 
The fact that different areas from those directly affected by an extreme event must be 
considered, leads to the need to enlarge the overlook from the ―local‖ scale to larger scales, 
considering how the ―local‖ is placed within larger economic and administrative regions. 
Some authors have stated that vulnerability assessment is inevitably local; the Ensure 
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project aims at challenging such position by showing that a more complex approach is 
required, because some vulnerabilities are local, or are particularly relevant locally in shaping 
the damage (like physical), but others make sense only when larger scales are considered 
(see for example systemic or social, when the latter include administrative and institutional 
vulnerabilities). The same consideration regarding scales becomes relevant when the natural 
environment vulnerability is considered. 
Furthermore, some vulnerabilities are actually evident at larger scale because of the nature 
of the threat and the intrinsic features of systems. The Eyjafjallajökull eruption in Iceland in 
spring 2010 showed how vulnerable the aviation system is to the consequences of a volcanic 
explosion provoking ash clouds endangering flights. A rather ―local‖ event, the consequences 
of which may nevertheless spread over very large zones; an event that has not provoked 
significant physical damage, losses or victims, but with a very large impact over 
transportation system and through the ripple effects in economic activities on the entire 
aviation industry and on the tourist sector.  
Finally the scale at which vulnerabilities are relevant depends on the institutional, economic 
and social arrangements in the different contexts, making clear that a unique rule for 
deciding a priori at what scales a certain analysis must be conducted does not make 
particular sense. The selection of relevant scales will depend on the context, and on the 
particular way in which different systems are connected and related to each other. 
 
1.2.4 Vulnerability and resilience 
In the project proposal, vulnerability was the main topic to be searched, with little 
consideration of other definitions that were considered in WP1 as part of the state of the art. 
Nevertheless during the project development, a consensus among partners was achieved 
regarding the need to make explicit the relevance of resilience. For the detailed discussion 
regarding the differences and overlapping meanings of vulnerability and resilience, it is 
worth to refer to the deliverables resulting from WP2; what is important here is to make 
clear how resilience entered in the Ensure project and how it is considered in the proposed 
integrated framework that will be described in subsequent sections of this report.  
The main output of long discussions, readings and reflection is that resilience cannot be 
simply considered as the ―flip-side‖ of vulnerability. In other terms, a resilient community is 
not just a community manifesting low levels of vulnerability. A community may be even 
vulnerable, particularly as far as physical vulnerability is concerned, and still be resilient in 
the aftermath of a disaster and manifest a high capacity to react and recover effectively. 
Also because what seems to emerge in literature is a different focus of vulnerability and 
resilience studies: the first are more oriented towards the identification of weaknesses, 
fragilities that make a given territory, a given community, a given country unable to resist 
the stress provoked by an ―external‖ source. Looking at resilience we appreciate the 
capacities to react, to overcome the problems created by the same existence of 
vulnerabilities and to ―bounce back‖ despite damages and disruption to ordinary life. 
Resilience entails the capacity to recover effectively, transforming the damage and losses 
into opportunities for a different territorial and environmental setting, in such a way that 
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pre-event vulnerabilities will be reduced and the resulting societal, urban, and regional 
patterns are healthier and safer than before the event impact. Authors like Handmer and 
Dovers, 1997 and Norris et al, 2008 have rejected the idea that a resilient community or a 
resilient city is simply a community or a city that is able to bounce back to pre-event 
conditions. Sometimes getting back to the exact pre-event conditions is just the opposite of 
resilience, particularly when high level of vulnerabilities characterized that condition. Instead, 
resilience has to do with the capacity to adapt to changes, to manage creatively uncertainty, 
to find resources, both material and immaterial, to face the consequences of a disaster.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Diagram showing the conceptualization of vulnerability, mitigation capacity and  
resilience in the Ensure project 
 
Resilience is perhaps an even more dynamic concept than vulnerability, in that it addresses 
the capacities to innovate and the ability to strategically orient complex processes like those 
implied by emergency, recovery and reconstruction. 
As just mentioned, literature on resilience is as vast as that on vulnerability. Also in this case 
the Ensure project needed to choose a direction of work, an interpretation cutting across the 
various definitions and alternative views available so as to be able to include resilience in the 
integrated framework. 
The diagram in figure 1.2, represents the interpretation provided by the project. 
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2 Methodological approach and framework 
description 
 
The framework developed within WP4 represents the final output of a long process of 
reflection, discussions among partners, and was shared with external experts in a workshop 
hold before the 2010 summer (see second annex). It is an attempt to accommodate the 
various relevant aspects that have been shortly described insofar and which constituted the 
results of previous WPs. It also has the ambition to comprise some of the knowledge and 
information about resilience and vulnerability that has emerged from literature and previous 
projects. 
The need to conceptualize the tools to be used in assessing vulnerability and resilience is 
strongly felt by the Ensure team. The large majority of articles and previous work simply 
couple theoretical thinking about the two (or more related) concepts and some applications 
where indicators and parameters are used (Eriksen and Kelly, 2007). Often it is not clear 
how the selected indicators are actually linked or derived from the most theoretical part. The 
associated risk is to use indicators that are taken for granted without further investigation 
that instead would be required. For example most studies consider the elderly more 
vulnerable, without making distinction within this rather large and too generically defined 
social group; in some instances (see Handmer, 2003), the elderly has performed much 
better than the younger generations, making evident that generalizations cannot be 
accepted without further analysis and that there is the need to relate indicators to specific 
spatial and temporal contexts before any convincing appraisal can be carried out.  
A similar need had emerged at a certain stage within the field of sustainability, and the 90s 
were marked by a rather consistent work on methodologies to identify appropriate 
parameters and criteria for judging whether or not the latter were consistent enough and 
useful to understand to what extent a region, a city, a country were actually getting closer 
to a condition of sustainable development (see Mac Laren, 1996; Winograd and Farrow, and, 
Winograd, 2007). It is odd for us to see that until now at least, few articles have appeared in 
the same vein in the vulnerability and resilience arena, even though we are convinced that a 
season of a similar outbreak of studies on the validity of indicators chosen to assess 
vulnerability will open. There will be a strong need for such studies as vulnerability 
assessments will be increasingly required by legislation (as in the case of the Flood 
Directive) and will constitute basis to distribute resources for mitigation. 
In summary, three answers can be provided for the legitimate question: why and what for a 
framework for vulnerability and resilience assessment.  
First, within the framework the goals to be accomplished carrying out the assessment must 
be established. What for? How the assessment may help in finding ways to mitigate risk and 
better prepare for facing the consequences of events the residual risk of which cannot be 
eliminated? 
Second, to ―find the right place‖ for each indicator that is in any case used in currently 
adopted vulnerability assessment tools. Within the framework the questions we try to 
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answer with each selected indicator have to be made explicit. In this way not only the 
questions at stake - but also the extent to which proposed indicators and their relative 
measures are actually providing a good proxy or synthesis of corresponding features and 
processes- become clear. In other words, are the proposed indicators (sometime driven by 
existing data) are actually representing the vulnerability aspect that we need to address? 
Third, and more general answer: the framework represents a model that attempts to 
capture the most relevant features of vulnerability so as to permit to draw a satisfactory 
picture of a given place and community in terms of their expected response to the impact of 
an extreme natural event. In this respect, the framework shares with any other model the 
fate of being a selection of aspects that are considered as particularly relevant and 
representative of a given reality. Inevitably many things have to be left out of the model, 
which by definition cannot and should not be clone of reality, but a mean to make sense out 
of what is observed in the ―real‖ world. As Slobodkin (1994, quoted in Bell and Morse, 2008) 
puts it: 
«Essentially all science is the study of either very small bits of reality or simplified surrogates 
of complex whole systems. How we simplify can be critical. Careless simplification leads to 
misleading simplistic conclusions». 
 
2.1 Main Ensure objectives and methodological procedure 
 
The Ensure project had set ahead two main objectives, one more general and theoretical 
and, the second more specific. 
The more general objective was to provide an interpretation of the relationship between 
vulnerability and related concepts (resilience, adaptation, coping capacity, etc.) within a 
framework strongly finalized towards prevention, following the rationale described in the 
previous paragraph. The framework must provide a sort of guideline to assess vulnerability 
before an event strikes, helping decision makers and even lay citizens take appropriate 
mitigation and anticipatory measures. In other words we are not satisfied with tools that 
permit only ex-post analysis, leading to a detailed and well developed description of what 
happened in a given area stricken by an extreme event, we wished to be able to identify the 
weaknesses and fragility that combined with the severity of an event may lead in the future 
to damage and losses. 
An example may clarify what is meant here. In the years 2001-2002 a rather interesting 
project was carried out by the Italian Ministry of Labour. In the context of social works for 
unemployed professionals with a master in architecture and civil engineering, it was decided 
to carry out an assessment of the seismic vulnerability of all public facilities (like schools, 
municipality buildings, governmental offices etc.) in Southern Italian regions. The final 
results is rather impressive, as there exist now records with fundamental data and 
assessments of the physical vulnerability to earthquakes of all facilities where a large 
number of people can be expected at the time of a seismic impact or that are critical to 
manage the emergency. Furthermore skilled professionals were trained in seismic 
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construction, and were provided the capabilities to identify key vulnerability factors in 
buildings. L‘Aquila was among the cities where the assessment was accomplished: several 
public buildings that collapsed or were severely damaged during the 6 May 2009 earthquake 
had been the object of analysis and ranked as very vulnerable (see figure 2.1). Were this 
information been used by authorities either to reinforce those structures or at least to check 
their residual resistance capacities after the first shocks recorded months before the main 
one, perhaps many lives could have been saved. Clearly what is apparent in this example is 
the potential utility of vulnerability assessments in very practical terms, but also the need to 
go beyond physical vulnerability to address the various deficiencies of complex social and 
environmental systems, that may lead to lack of compliance with norms and regulations, or 
to the poor management of information that holds the potential of saving lives and prevent 
the most severe losses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Detail from vulnerability assessment records for the city of L‘Aquila 
 
Within the project the result corresponding to this more general objective is the integrated 
framework shown in figures 2.4 and 2.5 and described in detail in paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3. 
The more specific goal of Ensure was to advance in the most ―established‖ field of 
vulnerability assessment, providing an updated picture of what is already available in 
literature, in previous studies, and in applications worldwide. We may count already on a 
good number of proposals concerning vulnerability indicators, parameters and measures, 
related to physical, systemic and social aspects. Those have been analysed and a selection 
of what seemed to the working group as most advanced or appropriate was proposed as 
part of the tool for vulnerability assessment. The result of this more specific goal can be 
seen in the individual matrices that are part of the integrated framework, as described in 
paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4. 
From a methodological point of view, the seismic case was selected as a reference example. 
In the latter in fact, methods for assessing buildings vulnerability to ground accelerations 
provoked by seismic waves at a given site have been developed for at least the last thirty 
year, producing results that are reasonably shared by the scientific community. From a 
theoretical perspective, the methodological path that has been followed is of particular 
importance to us (figure 3). It can be conceived as a four step path organised as follows: 
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 First damages have been surveyed and analysed to identify what were the mechanisms 
leading to specific failure patterns. Surveyed damage buildings are now part of a huge 
database comprising thousands of cases.  
 The large number of surveyed buildings allows for recognising recurrent failure patterns 
that are related to structural and non-structural characteristics that can be considered as 
an integral part of the failure mechanism, being the other relevant components the 
seismic input. Long years of study and discussions have led to the selection of a restricted 
number of indicators, summarizing the fundamental aspects that can be deemed as 
responsible for a given structural response, like shear resistance, plan and facade 
regularity. Those indicators serve as references to check the capacity of any regular 
structure to withstand the stress provoked by seismic shocks.  
 Then the picture provided by the vulnerability assessment tool must be compared to the 
real damage when the latter unfortunately occurs during an earthquake. Fragility or 
vulnerability curves represent the result of the procedure correlating the level of damage 
to the earthquake intensity or acceleration as can be seen in figure 3: to moderate levels 
of stress resistant buildings suffer no or minor damage while vulnerable ones are already 
significantly affected. At increasing levels of stress, vulnerable buildings collapse, while 
the least vulnerable still show residual resistance. 
 The last step requires refining vulnerability assessment tools and indicators any time new 
information or understanding of structural seismic response is available after damage 
surveyed in a real event. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Methodological process for eliciting physical vulnerability parameters in the seismic case 
 
Ideally this methodological path can be followed also as far as the vulnerability of structures 
to other types of stress (floods, landslides, fire, etc.) is concerned and experimental fragility 
curves have been proposed. Such methodological path can be seen as more general, not 
only for physical damage and physical vulnerability but as having a more general validity. 
The analysis of damage occurred in a severe event should lead to identify what ―part‖ of the 
damage can be attributed to the weakness of the affected system, to its inherent 
characteristics, making it more prone to suffer damage with respect to similar cases in the 
same event or in similar situations.  
Parameters to assess buildings vulnerability to earthquakes
(GNDT)
Classes
Parameters      A        B       C       D weight
 
  1. Type and quality of structural       0        5      20       45     1.0
     components
  4. Building       0        5      25       45     0.75
  6. Plan layout       0        5      25       45     0.50
  7. Front layout       0        5      25       45 variable
  8. Distance of walls       0        5      25       45     0.25
  9. Roof       0      15      25       45 variable
10. Non structural components       0        0      25       45     0.25
11. State of maintenance       0        5      25       45     1.00
Data comes from surveys conducted by instructed personnel
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By this we mean that also failures that cannot be labelled as physical structural performance 
can be analysed adopting a similar approach. What would be needed is a detailed reporting 
of malfunctioning in services, utilities, and critical infrastructures, the cause of which is due 
in part to the physical stress, but also (sometimes mainly) to weaknesses arising at the 
complex interaction of components and systems. 
In this regard it can be said that the proposed framework may be beneficial not only for 
conducting vulnerability assessment but also as a guidance to produce better damage 
accounts than has been the case until today. Some types of damage (in particular indirect, 
secondary, induced) have been scarcely reported, while the attention of authorities go to the 
costs of reconstruction ignoring the ripple economic and systemic effects that may 
reverberate across regions and communities. Those damages, generally underreported, may 
be nevertheless very relevant in explaining subsequent patterns of vulnerability long after 
the hazard impact and in areas apparently remote from those actually hit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Methodological process for eliciting systemic vulnerability 
  
The goals that have been described entail a rather high complexity, representing a 
challenging endeavour for the project. It is therefore hard to imagine that they can be 
accomplished in a single phase or following a strictly top down approach. Instead a more 
pragmatic procedure has been adopted: a mixed top-down and bottom-up path have been 
followed. Several case studies have been analysed in the previous WPs of the project with 
the idea of extracting significant aspects and concepts that could make part of a framework 
with a more general validity (that is not strictly linked to the individual case study); on the 
other hand, once developed, the model has been applied to the test case study areas, so as 
to get feedback regarding what had to be changed and how in the framework.  
The present report has been re-written at least a couple of times, to include ―lessons learnt‖ 
from the initial application of the method. Such an iterative process has been followed also 
by other scholars pursuing similar objectives, representing for us a ―relieving‖ reference (see 
Polsky et al., 2007). 
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2.2 Description of framework for integrated multiscale assessment 
of vulnerability and resilience to natural hazards 
 
The framework responds to the requirement of general theoretical advancement that was 
one of the two main objectives of the project. Combining the different pieces of the puzzle 
(or what can be recognised as such) into a methodological framework comprising the 
various aspects that were deemed important by the working group is by no mean a minor 
result, even though we are aware of the long way ahead before all parts of it will be actually 
operationalized in a satisfactory way. 
In figure 2.4 the framework is shown: as it can be clearly seen it is deployed over a plan 
where both the spatial and the temporal dimensions are evidenced. As for the spatial one, 
the scales at which both hazards and vulnerabilities should be appraised are represented in 
two distinct axes.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: General representation of the integrated framework to assess vulnerability and resilience  
across time and scales 
 
The reason is that not necessarily the scales at which hazards have to be analysed 
correspond to the scale at which the different types of vulnerabilities must be considered. 
For example, physical vulnerabilities are mainly addressed at the local scale, as the intrinsic 
fragility of structures, infrastructures, and people must be looked at in detail at the local 
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scale. What appears at larger scale is the result of such analysis, in terms of comparison 
among places. As already mentioned, systemic vulnerability can be appropriately considered 
only linking the local to the large scale (provincial or county level to the regional and 
sometimes above regional). When it comes to consider the capabilities to recover effectively 
in a resilient fashion, all scales must be considered: what will be reconstructed is ultimately 
what has been locally damaged, but the needed resources cut across all levels of 
government and depend also on the type and strength of relationships among the affected 
places and a much wider region. 
As for the temporal dimension, again, timing of hazards and vulnerabilities may differ: for 
example, the possibility of new occurrences of extreme events within a short period, when 
recovery is still going on, must be accounted for.  
In the figure, it is shown how the various vulnerabilities and resilience are considered with 
respect to the phases of the disaster cycle. Before the impact, that is when a sufficiently 
long time has passed since the last big event, the mitigation capacities are considered. Rose 
(2004) suggests that it is more correct to talk about mitigation capacities in the period 
before the hazard impact, while resilience should define more appropriately capacity to 
recover from an extreme event. This is nevertheless a matter of deciding the most suitable 
definition; what is actually relevant here is the attempt to understand whether or not 
conditions to enhance coping capacity and resistance of a complex system exist or not and 
how they are manifested.  At the impact, instead, the physical vulnerabilities play the major 
role: the direct physical damage that can be accounted for are strongly correlated on the 
one hand to the severity of the hazard, on the other to the level of physical fragility of 
artefacts and constructions. As the time from the impact passes, other forms of vulnerability 
gain relevance and, in particular during the emergency phase, precisely systemic 
vulnerabilities. Those express the response capacity (or lack of) not to the direct extreme 
event impact but rather the consequences of the latter, to the impairment in crucial systems 
and their components provoked by the physical damage. Finally, considering the time of 
reconstruction and recovery, resilience gain prominence: here again the response is not to 
the stress, but to the longer term induced, indirect, secondary effects it has produced. What 
we want to measure here is not merely a response capacity, but rather whether or not 
systems is able to recover by reducing pre-event vulnerabilities, to learn from the 
weaknesses that the event has revealed and to transform reconstruction into an opportunity 
to build and develop a better, safer and healthier place to live. 
The red and green arrows represent the various connections and links that exist among the 
different types of vulnerability and resilience, in space and time. Those will be tackled in 
sections ahead. 
 
2.3  Short description of the set of matrices comprising the 
framework 
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In this paragraph the ellipsoids‘ content as represented in figure 2.4 will be discussed in 
detail. Actually each ellipsoid is translated into a set of matrices as shown in figure 2.5. 
In each matrix the vulnerability indicators are proposed, taken from literature, ongoing and 
past research carried out by the Ensure team.  
In the first set of matrices, the capacity to mitigate is addressed; this means concretely that 
the vulnerability of the natural environment, the characteristics of the hazard are known, 
mapped and monitored appropriately. With respect to the vulnerability of objects and 
artefacts what is checked here is whether or not vulnerability assessment has been carried 
out and taken into consideration in planning and risk prevention policies; in the case of 
critical facilities, not only the awareness of systemic vulnerability is addressed but also the 
capacity to reduce it in ordinary maintenance programs should be envisaged and new 
facilities or replacement of existing ones must be considered. With respect to agents, their 
awareness of existing threats and fragilities is assessed as well as their willingness/capacity 
to address them when the hazard does not seem to impede in any particular fashion and 
time has passed since the last catastrophic event. 
In the second set of matrices, the physical propensity to damage of the natural 
environment, objects, critical facilities and people is assessed. All factors that may increase 
the potential damage are considered, including the possibility of enchained effects, both 
between natural hazards (like for example landslides triggered by earthquakes) or between 
natural and vulnerable built systems (like for example na-tech). 
In the third set of matrices, the potential reaction to first level losses is addressed: 
secondary effects in the natural environment, like for instance lahars or debris flows 
consequent to fires denudating entire slopes is considered. With respect to artefacts, urban 
areas and critical facilities, the capacity to keep functioning despite some level of physical 
damage is evaluated, considering the interdependencies among systems and among 
components of vital systems. With respect to agents, the capacity to manage emergencies, 
to endure in time of limited facilities and restricted access to resources and markets is 
considered. 
Finally, in the last set of matrices, the recovery potential is appraised. As for the natural 
environment the ecological resilience is referred to, particularly for those hazards like fire or 
drought that may significantly disrupt the natural environment itself with permanent 
damage. For buildings and cities, the capacity to embed the lessons learnt in the disaster 
while reconstructing artefacts and places is evaluated, as well as the capacity to couple the 
physical reconstruction with the symbolic one, accompanying the healing process of a  
traumatized social system.  
Regarding the latter, access to resources for reconstruction, availability of good 
administrative procedures, fast delivery of compensation are elements that seemed 
particularly relevant to recover in a satisfactory way. Fast access to compensation need not 
to be taken as an isolated indicator: the capacity to couple it to the control of how 
reconstruction will proceed and to what extent pre event vulnerabilities will be addressed is 
equally, if not more, important.  
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In this respect, but as a general consideration for all set of matrices, indicators should not 
be considered as standing alone. Some must be appraised in conjunction with others in 
order to draw a vulnerability and resilience assessment of a given area and environment. 
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Figure 2.5:  Ellipsoid translated into a set of matrices
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Each matrix is in its turn divided in four sections or sub-matrices (see figure 2.6). 
a. The first relates to the natural environment. Indicators that can be found in this part 
respond to three main questions: 
a. Is the available knowledge, including its representation in maps, tables, and other 
forms, sufficient and sufficiently taken into account for decisions at each stage of the 
disaster event? 
b. Are enchained natural hazards considered in the hazard assessment? It should be noted 
that this and the previous question are not aimed at introducing surreptitiously hazard 
aspects into vulnerability analysis. Instead the point that is made here is that a given 
system is less vulnerable if hazards are well known, monitored and early warning 
systems are put in place when relevant. 
c. Finally there may be elements in ecosystems and in environmental settings that are 
particularly vulnerable to the consequence of an extreme event (this is particularly true 
for forest fires and droughts) or to the mitigation measures which are taken to protect 
some other systems (for example lava diverting systems to protect buildings and 
infrastructures that may lead to the destructions of forests).  
b. The second relates to the built environment. In this part of matrices the following 
aspects are considered: 
d. Whether or not buildings have been built according to specific norms or to state of the 
art considering previous lessons learnt from past disasters. On the other hand, the 
position of buildings within hazardous zones has to be assessed. Clearly this is more the 
case of an ―exposure‖ rather than a vulnerability factor. 
e. For public facilities, the question is if there are further vulnerability factors that must be 
accounted for, regarding internal machinery, assets, tools that are fundamental for the 
functioning of a given service. 
f. As for the urban fabric, the point at stake is whether there are some vulnerability 
factors arising at the urban scale, going beyond the simple sum of the vulnerability of 
individual buildings and infrastructures, and which relate to the shape of the urban 
patterns, to the relationship between open and built spaces and with accessibility. 
c. The third regards critical facilities and production sites that are considered separately 
because of their importance in guaranteeing the survival of an urban system and for the well 
being of the potentially affected community. From a theoretical point of view they may be seen 
in conjunction with the vulnerability of the built environment, but from a practical and strategic 
perspective it makes sense to separate them. Critical facilities gain their prominence when 
systemic vulnerability must be appraised. 
d. The last part is devoted to the assessment of social systems and economic 
stakeholders‘ vulnerability. Social systems‘ and agents‘ vulnerability has been considered with 
respect to three main sub-groups: 
g. Individuals vulnerability, related to the level of awareness and preparedness to both 
mitigate and face the consequences of an external stress; 
h. Institutions‘ vulnerability, in which all agencies and organisations that may have a key role 
in both disaster management and disaster avoidance are considered. 
i. Finally economic stakeholders, who, similarly to institutions, may have a leading role in 
shaping vulnerability, in creating coping capacity mechanisms.
ENSURE Project (Contract n° 212045) Del. 4.1 
- 25 - 
System Component Aspect Aspect parameter Criteria for assessment Comments/ case study 
N
a
tu
ra
l 
en
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t 
natural hazards 
 existence and quality of mapping and 
monitoring 
 Specific parameters to permit 
assessment of the aspects that 
have been identified as relevant 
Criteria may range from binary 
(yes/no) to degree 
(corresponding to judgements) or 
to more physical measures (for 
example related to time needed 
for ecosystems to recover) 
 Specific parameters to permit 
assessment of the aspects that have 
been identified as relevant 
enchained events  
assessment of hazards triggered by other 
hazards 
ecosystems  
 fragility to hazards and to mitigation 
measures 
  
    
B
u
il
t 
en
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t residential buildings 
existence and compliance with codes and 
land use planning regulations Specific parameters translating 
into measurable factors the aspect 
to be assessed 
Criteria for multiple 
measurement modality are 
provided; they also depend on 
the scale at which the assessment 
is carried out 
Building codes exist for some 
hazards (particularly seismic) and 
not for others; nevertheless research 
in the field of resistance assessment 
to various types of stress has evolved 
in the last decades 
public facilities 
 existence of vulnerability assessment and 
their consideration on mitigation strategies 
or in emergency plans 
 
     
In
fr
a
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
a
n
d
 
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 s
it
e 
 
critical facilities 
existence of strategies addressing the 
interdependency and the functioning of 
critical facilities under extreme conditions 
Parameters to specify conditions 
at which crucial  lifelines and 
utilities cna keep functioning are 
provided, as well as to address the 
potential for na-tech 
Criteria for assessment are 
provided; proposed criteria 
reflect the need to address the 
interaction across spatial scales 
of such facilities 
Critical facilities and production 
sites are clearly part of the built 
environment. Nevertheless a specific 
group of rows have been dedicated 
to them because of their relevance. production facilities 
existence of plans and procedures to 
maintain production in safe conditions 
given the possibility of an extreme event 
      
S
o
ci
a
l 
sy
st
em
 (
a
g
en
ts
) 
people/ 
individuals 
weaknesses versus preparedness of 
individuals Most of those are qualitative 
parameters to assess the general 
level of preparedness and 
recovery capacity  (or lack of) to 
traumas and discomfort provoked 
by potential disasters  
Criteria for evaluating the 
parameters are provided, taking 
into consideration the different 
spatial scales at which 
individuals, institutions and 
economic agents act 
Whilst the previous groups of 
systems relate more to the "physical 
environment", clearly this one 
embeds the results of decades of 
social sciences research in the field 
of risk and disasters studies 
community and institutions 
weaknesses versus preparedness of 
organisations and institutions 
economic stakeholders 
preparedness and recovery capacity (or lack 
of) economic stakeholders 
 
Figure 2.6:  Matrices structure 
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With the rather broad term of social vulnerability we address several components of societal 
coping capacity, ranging from individuals, to social groups, to communities, to organisations. 
Social vulnerability can be both physical and systemic, as people can be physically injured and 
harmed, but are also vulnerable to the lack of basic services, to the new conditions required by 
evacuation, temporary sheltering, et. In the same vein, organisations, like for example civil 
protection, can be harmed in their assets and personnel, or diminished in their capacity to react 
because of a variety of systemic failures, including the lack of coordination and collaboration 
among different agencies, problems in communication, problems in deciding about matters that 
hold significant juridical and moral challenges. An important distinction that has been 
introduced in WP2 is between social and human capital, intending that vulnerability of both 
should be appraised. For neither of these concepts universally accepted definitions can be 
found. Basically, we can assume that human capital refers to skills, dexterity (physical, 
intellectual, psychological) and judgement capacity, which may be lost during an extreme 
event; on the other side, social capital refers to the value of social networks affecting the 
productivity and capability of individuals and groups to cope and recover from an extreme 
event. 
With economic vulnerability we refer to the response that economic sectors are able (or 
unable) to provide in the aftermath of an extreme event.  Also in the case of economic 
vulnerability, both physical and systemic aspects must be considered. Economic assets can be 
physically damaged, but economic activities are clearly extremely vulnerable to interruption of 
transportation services, to deficient lifelines, etc.... Days without the possibility to work, to 
receive products or to send them to destination constitute a net damage measurable in 
monetary terms. 
As can be seen in figure 2.6, each matrix is organised in columns: 
 The first identifies the system to be assessed; 
 The second identifies the components of the systems; 
 The third clarifies the aspects that have to be considered in the choice of the 
indicator/parameter that may better respond to the question, shown in the third column; 
 The fourth and the fifth determine how indicators/parameters can be measured and 
assessed, upon what criteria and using which tools (maps, diagrams, scores). 
 In the last column references are made either to a case study that was analysed in detail or 
to several cases that are relevant to the specific indicator at stake. 
It has been decided to produce a set of matrices for each ―hazard‖ (see figures 9 to 13). 
Methodologically it seemed useful to check to what extent the individual parameters in each set 
of matrices had to be differentiated upon the expected threat. In fact not only the physical 
response to the stress is so to say dependant on the hazard type of forces and/or pressures 
exerted on structures. Each hazard may vary as far as duration of onset (sudden or creeping), 
location (point or area- shaped) are considered: those aspects must be taken into 
consideration defining monitoring and mapping systems as well as specific mitigation measures 
to be taken before and after the impact.  
This does not mean that a multi-risk perspective is not considered. Actually it is pursued in two 
ways. First, in each set of matrices the possibility of enchained events (hazards triggering other 
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natural or technological threats) is fully appraised. Second, in applications (see WP5), a set of 
matrices related to the hazard threatening a given area can be used in combination. Results of 
applications to the test case studies confirmed that not only the physical vulnerability matrix is 
somehow ―hazard specific‖. An area, a community can be for example very well equipped and 
prepared for some events, while underestimate other hazards to which it is exposed.   
 
2.4 Working with vulnerability and resilience indicators 
As already mentioned, few studies have attempted insofar to clarify how different types of 
vulnerabilities should be accommodated in one integrated study and what process should lead 
to the identification of suitable indicators. Studies in this regard can be found regarding 
sustainability indicators and reports for countries or urban areas (see in particular 
MacLaren1996; Winograd and Farrow, n.d.). Those studies discuss the criteria that should drive 
any effort to develop sustainability indicators. The latter are rather useful for the present 
project, as the concept of sustainability is as difficult to measure as is vulnerability. Both 
require to capture the complex interrelationship among different systems which interact at 
various spatio-temporal scales, in a parallel and even in a cross cutting fashion.  
One important difference seems to distinguish vulnerability from sustainability: while in the 
latter the verification process is extremely difficult, as it requires confronting the state and the 
process toward sustainability with impacts that cannot be fully envisaged, in the case of 
vulnerability indicators, the latter can be confronted once an extreme event occurs with actual 
damages. This is perhaps more true for physical, some kind of systemic, social and economic 
vulnerabilities than for others, in particular resilience parameters. At least in principle, though, 
it is possible to compare the vulnerability assessed before the event and the damage occurring 
afterwards as well as to compare the expected response capacity with the way an actual event 
has been managed. In the meantime the establishment of good vulnerability indicators permits 
to enlighten aspects and types of losses that should be considered and checked in any event 
aftermath, so as to gain a reference value against which the validity of vulnerability indicators 
and of key measures can be evaluated. 
This means that the distinction between different kinds of vulnerability should encourage 
estimating coherently damages, distinguished among physical damage to buildings and 
infrastructures, damage to economic assets and activities, losses to human and social capital, 
secondary consequences in terms of functional failure of fundamental services an activities. 
On the other end, studies which are currently addressing the issue of how to find the best fit 
vulnerability indicators are being developed in the climate change community (see for example 
Eriksen and Kelly, 2007,  Adger et al., 2004). Those studies are particularly enlightening in that 
they drive our attention to the need to capture complex processes and relations among 
indicators, and not just provide a state diagnostic, which may be limited in relevance as far as 
potential usefulness by end users and decision makers. 
Therefore, before entering into the discussion of the validity of each individual parameter that 
has been selected, the criteria that have driven the same choice should be discussed.  
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The latter can be synthetized according to the diagram shown in figure 2.7. Criteria are 
grouped along three main axes:  
 On the x axe, the inherent characteristics of indicators are addressed; 
 On the y axe, the characteristics of the data to be used to assess the indicators value in a 
given place are shown; 
 On the z axe, the usefulness of indicators is appraised. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Criteria to identify and select vulnerability indicators 
  
 
a. With respect to the inherent indicators characteristics, the following have been granted 
importance in the literature. 
 Measurability. We are aware from the work that has been carried out in previous WPs that 
the complexity of phenomena and societal response to natural calamities cannot be fully 
grasped just using indicators. In the meantime we believe that the latter should be intended 
as proxies of complex aspects and systems‘ characteristics, so as to be able to achieve some 
important goals. The first is comparability among places and communities, to establish 
priorities and identify key specificities as well as constant features; the second is the 
possibility to assess, though with large uncertainties, to what extent given policies and 
strategies are able to move the system towards increasing or decreasing vulnerability levels. 
By measurability we do not intend only quantitative measures, but also qualitative, which 
allow constructing some sort of qualitative grouping of values referring to a benchmark or 
value established by previous research and findings. 
 Specificity. Indicators should address as much as possible specific vulnerability aspects 
rather than generic features that do not help in understanding what makes a given area or a 
measurable specific representative verifiable scientific 
validity
cost 
effective
cost of 
collection
spatio-
temporal
availability
quality
data
indicators 
characteristics
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given society more or less prone to suffer the consequences of an external stress. As 
mentioned in a previous deliverable, for example, economic disadvantage is not per se a 
measure of vulnerability: it becomes such when we are able to demonstrate how a poor 
response and low coping capacity is linked to limited access to financial resources and to 
services. 
 Representativeness. Indicators should represent a wide set of cases and situations rather 
than being constructed after each individual case. This requires that indicators are chosen 
after they have been recognised as constant elements in several similar cases or across 
scales and regions or across different risks. Indicators cannot be too tailored to the specific 
case at stake, even though calibration procedures must be carried out; on the other hand, 
they must guarantee a minimal level of generalization, to be supported by statistical 
analysis. While this requirement can be met for physical vulnerability, it is far more 
complicated and thus constitutes more an aim than an established feature, for the less 
investigated aspects, like social, systemic, and economic. 
 As for verifiability, as mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, there is the need to 
tune the search of correlations between indicators and surveyed damages after disasters, so 
as to be able to improve the capacity of indicators to elicit those systems characteristics that 
seem to be the root causes of poor or mediocre response. 
 The features mentioned above can be all mentioned as part of scientific validity, 
particularly when we talk about measurability and verifiability. In the meantime, to be 
scientific, indicators should meet the agreement of a large scientific community, should 
strive toward objectivity, even though we are all aware about the large room for subjective 
and even arbitrary judgement that is inevitably involved in any complex environmental 
assessment requiring to bridge among natural and human systems. Nevertheless, what can 
be required is that indicators be chosen as rigorously as possible, be framed in a transparent 
conceptual framework linking the selected indicators to the notion that must be evaluated 
(in our case vulnerabilities). 
 
b. With respect to data characteristics, the following criteria should be met, while looking for 
vulnerability indicators: 
 Data quality is an important requirement, even though many times only poor quality data 
are available, particularly for indicators that are not part of a long and well established 
tradition. In this case, perhaps it can be recommended that at least the quality of data will 
be made explicit so that assessors can judge to what extent the related indicator can be 
considered reliable. In fact, in designing a general framework, it is rather hard to dismiss all 
indictors for which data are not available in a given country or region good: this would be 
too limiting, also considering the fact that data quality differ enormously from one region to 
another and sometimes even from one municipality to another. Therefore eliminate 
indicators on this basis would diminish the relevance of assessments also in areas where 
data quality is high and the information that can be obtained may be very valuable for 
mitigation purposes. 
 Indicators of vulnerability are required to cover different spatio-temporal scales, when this is 
relevant for the final assessment. In this regard, we should make sure that data are 
available accordingly at the needed spatio-temporal scales. Similarly to what has been 
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said for data quality, this requirement, while valid in principle, can prove to be too limitative 
in some situations and particularly currently, as many data are not available because they 
have never or poorly been considered until now for risk mitigation purposes. As said above, 
the framework and the proposed indicators should set a sort of pathway for future damage 
assessment, to capture the attention of analysts on aspects that have been neglected 
insofar. 
 Availability should be considered also over time, particularly when processes must be 
captured: data that are available only at a given time spot do not permit to follow processes 
or to monitor whether or not a given system is becoming less or more vulnerable over time. 
 
c. The entire method is being designed to guide and orient amidst mitigation strategies. In this 
respect, how useful proposed indicators are in enhancing the latter must be asked as well. 
Usefulness in this regard does constitute an important criterion for indicators selection. 
 The first requirement is that indicators be understandable by users, not only as far as 
terminology is concerned, but also in the way they are measured, reference values selected 
and actually used in the assessment. This is a fundamental requirement; should indicators 
be discussed with concerned stakeholders and be used by them as part of their ordinary 
planning in programming activities (of land use and spatial planning, granting permissions, 
deciding about infrastructures modernization etc.). 
 Indicators should provide directly or indirectly a door towards a set of strategies aimed at 
mitigating present levels of risk. In this regard they should not be only ―descriptive‖ of a 
given situation, but also be linked to potential intervention policies, both as goals to 
be achieved and as factors against which achievements can be monitored and appraised. 
 Perhaps the most important requirement with respect to all those defined insofar, relates to 
what extent proposed indicators permit to distinguish different patterns in a given 
areas, eliciting so called ―pockets‖ or hotspots of vulnerability. In general, it is an important 
requirement that using the indicators, differences among conditions, individual areas, zones, 
parts of community, and communities are sorted out, so that priorities can be decided and 
tailored measures designed. 
 
The ―cost effectiveness‖ requirement has been left at the end to be considered collectively 
across all axes. 
Talking about data collection, cost effective means that a reasonable cost is associated to the 
operations needed to gather the required data. In this respect it is commonly known that 
census data, data derived from national and international databases are often preferred, not 
only because they are cheaper, but also because they guarantee coverage over time and 
across scales, and can be used for comparative purposes. A balance must be obtained between 
the requirement of good quality data, optimised for the needed level of detail, and cost of 
collection.  
Talking about usefulness, indicators that require too complex mechanisms to obtain data, or 
data that are privately hold or covered by secrecy are of limited use.  
Finally cost effectiveness can be measures also from a cognitive viewpoint: indicators that are 
too complex to construct, that require sophisticated and opaque operations to be assessed 
should be carefully considered, given the large uncertainties they may entail. In the meantime, 
ENSURE Project (Contract n° 212045) Del. 4.1 
- 31 - 
also the total number of indicators must be the object of reflection: endless lists of indicators 
are not only difficult to use, but also raise questions about the actual possibility to guarantee 
the other requirements of quality and usefulness that have been described until now. From a 
cognitive point of view, sustainability studies warn against the excessive number of parameters 
that nobody is able to neither handle nor master.  
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2.5  Example of the tailoring of matrices to a specific hazard  
 (forest fires) 
In order to fully grasp the characteristics and the potential of the proposed method, an 
example of the application of the framework to the forest fires case will be illustrated. In the 
first matrix, the mitigation capacity in a given area is examined (table 2.1). In the first section, 
related to the natural environment, the key issues to be considered refers to the existence of 
hazard maps and particularly of early fire detection systems connected efficiently to triggers 
able to mobilize resources for firefighting on the one hand and the protection of the population 
on the other. In the meantime the vegetation characteristics are assessed as far as their 
inflammability is concerned. In the built environment section, the main questions refers to 
whether or not existing vulnerabilities are recognized and addressed in land use plans and in 
urban strategies, related to ordinary residential buildings and to public facilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1.a - Matrix to assess mitigation capacity to forest fires  
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment Paramters value/ categories weight score scale Comments
Hazard maps availability
Maps of areas prone to 
fires; map of inflammability 
of vegetation
yes/no; quality as judged with
respect to international
standards
1
In many cases hazard maps are available;
the point though is also to understand to
what extent they are fit to support
mitigaton strategies
Do hazard assessment 
consider climate change
binary yes/no 0,5
Available knowledge updating Hazard maps updating Frequency of updating
every 2 years and after each
event/rarely 
0,5
technical monitoring 
systems linked to operation 
centre
yes/no 1
permanent staff dispaced in 
critical areas for direct 
monitoring and immediate 
intervention
yes/no 0,5
Connection of monitoring devices to 
modelling systems
Availability, quality of early 
detection systems and 
models
binary; quality of early 
detection and propagation 
estimation models
yes/no; models tailored to the
geographical context/not
tailored
0,5
Technologies and models to predict
phenomena must be tailored to the
sepcific context to be effective
Structural defence measures
Existence of defenses for 
breaking the fire lines
binary yes/no 1
At 
municipal/ 
county level
Vulnerability assessment of 
exposed built stock
binary; updating frequency
yes/no; every time new
building permits are given/only
occasionally
1
Risk maps and scenarios, 
including enchained events
binary; year of production yes/no 1
Vulnerability and exposure 
assessment considered in 
ordinary plans (example 
land use)
binary; mode of inclusion
yes/no; only 
formally/substantially with 
limitations and specific 
requirements
1
In most cases vulnerability assessment
are not available; but even in cases where
they are it is important to check if they
are considered in planning decisions
Building codes/rules binary; updated
yes/no; rules efficacy checked
after each event/rarely tested
0,5
At national / 
regional 
levels
Property regime of houses
owned houses versus 
tenants
owners ow < 50%/ ow > 80% 0,5
In literature it is hold that private owners
may be more willing to take mitigation
actions
Traditional building practice 
based on hazard knowledge
binary; capacity to re-
produce traditional 
techniques correctly
yes/no; judgement about the
capacity to conform to the
"code of practice"
0,5
Maintenance of fire 
suppression devices and 
clearing vegetation around 
houses
binary yes/no 1
Land use plans embedding 
risk mitigation and 
vulnerability reduction
binary; specific indications 
for vulenrable locations
yes/no; specific rules for the
wildland-urban interface and for
accessibility
1
This parameter has to be considered
together with the previous ones on quality
of hazard maps and on inclusion of
vulnerability assessments
If previous paramters yes,
then Implementation
capacity
binary; frequency of
inspections; trained
personnel for inspections
yes/no; every year/seldom 1
Implementation is a crucial aspect,
inorder to translate mitigation decisions
into risk reduction actions
If previous paramters yes, 
then Integration to other 
measures (insurance)
binary yes/no 1
Insurance per se can be even 
counterproductive in terms of mitigation, 
unless premium is set considering actual 
risk
Vulnerability assessment of 
critical infrastructure
binary, particularly for roads 
and water for firefighting
yes/no 1
Maintenance programs 
embedding mitigation
binary yes/no 1
New projects based on 
hazard/risk assessment 
binary yes/no 1
Level of coordination among 
stakeholders
degree low/medium/high 1
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites to wildfire
binary yes/no 1
Retrofitting measures for 
existing production sites
binary yes/no 1
New projects based on risk 
assessment 
binary yes/no 1
Na-tech explicitly 
accounted for in hazardous 
installations emergency 
plans
binary
yes/no; expert judgement on
quality
1
Enchained hazards are considered in the
framework both natural (in the natural
system part) and technological (here)
Risk perception/ awareness Degree strong/average/low 0,5
Reliance on institutional 
firefighting capabilities
Degree strong/average/low 1
Felt responsibility for 
firefighting and fire 
mitigation
Degree strong/average/low 1
It is in general important to understand if 
the community feels shared responsibility 
with government and agencies in risk 
mitigation
Tools and plans to 
guarantee early warning 
reach the communities
Binary yes/no 1
Here early warning are considered in the 
wider perspective, considering whether or 
not there are the conditions for their 
effective communication to the potentially 
affected ones
Individual preparedness 
regarding specific self 
protective measures; 
regarding measures 
included in emergency 
plans
hydrant available/not available; 
escaping routes known/not 
considered
1
Contingency plans for 
firefighting
binary yes/no 1
Effectiveness of measures 
included in contingency 
plans
degree strong/medium/low 1
Participation in 
development and 
prevention/mitigation 
strategies
degree strong/medium/low 0,5
binary; frequency
yes/no; every year/only 
seldom
0,5
tailored to the community 
features
yes/generic 1
Inclusion in school 
programs
yes/no 1
Economic access to 
resources for firefighting
degree vewry low/low/average/high 1
Coordination and 
cooperation among 
institutions in charge of risk 
prevention/ mitigation 
degree strong/medium/low 1
For critical infrastructures it is not likely
that complete substitution will take place
just for risk prevention purposes; therefore
it is crucial that in future plans and
maintenance programs prevention will be
one of the criteria for designing and
repairing/updating
Natural hazards identification and 
mapping
N
a
tu
ra
l 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
Natural Hazards
Hazard monitoring systems
Existence, distribution and 
quality of monitoring 
networks
At both 
municipal 
and county 
or regional 
levels
At municipal 
/ county 
level
At 
municipal/  
county level
At county/ 
regional or 
national 
levels
County/ 
regional level
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Inclusion of vulnerability and exposure 
assessments in land use plans
B
u
il
t 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
Rules and tools for 
risk  mitigation
Availability, quality and efficacy of 
mitigation rules
People/individuals
Capacity of individuals living in prone 
hazard areas of coping with hazardous 
events, which largely depends on the 
perception and awareness of risk 
conditions before the event occurs.
S
o
c
ia
l 
s
y
s
te
m
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a
g
e
n
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)
In
fr
a
s
tr
u
c
tu
re
 a
n
d
 p
ro
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 s
it
e
s
Existence of vulnerability 
assessments for production sites; 
consideration of na-techs
Production sites
Existence of vulnerability 
assessments for critical facilities; level 
of consideration of vulnerability in 
programs regarding critical facilities
Critical 
infrastructures
Community and 
Institutions
Municipal/  
county 
levels
Municipal/    
county level
Municipal/    
county level
County/   
regional level
Involvement of a community into 
decision-making processes related to 
risk prevention and mitigation, the 
capacity of Instituions of improving risk 
awareness 
Education programs & 
media campaigns 
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Table 2.1.b - Matrix to assess mitigation capacity to forest fires 
In the third section devoted to critical infrastructures, the main factor to be considered refers 
certainly to the existence and efficiency of water systems to be used in case of need; in the 
meantime the potential for na-tech in industries is addressed as well. In the last section, the 
preparedness of individuals and institutions is appraised, identifying parameters that ―measure‖ 
the availability of extinguishers, masks as far as individuals are concerned, and presence of 
well equipped and trained volunteering firefighters. As it can be seen in the table, two columns 
are provided for weights and scores. The first represent the relative importance of parameters, 
as derived from literature and expert judgment; the second translates into a score (according 
to an arbitrary system that assign for example 5 to low vulnerability and 1 to high or viceversa) 
the evaluation carried out in the are of relevance.  
  
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment Paramters value/ categories weight score scale Comments
Hazard maps availability
Maps of areas prone to 
fires; map of inflammability 
of vegetation
yes/no; quality as judged with
respect to international
standards
1
In many cases hazard maps are available;
the point though is also to understand to
what extent they are fit to support
mitigaton strategies
Do hazard assessment 
consider climate change
binary yes/no 0,5
Available knowledge updating Hazard maps updating Frequency of updating
every 2 years and after each
event/rarely 
0,5
technical monitoring 
systems linked to operation 
centre
yes/no 1
permanent staff dispaced in 
critical areas for direct 
monitoring and immediate 
intervention
yes/no 0,5
Connection of monitoring devices to 
modelling systems
Availability, quality of early 
detection systems and 
models
binary; quality of early 
detection and propagation 
estimation models
yes/no; models tailored to the
geographical context/not
tailored
0,5
Technologies and models to predict
phenomena must be tailored to the
sepcific context to be effective
Structural defence measures
Existence of defenses for 
breaking the fire lines
binary yes/no 1
At 
municipal/ 
county level
Vulnerability assessment of 
exposed built stock
binary; updating frequency
yes/no; every time new
building permits are given/only
occasionally
1
Risk maps and scenarios, 
including enchained events
binary; year of production yes/no 1
Vulnerability and exposure 
assessment considered in 
ordinary plans (example 
land use)
binary; mode of inclusion
yes/no; only 
formally/substantially with 
limitations and specific 
requirements
1
In most cases vulnerability assessment
are not available; but even in cases where
they are it is important to check if they
are considered in planning decisions
Building codes/rules binary; updated
yes/no; rules efficacy checked
after each event/rarely tested
0,5
At national / 
regional 
levels
Property regime of houses
owned houses versus 
tenants
owners ow < 50%/ ow > 80% 0,5
In literature it is hold that private owners
may be more willing to take mitigation
actions
Traditional building practice 
based on hazard knowledge
binary; capacity to re-
produce traditional 
techniques correctly
yes/no; judgement about the
capacity to conform to the
"code of practice"
0,5
Maintenance of fire 
suppression devices and 
clearing vegetation around 
houses
binary yes/no 1
Land use plans embedding 
risk mitigation and 
vulnerability reduction
binary; specific indications 
for vulenrable locations
yes/no; specific rules for the
wildland-urban interface and for
accessibility
1
This parameter has to be considered
together with the previous ones on quality
of hazard maps and on inclusion of
vulnerability assessments
If previous paramters yes,
then Implementation
capacity
binary; frequency of
inspections; trained
personnel for inspections
yes/no; every year/seldom 1
Implementation is a crucial aspect,
inorder to translate mitigation decisions
into risk reduction actions
If previous paramters yes, 
then Integration to other 
measures (insurance)
binary yes/no 1
Insurance per se can be even 
counterproductive in terms of mitigation, 
unless premium is set considering actual 
risk
Vulnerability assessment of 
critical infrastructure
binary, particularly for roads 
and water for firefighting
yes/no 1
Maintenance programs 
embedding mitigation
binary yes/no 1
New projects based on 
hazard/risk assessment 
binary yes/no 1
Level of coordination among 
stakeholders
degree low/medium/high 1
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites to wildfire
binary yes/no 1
Retrofitting measures for 
existing production sites
binary yes/no 1
New projects based on risk 
assessment 
binary yes/no 1
Na-tech explicitly 
accounted for in hazardous 
installations emergency 
plans
binary
yes/no; expert judgement on
quality
1
Enchained hazards are considered in the
framework both natural (in the natural
system part) and technological (here)
Risk perception/ awareness Degree strong/average/low 0,5
Reliance on institutional 
firefighting capabilities
Degree strong/average/low 1
Felt responsibility for 
firefighting and fire 
mitigation
Degree strong/average/low 1
It is in general important to understand if 
the community feels shared responsibility 
with government and agencies in risk 
mitigation
Tools and plans to 
guarantee early warning 
reach the communities
Binary yes/no 1
Here early warning are considered in the 
wider perspective, considering whether or 
not there are the conditions for their 
effective communication to the potentially 
affected ones
Individual preparedness 
regarding specific self 
protective measures; 
regarding measures 
included in emergency 
plans
hydrant available/not available; 
escaping routes known/not 
considered
1
Contingency plans for 
firefighting
binary yes/no 1
Effectiveness of measures 
included in contingency 
plans
degree strong/medium/low 1
Participation in 
development and 
prevention/mitigation 
strategies
degree strong/medium/low 0,5
binary; frequency
yes/no; every year/only 
seldom
0,5
tailored to the community 
features
yes/generic 1
Inclusion in school 
programs
yes/no 1
Economic access to 
resources for firefighting
degree vewry low/low/average/high 1
Coordination and 
cooperation among 
institutions in charge of risk 
prevention/ mitigation 
degree strong/medium/low 1
For critical infrastructures it is not likely
that complete substitution will take place
just for risk prevention purposes; therefore
it is crucial that in future plans and
maintenance programs prevention will be
one of the criteria for designing and
repairing/updating
Natural hazards identification and 
mapping
N
a
tu
ra
l 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
Natural Hazards
Hazard monitoring systems
Existence, distribution and 
quality of monitoring 
networks
At both 
municipal 
and county 
or regional 
levels
At municipal 
/ county 
level
At 
municipal/  
county level
At county/ 
regional or 
national 
levels
County/ 
regional level
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Inclusion of vulnerability and exposure 
assessments in land use plans
B
u
il
t 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
Rules and tools for 
risk  mitigation
Availability, quality and efficacy of 
mitigation rules
People/individuals
Capacity of individuals living in prone 
hazard areas of coping with hazardous 
events, which largely depends on the 
perception and awareness of risk 
conditions before the event occurs.
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a
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u
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u
c
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e
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Existence of vulnerability 
assessments for production sites; 
consideration of na-techs
Production sites
Existence of vulnerability 
assessments for critical facilities; level 
of consideration of vulnerability in 
programs regarding critical facilities
Critical 
infrastructures
Community and 
Institutions
Municipal/  
county 
levels
Municipal/    
county level
Municipal/    
county level
County/   
regional level
Involvement of a community into 
decision-making processes related to 
risk prevention and mitigation, the 
capacity of Instituions of improving risk 
awareness 
Education programs & 
media campaigns 
ENSURE Project (Contract n° 212045) Del. 4.1 
- 34 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2: Extract of the matrix to assess physical vulnerability to forest fires 
The next column is devoted to the spatial scale at which the parameter is evaluated. In some 
cases such scale has to be decided depending on the area to be covered and the context at 
stake. If the problem is assess the vulnerability of an entire province (as will be seen in the Ilia 
case in Greece, see WP5) the county or even the regional level must be taken for most 
parameters; if the focus restricts on one sub-area, a municipal scale can be addressed. For 
some parameters, like for example law and norms provision, that have clearly a relevant 
impact on mitigation, a national level must be taken, or regional in those states that grant 
legislative power to regions regarding the topic of interest (in this case protection against 
fires). 
  
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment Paramters value/categories weight score scale Comments
Surface fuels
Only needle or leaf litter on the
ground; sparse low vegetation; tall
dense phyrgana or shrubs
1
Existence and cover of tall 
tree crowns 
No tree crowns; tree crown cover
of 40%; tree crown cover >=
40%
0,5
Type of trees (see next 
page for details)
according to the classification
provided by Dimitrakopoulos
and Papaioannou, 2001
1
Average vulnerability at the 
municipal scale, considering 
settlements(rural)  or urban 
parts
Considering parameters 
provided in the attached 
specific  table
Low-medium-high vulnerability 1
This parameter 
makes sense at 
an urban 
/county scale, 
Historic sites (archeological) 
and buildings (monuments 
and museums) in the 
hazardous areas
Binary; extent and relevance
no/yes; dimension; 
minor/relevant/very relevant
1
Built pattern (follwoing 
Lampin-Maiillet et al., 2009)
Building density and 
proximity is an indicator for 
assessing  potential sources 
of ignition and surface to be 
cleared from vegetation
very dense; dense, scattered; 
isolated
1
This parameter 
makes sense at 
an urban 
/county scale, 
The quoted study showed that sparse
buildings are ore likely than grouped
to create multiple sources of ignition
water system pressure
normal/ too low pressure for
hydrants
1
self eater tank available/not available 1
roads interaction with fuel
large road sections in open
zones/in the middle of fuel
areas
1
Both a the 
scale of the 
assessment 
and at larger 
scale
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites
as for buildings, but 
including attention to 
storage of hazmat
structurally vulnerable/low
vulenrability; large storage/no
storage
1
At a 
muncipal/       
county scale
Vulnerability due to 
dependency on lifelines
depending on the degree of 
dependance upon external 
vulnerable lifelines
self eater tank available/not
available
1
At a 
muncipal/       
county scale
Sparse population
ratio between population 
living in isolated buildings 
and remote settlements 
and total population
r <5%; r > 20% 1
At the 
municipal/      
county scale.
This parameter would make sense
also at a regional scale analysis,
but adopting statistical techniques
and mapping
self protection means
hydrants at home/lack of 
hydrants
1
self protection against 
smoke
availability of masks/lack of 1
Age; mobility impairment, 
other impairment
difficulties to comply with 
evacuation orders; 
difficulties in escaping
> 65; number of handicapped 1
Distance from firefighting 
resources
time of arrival within 30 min; > 1 hour 1
Availability of trained 
personnel
professional training in the 
community
firefighters 
(professional+volunteers)/only 
professional
1
N
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Production sites
Critical 
infrastructures
People/individuals
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
B
u
il
t 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
Natural ecosystems 
Fragility of natural ecosystems to 
hazard(s)
land cover inflammability 
Those paramters 
clearly have to 
be assessed at 
least at a county 
scale
This table looks at a
municipal/county level, while some
paramters clearly make sense only
at larger scales. In the meantime
for assessing the vulnerability of
individual buildings a more local
scale must addressed (see next
table)
Community and 
Instituions
Factors that may lead to large number 
of victims
Factors that make production sites 
vulnerable (including na-tech potential)
Factors that make critical 
infrastructures vulenrable (mainly 
lifelines)
Factors that may lead to injuries and 
fatalities
It is important in the methodology
to be as specific as possible, so
the generic assessment of the
availability of means and personnel
for mitigating the impact are
tailored to the sepcific threats
against which the population must
be protected.
At a 
muncipal/       
county scale
At the 
municipal/      
county scale
In the case of forest fires clearly the 
vulnerability of the natural
ecosystems is crucial (type of
vegetation, density, etc.)
Factors that make the urban fabric 
and public facilities vulnerable to the 
stress
Preparedness
Vulnerability assessment of 
critical infrastructure
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Table 2.3: Extract of the matrix to assess systemic vulnerability to forest fires 
The mitigation table for forest fires has been provided integral, comprising all parameters that 
have been selected; in the next tables, only an extract of the tables will be provided to 
facilitate readability of the individual parameters and comments.  
Regarding the physical vulnerability (table 2.2), the main aspects that have to be considered 
are clearly: 
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters value/ 
categories weight score scale Comments
Natural ecosystems soil deterioration increase of erosion 
<= 30 %; 30 x x <
50%; x>= 50%
1
landslide hazard
degree of increase of 
landslide potential based on 
survey and exprt judgement 
low/medium/high 1
Existence of public facilities 
and resources to face the 
emergency
Availability of movable fire 
fighting equipment or of an 
automatic fire-fighting 
network (E3)
yes/no 1
At the county or regional level
Buildings density and 
proximity  (follwoing Lampin-
Maiillet et al., 2009)- total 
perimeter to be protected
very dense; dense, 
scattered; isolated
1
At the 
municipal/count
y level
Various studies attempted to assess
the vulnerability of the urban fabric
based on features like house density,
totla perimeter to be cleared by
vegetation and total surface to be
protected in case of fire
Type of roads serving
the various settlements
Plain roads/mountain 
roads
Signs in roads and streets
(names, numbers, etc.)
yes/no Local/municipal 
level
existence of public facilities in
the area
yes/no
expected travel time t > 30 min/ t <= 30 min
road network to public 
facilities
as for accessibility to 
vulnerale areas
Yes/no; in sufficient
number/insufficient
1
Existence of a swimming
pool or a water tank of
more than 3 m3 in the
plot
0,5
Degree of dependance of 
production sites from 
lifelines
water for fighting
existence of tanks
and devices for
firefighting
Accessibility to the plant 
and to markets
redundancy; quality of 
roads; usability; expected 
increase in travel time
as for roads network
to vulnerable areas
Contingency plan for na-
tech
binary yes/no
Business continuity plan binary yes/no
Trust in information 
provisers
binary yes/no 1
Clearly this can 
be assessed 
only at regional 
scale
Apart in some very special context
where the local perception and
situation is different from the
regional/national
Tenants, landowners and 
neighbours have been 
trained in fire-fighting
binary and frequency of 
training
yes/no; every x 
months/only 
occasionally
1
Voluntary fire fighers binary; number
yes/no; number 
/neighborhood
1
If previous yes, then 
Training
degree of training and 
means availability to 
volunteers
good/average/low 1
Presence of impaired 
groups (elderly, sick 
persons, etc.)
binary; number and 
accessibility to leaving 
areas
yes/no; 
numbr/neighborhood 
and accessibility
1
Existance of contingency 
plan fro threats at stake
binary; date of last 
production or update
yes/no; recent/>2 
years with no updating
1
If previous yes, Training 
using the contingency plan
binary; frequency of training
yes/no; every 
year/only occasionally
1
Capacity to run economy 
and respond to crises
degree yes/partially/no
1
Capacity to invest in 
recovery and take 
preventive actions
Binary or degree
Yes/no or 
none/partial/high
1
At a muncipal 
or county scale
At acounty or 
regional scale
At a county or 
regional scale
At the county 
or regional 
scale
At both 
muncipal and 
county or 
regional level
At the county or 
regional scale
At the muncipal 
and county level
At the 
muncipal, 
county and 
regional level 
depending on 
the focus of the 
assessment
Accessibility to vulnerable 
areas
Availability of water for
firefighting
Factors that may reduce coping 
capacity during crisis
People/individuals
Accessibility to public 
facilities
Existance of lifelines
Roads characteristics
Factors that make buildings, the 
urban fabric and public facilities 
vulnerable to losses
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
B
u
il
t 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
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Factors that may lead to halting 
production
Production sites
Factors that make critical 
infrastructures stop functioning
Fragility of ecosystems  to  
potential secondary effects of 
hazard(s)
S
o
c
ia
l 
 s
y
s
te
m
 (
a
g
e
n
ts
)
Critical 
infrastructures
Factors that may hamper 
effective crisis management
Community and 
Instituions
Economic 
stakeholders
Economic stakeholders 
preparedness to face crises
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 Inflammability of vegetation, buildings and infrastructures. In this regard some studies 
highlighted that the pattern of the urban fabric is important to determine ignition points and 
frequency. For example Lampin Maillet et al. (2008) show that sparse and isolated buildings 
pattern produces more ignition points than dense pattern, based on their studies of fires in 
Southern France; 
 As for the built environment, important is also adherence to rules of construction and 
maintenance of open spaces that reduce flammability and avoid fast development of fires; 
 As for critical infrastructures, the conditions of roads, their interaction with flammable 
areas (crossing forests for example) are fundamental parameters to be accounted for; 
 Addressing social and individual preparedness, self protection means and adequate 
behavior (which requires prior preparedness) determine to a significant extent survival rates, 
particularly in extremely severe fires. 
As for systemic vulnerability (see table 2.3), all factors that may worsen the response to 
emergency are considered, as the possibility of soil erosion and landslides as secondary effects 
of slopes denudation. Furthermore, conditions that favor or constrain successful firefighting are 
considered. Therefore accessibility factors within and towards potentially stricken areas become 
crucial elements to evaluate how fast and effectively it will be possible to evacuate on the one 
hand and for firefighting and rescue teams to arrive to the burnt zones. In this case the same 
parameter considered in the physical vulnerability table, buildings density and proximity is used 
to determine what will be the total perimeter to be protected by firefighters. Clearly it is both 
easier to reach and to protect dense built block with respect to a large number of isolated 
buildings sparse over large areas. 
Finally regarding resilience (table 2.4), the capacity of the natural environment to ―bounce 
back‖ has an ecological meaning: some species may recover faster than others, the extent to 
which plants have been damaged condition post fire recovery. In literature it is hold that also 
post fire management (for example types of plants selected for re-vegetation and availability of 
maps and pictures to document pre-fire situation) are crucial to determine what will occur in 
the affected area. The resilience of the natural environment has repercussion also on economic 
sectors like tourism and agriculture, for which the integrity of landscape is an essential 
condition for production.  
What has to be taken into account in both the post and the pre-event phases is that to a 
certain extent successful fire prevention practices may lead to more severe and devastating 
extreme fires once the latter finally occur. In this regard, parameters attempt to capture the 
need for judicious practices that acknowledge the fact that fires are natural events and are part 
of the ecosystem of forests and woods. 
As for other natural hazards, the ―hazard‖ is part of the natural functioning of the environment, 
while it becomes a disaster when vulnerable communities and settlements are exposed. 
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Table 2.4: Extract of the matrix to assess resilience in areas exposed to forest fires 
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Paramters values/ 
categories weight score scale Comments
Fire recovery
Post fire vegetation re-
growth
South facing slopes/North
facing slopes
0,5
A post vegetation fire study took place
in Mount Carmel, Israel. Unlike the
study from Delgado, the recovery of
vegetation was seen to occur better in
north face slopes in contrast with south
facing slopes. This seems to be a
dominant assumption on the fire
comunity. The choice for 4 and 2
vulnerability scores reflect that the
difference is not very extreme, as
highlithed by the study. 
plants used for reforestation
use of endemic species for 
reforestation/use of fast 
growing vegetation
1
This parameter is very country specific.
In theory salvage harvesting can indeed
lead to decreased regeneration after a
fire, but harvesting can also lead to
lower fuel loads at the stand and
therefore make the fire less intense... It
is a tricky issue. Maybe one can focus
instead on post burnt fire policies. How
is the reforestation of burnd areas
planned? do they use endemic species
or do they relly on fast growing
vegetation (in general less resiliant and
more prone to fires)? 
Structural and non structural recovery 
measures
availability of maps and 
pictures to document 
regeneration
binary yes/no 0,5
Usually studies make use of satellite
pictures to document changes in post-
fire vegetation. 
Existance of plans and 
provisions to encourage 
mitigation in buildings and 
surrounding zones
binary yes/no 1
National/           
regional level
Difficulties in vegetation clearance
around buildings due to ownership
obstacles
Level of integration of 
physical reconstruction with 
community healing 
processes
Room is given for 
interpreting in the 
new/restored setting the 
meaning of the destruction 
(After Valen and 
Campanella, 2005)
High/low 0,5
muncipal/    
county level
Existence and strength of 
norms prohibiting building in 
burnt areas
binary; degree of 
compliance/inspection 
capability
yes/no; low/high
national/ 
regional level
This is clearly a crucial resilience
factor, very specific to forest fires that
are many times man made with the
objective to create conditions for
urbanisation
Water system for 
firefighting 
level of improvement after 
disaster
low/high 1
In site devices for quick 
survey of damaged parts
binary yes/no 1
Availability of spare 
materials for fast repairs
binary yes/no 1
Availability of personnel for 
repairs
binary yes/no 1
Existence of protocols to 
proceed with repairs 
requiring inter-lifelines 
interventions
binary yes/no 0,5
county/  
regional level
Relevance of the area as a 
tourist attraction
degree low/average/high 1
Activities depending on the 
existence of woods
binary yes/no 0,5
Economic sectors
Diversified or concentrated 
on few sectors
Few/many different
economic sectors in the area
1
Availability of private 
resources for recovery
degree yes/no
Access to insurance binary; coverage
yes/no; percentage of 
coverage
Age structure
Aging population; low 
fertility rates
indexes
Local condition of aged 
population
autonomous/not 
autonomous; relatively 
healthy/not healthy
autonomous/not 
autonomous; relatively 
healthy/not healthy
Employment rate degree high/medium/low
Trust in institution degree
high/medium/low (from 
sociological surveys when 
available)
Transparency in funds 
allocation
Existance of public 
information and 
independent control 
mechanisms
yes/no
regional 
/national level
Long term vision
Existance of strategic 
development/land use plans
yes/no
regional/ 
county level
It is deemed very important to have a
long term vision to strenghten
resilience, that will consider the
development in a longer time horizon,
including the possibility of further
hazard impacts
Insurance coverage binary; coverage Yes/no;percentage
Dependance of economic 
actors on loss of 
environmental goods
Prevalent tourist acitvity; 
agricultural activity
percentage
Clearly in the case of forest fires the
burnt areas constituted a unique
landscape that until recovered will not
be available for activities strongly
dependent on it
Those parameters as well as others
that are not reported in this sample are
aimed at assessing the strenght,
cohesion and recovery capability of the
local comunity affected by fires
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Natural ecosystems 
Community
Affected community's resilience to the 
consequences of a catastrophe
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Urban fabric/built environment capacity 
to recover reducing pre-event 
vulnerability
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Transparency, reliability and 
trustability of institutions in charge of 
reconstruction
Critical 
infrastructures
People/individuals
People's resilience in the face of the  
catastrophe induced trauma
Institutions
Ecosystems capacity  to recover from 
damages
Economic 
stakeholders
Capacity and willingness of 
stakeholders  to reinvest in affected 
areas
Availability of tools to recover 
production sites rapidly and at low 
costs
Economic activities
Availability of tools to recover critical 
infrastructures rapidly and at low costs
municipal/ 
county/regional 
level
At a municipal/  
county level
Municipal/ 
county level
municipal/  
county level
Municipal/  
county level
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Considering the resilience of communities and population, an important aspect to be 
considered in reconstruction after a devastating event like a fire, which causes in many cases 
the total loss of people‘s belonging and memorabilia, is the cohesion of society, the capacity to 
develop a long term vision and the positive conditions for permitting healing of trauma and not 
just physical rehabilitation. 
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3 Critical discussion of the integrated framework  
(largely based on first application to the test case 
study areas) 
 
The application of the framework to the test case study areas (see WP5) provided a crucial 
return in terms of acquired experience and highlighted both strengths and weaknesses of the 
methodology. 
The framework is at a stage of a prototype; some difficulties in applying it to concrete cases 
derive from this inherent character. On the other end, the experiences gained in applying the 
framework evidenced some points that could be hardly raised based on theoretical perspectives 
only. The most relevant relates to the need to include the framework into a larger assessment 
procedure, where the fulfillment of the matrices is still the most relevant part, but not the 
exclusive one. 
In other terms, one must consider the evolution (both in time and  ??? as far as research 
efforts must be taken into account) of the framework and the related matrices. First a general 
scheme has been produced, in the attempt to capture the most relevant components, features, 
issues raised in the discussion about vulnerability and resilience. Second, the general scheme 
was specified, producing matrices in which parameters and criteria to appraise vulnerability and 
resilience were tailored to distinct hazards.  
Indicators received a specific connotation, showing what were the main features and aspects 
making a given environment (natural/built/social) more or less prone to damage and more or 
less capable to mitigate and/or recover. Such tailoring entailed a choice which is somehow 
questionable, as reference to individual hazards is explicitly made while the ambition to be 
general/comprehensive/multirisk is temporarily abandoned in favor of a more traditional kind of 
approach. The pro of such choice though, has been the potential of exploring vulnerability and 
resilience across several cases, defining in a much more precise and concrete manner what 
makes a given environment more or less fragile.  
Still, even with this level of specification, matrices remain at a ―general‖ level, somehow 
independent from specific contexts. And here the issue of how to adapt the assessment to the 
understanding of the context pops out in a very relevant fashion. Application to test case study 
areas evidenced that a clear cut straightforward application of the methodology, and in 
particular of the framework and the matrices, is not possible. One may even say that this could 
have been expected since the beginning and that actually an obvious process of tailoring and 
adaptation, this time to the context at stake, had necessarily to be forecasted. In any case, 
testing showed in a very evident way this need. Therefore a clarification of how to use the 
framework, even at an experimental stage, before moving from the prototype towards a more 
ready-to-use tool has to be provided (see paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3).  
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3.1  Quantitative or qualitative vulnerability and resilience 
assessments: a misplaced question 
 
As stated at the beginning of this paper, and as explicitly stated since the beginning of the 
Ensure project proposal, one of the main needs felt by the partners was to integrate both 
―hard‖ and ―social‖ sciences issues to assess vulnerability and resilience. 
―Hard‖ sciences provide information and insight to understand why given infrastructures and 
structures fail under given stress, be it the physical stress of the natural agent or the 
malfunctioning provoked by a certain level of physical damage to critical systems or 
components. Social sciences in their turn provide explanations and example showing how and 
why given communities are better equipped than others to face natural calamities. This has to 
do with the physical and functional consistency of assets, but also, in a meaningful portion, to 
less ―tangible‖ facts, entailing social cohesion, robustness of economy, cultural and human 
resources. The Ensure project started its own research path from the recognition that 
mitigation policies must take into account the ―two‖ sides of the coin. (A coin is certainly a 
simplification, as we should talk about a multifaceted prism, yet it can be accepted for the 
purpose of the following discussion). 
Conditions for better overcoming a crisis, a calamity depend on several circumstances and 
conditions that partially have to do with material components and partially with social, 
institutional and economic arrangements. Not to mention the fact that the ―hard‖ and the ―soft‖ 
sides are not separated, they continually interact and such interaction produces fragilities and 
strengths. Therefore, any attempt to assess the response capacity to an extreme event, must 
consider both sides of the coin and possibly their mutual interconnection.  
At the end, as stated by Winograd (n.d.), the goal of vulnerability assessments should be 
«turning the data into relevant information and information into action».  
Be it in the form of a list of factors to be considered or in more complicated schemes, as the 
one proposed in Ensure, an agreement has to be reached (even a temporary one) between – 
to simplify- social and ―hard‖ scientists/engineers.  
The very first level is mutual respect and recognition of importance of matters which are 
studied by the other discipline; the second step is to face the objective difficulties and 
obstacles in making the coexistence of two different mindsets and models of thinking and 
analyzing. 
In this respect, in the vast literature devoted to this certainly not new issue, a particularly 
insightful perspective is offered by Ginzburg in an article written in ―History Workshop‖ in 1980. 
In the article, he discusses the main obstacles to mutual understanding and recognition, 
referring to the irreducible difficulties whenever the ―human‖ component has to be considered, 
something which sounds certainly familiar to most ―hard‖ scientists working in the field of risk. 
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Whilst a couple of decades of interdisciplinary research have set the floor for a different 
attitude with respect to the past, and as more mature positions have emerged recently, 
overcoming complete lack of communication and disciplinary barriers, there are still key issues 
that require further reflection and settling of divergent positions. This is deemed to be relevant 
not only to improve communication and knowledge exchange between ―social‖ and ―hard‖ 
scientists to limit the discussion to the ―big‖ categories (whereas we are perfectly conscious 
that large gaps exist also within each ―block‖) but also to answer a key question for the 
project: are vulnerability and resilience assessment ―science‖? And, as a next question, going 
after a similar one posed by scholars in sustainability ―science‖ (Bell and Morse, 2008): are 
vulnerability and resilience assessment ―good‖ or ―bad‖ science or even ―bad transposition of 
otherwise good science‖? 
Ginzburg suggests that there are two main irreducible differences between what he calls 
Galilean and social sciences: on the one hand the treatment of the individual as opposed to the 
typical and therefore treatable in statistical (quantitative) terms and the capacity to predict the 
behavior of a variable, the evolution of a given phenomena. 
As for the first point, clearly social sciences cannot avoid studying the individual, without losing 
critical information and understanding; attempts made by some social scientists to get closer to 
hard sciences resulted in rather ―meager‖ results according to Ginzburg. In the meantime the 
author asks whether or not we can get to a situation where the understanding of the individual 
is somehow ―scientific‖, if conjectures that characterize ―soft‖ sciences can be as rigorous as 
quantitative modeling. Without entering into the much wider debate of the so called ―post 
normal science‖, in which for example Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) demonstrated that even 
―hard‖ sciences have undergone a significant mutation that has brought them quite far from 
the Galilean model, the point made by Ginzburg is still relevant. He points at the divergent 
mindsets, according to which ―hard‖ and social scientists judge method and rigor, which still 
constitute a formidable obstacle to working together. 
In the case of vulnerability and resilience studies, we may even go further and state that the 
point is not just making the two fields communicate, but actually develop possibly good science 
at the border of the two fields (and the many more disciplines within each) to address issues 
that are in the meantime material, physical and human, social. Continuing referring to 
Ginzburg‘s article, resilience and vulnerability assessments resemble to a ―medicine‖ type of 
effort, where classifications of diseases (in our case classes/categories of vulnerability) and the 
symptoms to be considered (the indicators) and how to judge their relevance and severity 
(criteria for assessment) are at stake. Within the framework, some indicators respond more to 
a Galilean type of science, when statistical methods and sufficient data can be used for their 
assessment (typically most of physical vulnerability parameters and some systemic in the sense 
adopted by the project). Many others (typically all those referring to social systems) will remain 
at a ―classificatory level‖. The point is therefore whether or not the two types of assessments 
can or even should coexist in the same framework. We think that even though in a rather 
imperfect way, the framework provides an acceptable level of integrated vision of the different 
aspects that must be taken into account in vulnerability and resilience assessments, without 
sacrificing relevant fields where knowledge on response of social, built and natural 
environments to extremes has been produced. 
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We are of course aware of some inevitable limitations such an endeavor implied since the 
beginning. 
First, it is clear that the different indicators and parameters do not simply address different 
issues, but actually manifest also different ways of capturing vulnerability. Their co-existence in 
the framework is somehow arbitrary, as they actually play at different levels, not only in spatial 
and temporal scales, but also conceptually.  
Nevertheless, given this minus, the framework offers a synoptic vision of what current 
literature and experiences have produced insofar, posing in a transparent way and in open 
access terms the question of how different views can/cannot coexist to provide a more 
articulated and nuanced picture of a system or a territory at risk.  
Second, it is as well recognized that the tool that has been developed is currently a prototype 
and should be managed as such. It cannot be simply given to potentially interested 
stakeholders leaving them ―alone‖ in the application of the framework and associated matrices.  
As the application to the test case study areas evidenced, a number of intermediate steps must 
be followed in order to use it at best and none of them can be at the moment ―standardized‖. 
Some of those preliminary steps as described in paragraph 3.2 can be considered part of a 
more general and thorough procedure, where the use of the framework is certainly a core 
component but not the exclusive one. On the other hand, tuning and adaptation to the specific 
context at stake have to be made because of the prototype character of the framework and the 
related matrices. Therefore, in a further evolution of the methodology, a sort of discussion and 
participatory approach should be taken, involving different stakeholders to understand with 
them for what specific purposes, how, to what extent, and with which changes the 
methodology can be successfully applied. 
Apparently, considerations made by the various teams working on the test case study areas 
showed that the methodology, and the framework which constitutes its skeleton, are valid in 
that they set the floor for a comprehensive evaluation, considering multiple dimensions and 
facets of vulnerability and resilience. Difficulties arise in the assessment of some parameters, 
because of the way they have been conceived and constructed. Further research in this domain 
could enhance the applicability of parameters (see in this regard also paragraph 3.3 and 
section 4). On the other side, getting acquainted with the methodology requires some time and 
practice.  Guidelines to help follow the methodology may certainly help, but as stated by 
Ginzburg «in medicine, history/human sciences (and we may add in vulnerability and resilience 
assessments), the elastic rigor – to use a contradictory phrase – of the conjectural paradigm 
seems impossible to eliminate. Nobody learns how to be a diagnostician simply applying rules».  
This leads us to the second important difference between ―hard‖ and ―soft‖ sciences as 
discussed by Ginzburg: that is the prediction capacity (or lack of). Because of the relevance of 
the individual in social and human affairs, only a retrospective prediction can be attempted. 
The ―conjectural‖ paradigm of history or criminology may reconstruct a posteriori an event or 
the scene of a crime. Much more difficult and even questionable is the possibility of 
―prospective‖ prediction, to forecast how the future will unfold, how and if a crime will be 
committed. 
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Whilst clearly even in ―hard‖ sciences the capacity to predict is not that obvious and banal, 
particularly when large uncertainties are implied (see Sarewitz et al, 2000), still the evolution of 
variables with constant characteristics can be reasonably forecasted. As for disasters, the 
debate between those who held that each event is unique and those who privilege constant 
and repeated behaviors and patterns is still very harsh. Again the metaphor of medicine can be 
useful for vulnerability and resilience assessments: indicators can be treated as ―symptoms‖ of 
a condition the quality of which can be fully grasped only within a scenario type of exercise. 
Whilst the development of damage scenarios was beyond the application set for the Ensure 
project, it became clear through the test case studies that only conditioning certain indicators 
to a predetermined scenario it was possible to fully appraise them, particularly when cross 
scale relationships were crucial. 
 
3.2 Temporal and spatial scales: a viewpoint from the Ensure project 
 
The issue of scale has been rather neglected or poorly appreciated for a rather long extent, 
while in the meantime the concept of vulnerability, coping capacity, resilience and related 
concepts were undergoing a significant evolution process. It has become the centre of interest 
and studies with the first applications of climate change scenarios, particularly when the latter 
had to be regionalized, and with the development of the first global integrated assessments of 
the state of the environment and risks. The main question that the latter analyses have raised 
regards the relevance for local places but even for regions of projections and scenarios that 
have been drawn considering global trends and processes, while neglecting the information 
that can be gathered locally. It was clear for the scientists in climate change and those 
involved in global environmental assessments that for some phenomena, what happens in a 
given place, or at a micro level cannot be always neglected, as sometime it may contribute to 
change the evolution or patterns at much larger scales. Therefore a reflection on the meaning 
and use of scale in such studies and conversely in natural hazards has broken through various 
research groups, producing insightful thoughts that are relevant also for the Ensure project. 
The reason why the scale issue is crucial can be derived from the rather enlightening and 
systematic discussion by Willbanks and Kates (1999):  
- For the ―tractability‖ of the problem at stake: when considering for example the 
vulnerability of buildings, a one by one survey can be carried out in very small municipalities 
and in any case only locally; when the vulnerability of entire provinces, counties or regions 
must be appraised, sampling techniques or even statistical analysis based on poor data (like 
census data) has necessarily to be adopted. This does not mean that studies at larger scales 
are less reliable: they obviously serve another purpose, which is the setting of strategies and 
policies identifying priorities, rather than deciding about individual interventions. Many other 
examples can be presented; in general it is true that vulnerability assessments regarding 
several components of vulnerability are much more tractable at the local scale, and the quality 
of information that can be gathered is much higher. Nevertheless, the limitations of 
investigations conducted only at the local level should be pointed out as well. First, the 
resources necessary to carry out a thorough survey are limited and therefore many localities 
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will not be covered because of lack of time, money, personnel; second, at the local scale some 
relevant factors influencing trends and conditions can be missed, as they operate at other 
scales or levels. It is rather hard, perhaps impossible, to identify the ―right‖ scale or level at 
which to analyze a given problem, as the latter depend on the purpose of the assessment, on 
the available resources but also, importantly, on the type of patterns and phenomena that have 
to be investigated. This leads us to the next point. 
- A multi-scale, multi-level approach is relevant whenever ―emergent‖ aspects, patterns, 
relations emerge at higher (or lower) scales and levels and therefore missing them may 
invalidate the entire assessment. An example is provided by lifelines vulnerability assessment: 
because of their intrinsic hierarchical structure and of their mutual interdependence, studies 
conducted at a local level may completely miss the relevant interconnections that are both 
spatial and systemic. Furthermore not just one level is implicated in infrastructures 
organization: actually it depends on the specific arrangements in a given country or even 
continent. Before moving to the analysis of the local vulnerability of lifelines, one must estimate 
where the vital links, nodes, segments are. In this respect, it may be suggested that physical 
vulnerability assessment is more likely to be ―local‖, whilst ―systemic‖ vulnerability as defined in 
the Ensure project is more likely to be grasped at higher levels, regional or national. Following 
Root and Schneider (1995) a ―cyclical scaling‖ method has to be preferred to rigidly pre-defined 
―top-down‖ or ―bottom-up‖ approaches, going from the local to the regional or national and 
back to the local, depending on the question to be answered with the vulnerability and 
resilience assessment. 
- Considering multiple scales and levels supports even more strongly the need for a 
methodological strong framework as the one suggested by the Ensure project. In fact, a 
definite rule valid for all types of assessments cannot be established, as the choice depends on 
the objective of the assessment but also on the systems to be analyzed and on the specific 
context where the analysis is carried out. Such a framework, by establishing how given 
parameters and topics must be addressed at what level and scale, is better fit than case by 
case analyses to accomplish what Willbanks and Kates (1999) see as key requirements: put 
localized observations into a reference context; increase the comparability of studies conducted 
at the same spatial level and across time. This is a requirement that has been stated, even 
though phrased in other ways, by the Asean group producing the Post Nargis Cyclone 
assessment of needs and damage in the affected Myanmar areas (2010). The latter shares 
with Ensure a similar philosophy, according to which vulnerability and resilience evaluations are 
useful exercises only at the condition that they support and offer insight for deciding mitigation 
and prevention strategies.   
It must be acknowledged that introducing scale into vulnerability and resilience assessments is 
not easy; there are not available standards or references that can be taken as a guidance. But 
even in more general, theoretical terms «improving the understanding of linkages between 
macroscale and microscale is one of the great overarching intellectual challenges of our age in 
a wide range of sciences» (Willbanks and Kates, 1999). The authors continue suggesting that 
«weaknesses in appreciating the interaction of processes moving at different time scales and 
extents, in fact, underlay a great deal of the current scientific interest in complexity, non linear 
dynamics, and the search for order amid seeming chaos». The issue of scale is particularly 
important when different scientific perspectives must cooperate together in a truly 
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interdisciplinary way. As suggested by Root and Schneider (1995) «the scale at which different 
research disciplines operate make multidisciplinary connection difficult and necessitate devising 
methods for bridging scale gaps». Having said that, it is clear that what can be realistically 
achieved within the Ensure project is first an explicit recognition of the importance to consider 
the scale issue as a central one and second a proposal of how it can be operationalized within 
the proposed methodology. 
In accordance with the already quoted definition of vulnerability provided by Turner et al 
(2003), we may well take the definition of scale as suggested by Gibson et al (2000): «We use 
the term scale to refer to the spatial, temporal, quantitative or analytical dimensions used by 
scientists to measure and study the objects and processes. Levels on the other hand refer to 
locations along a scale». 
In the suggested framework, both the spatial and the temporal scales of disasters are 
considered to structure the analysis of vulnerability and resilience. It is also suggested that 
even though both concepts are dynamic and dynamism is a crucial aspect to understand how 
and why given levels of vulnerability or resilience can be ―measured‖ today, what can be 
practically achieved is a ―picture‖ of frames at meaningful levels of the scale.  
In order to operationalize the concept of scale, then two main aspects will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs: first what are the relevant levels for each scale to investigate for what 
purpose; second how we may treat cross-level and cross-scale relationships. 
 
Following what has been discussed until now, the following can be proposed for the Ensure 
project in practical terms: 
a.  Scale up and down, adopting statistical and sampling techniques for those aspects 
(particularly physical vulnerability) that are cumulative (which means that the physical 
vulnerability of buildings in a region can be seen as the additional vulnerability of every 
single building); 
b. For systemic vulnerability, a cycling scaling approach may be adopted, going up to the 
largest spatial scale necessary to identify functionality at the lower (or local) level of 
concern; 
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Figure 3.2: Scheme to sketch the cross temporal scale relationship in a given area and context 
c. For mitigation and resilience, the appropriate spatial scale depends very significantly on the 
purpose and the end user of the assessment. In this case, a ―mapping‖ approach following 
the one proposed by Briguglio et al (2008, see figure 3.2) can be followed. In other words, 
one has to first identify in the case at stake what are the agents and the economic 
stakeholders that are most relevant for understanding a given pattern of preparedness (or 
lack of) and of capacity (or lack of) to influence physical and systemic vulnerability and then 
direct the efforts into the assessment of the elements at different spatial levels that are 
relevant for the case at stake. For example, while talking about the physical seismic 
vulnerability of buildings in a given region in Italy, it may be relevant to search at the 
national level when laws providing economic incentives for retrofitting have been passed 
and what are the authorities in charge of controlling the correct use of those incentives. 
Then the appropriate level at which to analyze agents‘ behavior in this specific case can be 
decided.  
 
3.3 Dealing with cross-level and cross-scale relationships 
Insofar the framework description has provided a static picture of the vulnerability assessment, 
providing the explanation of what can be viewed as a skeleton comprised by subcomponents 
and indicators to enlighten and evidence that the various factors that have been recognized in 
literature and past applications as relevant for understanding the potential response of a 
complex territorial system to the ―external‖ stress due to a natural extreme. 
The Ensure team though has acknowledged since the first WPs (in particular the second one) 
that links, connections, coupling relations exist among indicators. More than that: the validity 
of a vulnerability assessment requires the understanding of such connections to avoid 
misleading results that do not take into account how the various factors interact in a real 
setting. 
Given that, the issue of how to play on the relationships that have been sometimes grasped in 
back analysis within the framework has still to be fully understood. 
At least three types of relations can be recognised. 
The first (see figure 3.1) relates to how the different indicators within the same matrix may be 
connected to each other. In general term, it can be assumed that social agents in various 
forms may have a direct or indirect, strong or loose influence on all other types of vulnerability, 
that is on the vulnerability of natural systems (for example the decision to change the type of 
vegetation coverage for economic profitability may induce instability in slopes or give room for 
more inflammable species), on the vulnerability of the built environment (here the all issue of 
compliance with norms and state of the art techniques enters), on the vulnerability of critical 
infrastructures (not only the way they are constructed, but also to what extent they are 
privatized, whether or not managing companies are controlled, coordinated by public bodies, 
etc.). 
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Figure 3.1: Relations among indicators within the same matrix 
The second and the thirds relate to spatial and temporal cross-scale and cross level 
connections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Proposed model for vulnerability conceptualization within risk assessment  
context by Roberts et al (2009) 
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As it is already very complex as shown in the previous paragraph to address scale issues per 
se, it is even more challenging to tackle such cross-scale relationships. As already said, whilst 
the relevance of such connections has been recognised theoretically, it is still rather difficult to 
achieve it in real applications. Having a conceptual framework is already a good advancement 
as suggested by Roberts et al (2009, see figure 3.3). Actually, their framework has a lot in 
common with ours, and can be suggested as a visualization of the kind of pre-vulnerability 
assessment that must be carried out in order to identify what are the relevant links among 
indicators at different spatial and temporal scale for a specific case at stake.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Relations among indicators across the set of matrices (referred to time-scale levels) 
  
Again, it is deemed that a general theoretical statement of how those connections work is 
impossible at the state of the art (or perhaps even counterproductive form a conceptual 
viewpoint); instead, what can be practiced is the definition of a ―scenario‖ where conditional 
relations among indicators are recognised as relevant and therefore for those indicators at the 
appropriate level of spatial scale the full assessment will be completed. The others will be as if 
―turned off‖ and not examined in that particular case.  
Similarly for time scale (see figure 3.4); whilst it can be hold in general that what is decided in 
the period before the impact, the capacity or incapacity to mitigate have direct consequences 
on physical vulnerability, and on the systemic. The resilience of the system is not dependant 
only on pre-event decision, as emerging positive capacities may arise from society and 
Mitigation capacity 
related to the 
natural environment
Mitigation capacity 
related to the 
built environment
Mitigation capacity 
related to the 
critical facilities
Mitigation capacity 
related to the 
social and economic  
agents
Physical vulnerability 
of the 
natural environment
Physical vulnerability
of the 
built environment
Physical vulnerability 
of the 
critical facilities
Systemic vulnerability
of the 
natural environment
Systemic vulnerability 
of the 
built environment
Sysemic vulnerability
of 
critical facilities
Resilience
of the 
natural environment
Resilience 
of  the 
built environment
Resilience
of 
critical facilities
Physical vulenrability
of  the
social and economic  
agents
Systemic vulnerability 
of the 
social and economic  
agents
Resilience 
of the 
social and economic  
agents
PRE-IMPACTPERIOD EMERGENCY RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTIONIMPACT
ENSURE Project (Contract n° 212045) Del. 4.1 
- 49 - 
territories in sometimes unexpected ways, difficult to fully envisage before the event. In this 
regard, while recovery and reconstruction clearly pave the floor for creating or eliminating 
vulnerabilities and are therefore always part of ―mitigation‖ to the next, future, extreme event, 
the relation between mitigation and resilience is not necessarily so linear. Resilience, though, 
has to do with the expected level of damage, the extent to which places and communities are 
disrupted in the aftermath of the event.  
In figure 3.4. the mitigation capacity, physical, systemic vulnerability and resilience of the four 
main systems that have been represented in the matrices are shown across the temporal 
phases of a disastrous event. The long arrows below the phases labels indicate that there is no 
linearity and that the pre-impact event sort of starts when the reconstruction is over (or, 
better, when enough time since the last event has passed so that the pre-impact event is felt 
as a ―normal‖ time). The other arrows among the various systems‘ vulnerability and resilience 
boxes show the relations that exist inevitably over time among mitigation, physical 
vulnerability, vulnerability to losses, resilience. The links among systems shown in figure 3.1. 
should be ideally superimposed so as to represent the complexity of such cross temporal scale 
relationships. In the figure only some of the links are evidenced, while it is clear that many 
other may be found in real cases.  
In summary, it is clear that as it is already very challenging to account for cross-level and scale 
relations as well as for interactions among indicators in back analysis, in prospective 
assessments this becomes an unachievable goal, if prescribed in too strict terms. It is inevitable 
to simplify and propose a more pragmatic approach, that will first make explicit what kind of 
interactions among stress  physical damage  systemic vulnerability  response to losses  
 assumed capacity to recover can be envisaged in a given place, in a given region at the time 
when the assessment has to be conducted, and then identify the most relevant relations 
among what indicators at which spatial or temporal level.  
Even though the proposed solution is partial and not fully satisfactory, it must be reminded 
though that it is in line with some current proposals that have been strongly supported by 
some end users. An example is provided by the already quoted Asean post Nargis assessment, 
where a very similar approach to the practical one we propose here was adopted, under 
extreme circumstances under the urgency to provide quick results for the affected 
communities. In fact, first a spatial grid was established to identify the key levels at which the 
assessment would be carried out; then an indicators‘ framework was set to guarantee both 
comparability and emergence of specific needs and problems in different localities; third, the 
assessment looked ahead at recovery, providing a tool that could be used also across time to 
verify the efficacy of aid and intervention policies.  
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3.4 How temporal and spatial cross scale relationships can be 
analysed in practice within the Ensure approach: an example 
applied to the forest fires case. 
Regional patterns of forest fires depend on numerous human, landscape and climatic factors 
that change frequently in time and space (Cueva 2006). For example, forest vegetation type 
and structure, biomass of live and dead surface fuels, land topography, weather factors, 
population density. Countries in the Mediterranean region of Europe are frequently subjected to 
the economic, ecologic and human consequences of forest fires (Bassi et al. 2008). Here a 
dynamic adaptation of the Ensure framework is proposed, to account for the very relevant 
linkages between actors and objects, across spatial and temporal scales. Although in theory the 
concept vulnerability demands for a thorough investigation of biophysical, cognitive and social 
dimensions of human-environment interactions (Polsky et al., 2006), in order to make the 
assessment of vulnerability meaningful an intermediate level of complexity needs to be found. 
In this light, wildland-urban-interface (WUI) emerges as an adequate focal system. WUIs are 
defined as areas where urban lands meet and interact with rural lands (Lein and Stump, 2009). 
Some of WUIs are characterized by increased human activities and land use conversion 
(Lampin-Maillet et al. 2009). In general, as people and wildland interact, the potential for forest 
fires becomes elevated and risks to fire hazard rise. 
The suggested model depicts agents, objects and their interactions contributing to physical and 
economic vulnerability of the WUI‘s. Agents and objects are positioned according to a time and 
spatial axis (see Figure 3.5). The time axis denotes the traditional stages of the disaster cycle 
(from pre-disaster to recovery) while the space axis highlights the scales of influence for each 
agent and object (from macro to micro). For explanatory reasons let us focus on the pre-event 
stage. At this level, agents and objects influencing fire ignition and/or fire propagation are 
investigated, e.g. flammability and fuel structure, human activities or climate patterns 
(Chuvieco and Salas 1996). After agents and objects are placed in the appropriate spatial scale 
of influence, their interactions (represented by arrows 1 to 13) are elaborated from forest fire 
literature. For example, a demographic decrease in the rural areas of Portugal has lead to the 
abandonment of arable areas and their subsequent conversion to woodland. The resulting 
increase on fuel loads made these regions more susceptible to the occurrence of fires (Pereira 
et al., 2005). The phenomenon of land abandonment driving fires was also reported in Greece. 
As forests and villages were gradually abandoned, the number of forest fires and area burned 
annually started growing steeply since the end of the 1970s (Xanthopoulos, 2004). This 
relation can be abstracted by the agent population modifying the object land use and 
flammability (see arrow 6).  
In a similar way, the agent governance (usually present at macro- and meso-scales of the pre-
event phase) was found to shape physical vulnerability at the micro-scale via the agent 
population and their interaction with the objects built and natural environment. It was 
observed that residential risk management decisions (arrows 7 and 8) are made in reference to 
institutional incentive provided by the existence of public fire suppression (arrow 3). If 
residents believe that fire-fighters have the capacities to protect local homes they are less likely 
to implement measures to reduce home ignitability (Collins 2005).  
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Resulting physical vulnerability during the impact phase translates to economic consequences 
on the course of the recovery phase. Examples from the 2007 Greek mega-fires showed that 
around 78000 ha of agricultural land burned on Peloponnese were primarily olive groves. In 
the Prefecture of Ilia alone 50% of the olive production potential was lost, such damage should 
be seen in relation to the main source of income in this area (WWF 2007). Access to insurance 
by the agents economic stakeholders (arrow 11) or the existence of governance funds to cope 
with disasters provided by governance (e.g. European solidarity fund, see arrow 12) have a 
positive effect in reducing economic vulnerability at the micro-scale. The agent economic 
stakeholder revealed to play a double role in influencing economic and physical vulnerability. 
While its effect is positive at the recovery phase, the continuous maintenance of insurance 
structures might, in the long run, have a negative effect on physical vulnerability at the micro-
scale. Using focus group methods Winter (2003) found evidences of a substitution effect in 
which residents believed ‗‗their responsibilities relative to wildfire risk are fully discharged by 
maintaining insurance coverage on their home‘‘ (arrow 13). This might result in difficulties in 
changing the spatial arrangement of settlement patterns (built environment) that is in turn 
linked with ignition sources in the natural environment (Cardille et al., 2001; Syphard et al., 
2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5:  Conceptual framework for the assessment of vulnerability of people and 
build environment to forest fires in the WUI 
The modified framework is now the basis to construct a dynamic qualitative model of 
vulnerability to forest fires. First a few words why such approach was taken. Investigating how 
different agents and objects shape the overall vulnerability requires necessarily the use of a 
dynamic approach. This approach allows the user to change at will selected parameters and 
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observe the corresponding effect across the system components. Ideally, a quantitative 
analysis of a dynamic model would allow for more meaningful results. In the case shown here 
such analysis is pursued. This exercise is meant to set examples on how the original 
vulnerability framework produced by the Ensure project can adjusted for investigating dynamic 
links of vulnerability factors. For example, what parameter or combination of parameters can 
more effectively increase or reduce vulnerability? The overall structure of the model conceived 
is presented in Figure 3.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Graphic representation of the operated model 
 
The model shows the dependencies between the variables temperature, fire size, fire ignition 
economic damages and WUI growth (represented by the squares temperature, fire_size, 
fire_ign, econ_dam and WUI_grow respectively in Figure 3.6). The dependency is of course not 
a direct one; for example, additional parameters such as emission rate (emissions_rate), 
flammability of the vegetation (flam), settlement development (WUI_disp_factor) or access to 
insure (access) (highlighted by blue circles in Figure 3.6) control the dynamics of the main 
variables. Main variables and additional parameters are included in the model via abstraction 
from literature results. For example, the density of settlements that intermingle with forest 
vegetation cover have been found to influence the fire ignition density as shown in Figure 3.7  
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Figure 3.7: Fire ignition density value (Lampin-Maillet et al 2008) 
 
For a case study in Southern France, fire ignition density values were found to increase greatly 
from clustered dwellings (4.2 fire ignition points per 1,000 ha), to scattered dwellings (5.2 fire 
ignition points per 1,000 ha) and finally to isolated dwellings (9.5 fire ignition points per 1,000 
ha). This suggests that the spatial pattern of dwellings has a real impact on fire occurrence. 
Humans, and their spatial distribution, explain a part of the variability in the number of ignition 
points (Lampin-Maillet et al 2008). In our model the spatial pattern of dwellings is set by the 
parameter WUI_disp_factor that influences directly the probability of fire ignition represented 
by ign_prob in Figure 3.7.  
We try to mimic the findings of literature by formulating ign_prob = WUI_grow*(1-
(1/WUI_disp_factor)) where WUI_grow is the total size of our settlement and (1-
(1/WUI_disp_factor)) the effect of settlement dispersion on ignitions so that when 
WUI_disp_factor decreases (this is more compact settlements) ign_prob increases. By 
changing the parameter WUI_disp_factor we can test the corresponding effect on fire ignitions 
across time.  
A quick test shown in Figure 3.8 exemplifies how changing the WUI_disp_factor influences the 
probability in fire ignitions. For a WUI_disp_factor of 2 the range of ignition probabilities varies 
between 0.5 and 0.53 (lower panel). If we double the WUI_disp_factor, ignition probabilities 
range from 0.75 and aprox. 0.80. Note again that these are not quantitative numbers; they 
only depict a qualitative change towards higher ignitions probabilities in WUI_disp_factor 
increases.  Similar exercises as the one exemplified where carried for the totality of parameters 
and variables that compose our model. Of particular interest in our model is the linkage of 
insurance access (access) and net economic damages (net_eco_dam) influencing the decision 
to construct new settlements in the WUI. This feature can be found in the lower region of 
Figure 2 where net_econ_dam links to settling_decision closing the ―vulnerability‖ cycle of our 
model.   
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Figure 3.8: Evolution in ignition probability evolution for WUI_disp_factor=4 (top panel) and 
WUI_disp_factor=2 (lower panel) in time (x). 
 
Although the positive feedback of insurance structures driving higher fire losses seems 
reasonable and consistent with previous studies, research has only begun to document 
situations in which the residential risk management calculus intersects with policy structures to 
create incentives for risk-amplifying behaviours (Collins 2005). Setting the mathematical 
formulation to mimic such complex aspect of fire prevention is therefore not a straightforward 
exercise. In the context of our modeling framework we have defined net_eco_dam as the net 
economic damages resulting from the application of an insurance access rate to the total 
expected damages (eco_dam in Figure 3.6). Net_eco_dam is therefore formulated so that 
net_eco_dam = eco_dam-(eco_dam*access). In a few words, the net economic damages are 
equal to total economic damages (eco_dam) minus the total economic damages that are offset 
by the application of an insurance access rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Total economic damage (left) and net economic damage (right) when and 
access insurance rate of 0.4 (access in Figure 2) is applied. 
In Figure 3.9 we show the example of total economic damages and net economic damages 
after applying an access insurance rate of 0.4. The decision to settle in the WUI  
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(settling_decision) in our model is a function the net_eco_dam, more specifically we construct 
settling decision so that settling_decision = WUI_grow*(1/net_eco_dam).  
The ration 1/net_eco_dam controls how much the WUI grows. If net_eco_dam assumes very 
high values then the WUI growth will be hindered since it is not economically feasible to build 
in the WUI. If net_eco_dam assume very low values, for example 0 (zero), this implies that all 
damages are covered by insurance practices and therefore the decision to settle in the WUI is 
made favorable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10  Dynamics of WUI growth and net economic damages 
 
Results show that while losses can be compensated by the existence of insurance mechanisms 
(net_eco_dam in figure 3.10) settlement grows due to the substitution effect highlighted by 
arrow 13 in Figure 1. After a certain period, settlement growth originates losses that can no 
longer be compensated by relief mechanisms. With the growing magnitude of fire towards the 
end of the simulation (see Figure 3.10), settlement growth starts to stabilize.    
 
Once this kind of interactions is understood, the model can be tested for its sensitivity (e.g. 
how strong the main variables react to a change in the parameters). For example, due to a 
consistent projected increase in temperature across the Mediterranean basin (Giorgi, 2007) and 
the time delays associated with atmospheric response, climate mitigation measures 
(represented by parameter emissions_rate in Figure 3.6), have limited effect in controlling 
losses from forest fires. Instead, socio-economic drivers of forest land-use and settlement 
planning significantly contribute to the intensity of losses. Management policies should 
therefore focus on modifying these parameters, for example, shifting away from highly 
flammable pine monocultures (represented by the parameter flam in Figure 3.6) and providing 
support to mixed forests with native fire resistant species has improved natural fire prevention 
in the Mediterranean area and also the range of economic markets to be explored (Bassi, 
2008). The model also highlights how a change in access to insurance can result both in lower 
and higher losses rather than the generalized assumptions that access to insurance contributes 
to lower economic vulnerability.  
The approach followed is an attempt to evaluate how multiple actors and objects interact in the 
context of forest fire hazard shaping physical and economic vulnerability. The challenge of 
ENSURE Project (Contract n° 212045) Del. 4.1 
- 56 - 
linking cross scale (both in time and space) interactions is not trivial and more assessment 
needs to be done mainly in the fields of risk perception and individuals decisions. On the other 
hand, the physics of climate, vegetation and fire are now relatively well understood. This 
means that simple dynamic models as the one presented can be constructed to evaluate how 
decisions on climate mitigation, fuel loads reduction and fire fighting capacities influence 
vulnerability. In this respect the model highlights that although future climate variability plays a 
role concerning the intensity of forest fires, losses are shaped at a large extent by settlement 
dynamics and vegetation flammability.  
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4 Open conclusion 
 
At the end of the Ensure project, some observations may be brought to the attention of 
readers regarding in particular the successes, strengths and failures of interdisciplinary work. It 
is a sort of ―common sense‖ in the scientific community working on risks, hazards, prevention, 
that an interdisciplinary approach is required, and for a number of good reasons.  
Some are rather self-evident: the multiple competences needed to study different phenomena 
(sometimes enchained), the various components of risk (hazard, exposure, vulnerability) that 
call for a variety of expertises.  
Other reasons are less banal: we are tackling vulnerability and resilience of complex systems, 
across multiple spatial and temporal scales. No single scientific community or expertise is able 
to address those issues satisfactorily. With respect to the past, it can be said that 
interdisciplinary research has been accomplished; several teams with members of various 
disciplinary backgrounds have worked together in projects, just to mention those funded under 
the 6th and 7th FP.  
In Ensure we did have an interdisciplinary team and we did encounter obstacles and 
constraints that other groups, in completely different sectors, have experienced as well (see 
Nicolson et al, 2002 and Lélé et al. 2005). The interesting fact about the quoted articles is that 
they are recent and they report about experiences of working and coordinating different 
scientific communities. We will ground here on their reflections to draw our own ones, based 
on the Ensure work. 
First, the type of ―interdisciplinarity‖ has to be clearly defined. In Ensure we did not face simple 
collaboration (the first level of ―interdisciplinarity‖ according to Eigenbrode et al., 2007), and 
even not the focusing on a given task or problem (the second level), rather we had to first 
identify and define the contours of the problem (the third level). In fact we had to state what 
resilience and vulnerability meant for us and how we intended to convert the agreed upon 
interpretation into a way of measuring and assessing (see Winograd, 2007). The readiness to 
this type of collaboration and coordination was not equal for all participants, independently 
form partner/country/scientific background. Such readiness had more to do, as stated by Lélé 
et al. (2005), with the acceptance of the other, the willingness to cross disciplinary borders, 
and the capacity to select and simplify relevant knowledge in each own field in a form useful 
for the collaboration, rather than specific field of expertise or personal curriculum. 
The scientific coordinator had certainly significant responsibility in the difficulties to make the 
various project parties interact and integrate rather than polarize on definitional issues or on 
divergent modelling perspectives. Yet, the project was a meaningful learning experience in this 
regard. We now agree with Nicolson et al., 2002, when they say that such a project should 
start with a prototype or a similar ―close‖ model, readymade ―position paper‖ on which to 
collapse different views and competences is certainly a valuable recommendation. The initial 
agreement on a prototype clarify since the beginning the role that each expertise may have in 
the project, and would set the expectations regarding its results. A sort of initial negotiation 
regarding the object, the objective and a baseline model to test must exist prior to the 
beginning of the teamwork and not just an output. Such negotiation would lead to a 
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preliminary result that will be changed and even reversed at the end of the project, but which 
will compel partners to focus on common issues and way to accomplish expected results.  
Another important point refers to allocating enough funding and time for smaller, partial 
meetings among some components of partners‘ teams. Those meetings allow for mutual 
comprehension, better mutual understand ding and construction of a shared view of the 
problems to be solved and the methodology to be developed. Such smaller group discussions 
were partially hold within the Ensure project to set issues related to vulnerability to landslides, 
volcanic crises and forest fires and proved to be particularly valuable. 
To conclude with a positive remark, there was an agreement among Ensure partners that the 
framework constitutes a significant achievement of the project, which provides the possibility 
for each expertise to locate itself within a larger and more comprehensive context. At the end, 
engineers will continue studying what are construction features that make buildings and 
networks more or less vulnerable to earthquakes, floods or forest fires; in the meantime 
though, they will understand that the ―root‖ causes and the drivers of such physical 
weaknesses have to be looked for elsewhere, in the legislative and institutional arrangements, 
in the capacity of governments and administrations to implement and achieve compliance with 
building codes, land use norms and regulations.  
Volcanologists, seismologists, hydrologists will certainly continue to attribute high relevance to 
hazard maps availability; in the meantime though, in having to assess also the quality of 
produced maps, they will consider to what extent those maps are fit to support planners and 
decision makers in land use choices, relocation programs, development and redevelopment of 
urban areas and infrastructures.    
ENSURE Project (Contract n° 212045) Del. 4.1 
- 59 - 
5 References 
 
Adger N., N. Brooks, G. Bentham, M. Agnew, S. Eriksen, New indicators of vulnerability and 
adaptive capacity, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Technical Paper n. 7, 2004 
 
Al-Kuwaiti M., N. Kyriakopoulos, S. Hussein, Network dependability, fault-tolerance, reliability, 
survivability,: a framework for comprative analysis, in ―Proc. The 2006 International Conference 
on Computer Engineering and Systems (ICCES‘86)‖, 5 – 7 November 2006, Cairo, Egypt. 
 
Asean, Post Nargis joint assessment, 2008, available online at: www.asean.org/21765.pdf. 
 
Badia, A., Serra, P., Modugno, S., Identifying dynamics of fire ignition probabilities in two 
representative Mediterranean wildland-urban interface areas, Applied Geography 31, 2011,  
pp. 930-940  
 
Bassi, S., Kettunen, M., Kampa, E., Cavalieri, S., Forest fires: causes and contributing factors to 
forest fire events in Europe, Report for the European Parliament‘s Committee on Environment. 
Public Health and Food Safety, Brussels, 2008  
 
Beeson,P.C., Martens, S.N., Breshears, D.D., Simulating overland flow following wildfire: 
mapping vulnerability to landscape disturbance, Hydrological Processes 15, 2001,  
pp. 2917-2930  
 
Bell S., S Morse, Sustainability Indicators: Measuring the Immeasurable?, Earthscan, 2008. 
 
Bruguglio L., G. Cordina, N. Farrugia, and S. Vella, Economic vulnerability and resilience. 
Concepts and measurements, Research Paper No. 2008/55, United Nations University, 2008. 
 
Bruneau, M., Chang, S., Eguchi, R., Lee, G., O‘Rourke, T., Reinhorn, A., Shinozuka, M., Tierney, 
K., Wallace, W., and von Winterfeldt, D., A framework to quantitatively assess and enhance the 
seismic resilience of communities, in ―Earthquake Spectra‖, vol. 19 :4, 2003, pp.733–752. 
 
Caballero D., Wildland-urban interface fire risk management: the WARM project, in 
―Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Fire Economics, Planning, and Policy: 
a global view, 19-22 April, 2004, Cordoba, Spain. 
 
Cardille, J.A., Ventura, S.J., Turner, M.G., Environmental and social factors influencing wildfires 
in the Upper Midwest, United States, Ecological Applications 11, 2001, pp. 111-127,   
 
Chuvieco, E., Salas, J., Mapping the spatial distribution of forest fire danger using GIS, 
International Journal of Geographical Information Systems 10, 1996, pp. 333-345,  
 
Colins. T.W., Households, forests, and fire hazard vulnerability in the American West: A case 
study of a California community, Global Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards 
6, 2005, pp. 23-37 
 
Cueva, A., Recent fire regime in peninsular Spain in relation to forest potential productivity and 
population density, International Journal of Wildland Fire 15, 2006, pp 397  
 
Cutter S., J. Mitchell, M. Scott, Revealing the vulnerability of people and places: a case study of 
Georgetown County, South Carolina, in ―Annals of the Amercian Geographers‖, vol. 90:4, 2000 
ENSURE Project (Contract n° 212045) Del. 4.1 
- 60 - 
 
Cutter S., L. Barnes, M. Berry, C. Burton, E. Evans, E. Tate, J. Webb, A place-based model for 
understanding community resilience to natural disasters, in ―Global Environmental Change‖, 
vol. 18, 2008, pp. 598-606  
 
Dimitrakopoulos A.P., K. Papaioannou, Flammability assessment of Mediterranean forest fuels, 
in ―Fire technology‖, vol. 37, 2001, pp. 143-152 
 
Eigenbrode, D. Sanford, O'Rourke, Michael, Wulfhorst, J.D., Althoff, M. David, Goldberg, S. 
Caren, Merrill, Kaylani, Morse, Wayde, Nielsen-Pincus, Max, Stephens, Jennifer, Winowiecki, 
Leigh, Bosque-Perez, A. Nilsa, Employing philosophical dialogue in collaborative science, in 
―BioScience‖, vol. 25:1, 2007, pp. 55-64. 
 
Eriksen S., Kelly P., Developing credible vulnerability indicators for climate adaptation policy 
assessment, in ―Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change‖, vol. 12, 2007,  
pp. 495-524. 
 
Fekete A., M. Damm, J. Birkmann, Scales as a challenge for vulnerability assessment, in 
―Natural Hazards‖, vol. 55, 2010, pp. 729-747. 
 
 
 
Funtowicz S. and Ravetz J., ―Uncertainty and quality in Science for policy‖, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, The Netherlands, 1990. 
 
Gaithera, C.,  Poudyalb, N., Goodrick, S., Bowker J.M., Malonec, S.,  Gand, J., Wildland fire risk 
and social vulnerability in the Southeastern United States: An exploratory spatial data analysis 
approach, Forest Policy and Economics 13, 2011, pp. 24-36 
 
Gibson C., E. Ostrom, T.K. Ahn, The concept of scale and the human dimension of global 
change: a survey, in ―Ecological Economics‖, vol. 32, 2007, pp. 217-239. 
 
Ginzburg C., Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: clues and scientific method, in ―History 
Workshop‖, vol. 9, 1980, p. 5. 36. 
 
Giorgio, F., Lionello, P., Climate change projections for the Mediterranean region, Global and 
Planetary Change 16, 2007, pp. 90-104  
 
Jasanoff S., The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymaker. Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, Mass., 1990. 
 
Handmer J., S. Dovers, (1996) A typology of resilience: rethinking institutions for sustainable 
development, in ―Industrial and Environmental Crisis Quarterly‖, vol. 9:4, pp. 482-511. 
 
Handmer J, (2003) We are all vulnerable, in ―Australian Journal of Emergency Management‖, 
vol. 18:3, August. 
 
Hills A., Insidious environments: creeping dependencies and urban vulnerabilities, in ―Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management‖, vol. 13:1, 2005. 
 
Klein R., R. Nicholls, F. Thomalla, Resilience to natural hazards: how useful is this concept?, in 
―Environemntal Hazards‖, vol. 5, 2005, pp. 35-45 
 
ENSURE Project (Contract n° 212045) Del. 4.1 
- 61 - 
Lampin-Maillet, C., Jappiot, M., Long M., Bouillon C., Morge D., Ferrier, J.P., Mapping wildland-
urban interfaces at large scales integrating housing density and vegetation aggregation for fire 
prevention in the South of France, Journal of Environmental Management 91, 2009,  
pp 732-741,  
 
Lampin-Maillet C., M. Jappiot, M. Long, D. Morge, J.P. Ferrier, Characterization and mapping of 
dwelling types for forest fires prevention, in ―Computers, Environment and Urban Systems‖, 
vol. 33, 2009, pp. 224-232. 
 
Lein, J.K., Stump, N.I., Assessing wildfire potential within the wildland-urban interface: A 
southeastern Ohio example, Applied Geography 29, 2009, pp. 21–34 
 
Lélé S., R. Noorgaard, Practicing Interdisciplinary, in ―BioScience‖, vol. 55:11, 2005,  
pp. 967-975. 
 
Lewis J., Development in disaster-prone places, studies of vulnerability. Intermediate 
Technology Publications: UK, 1999. 
 
Maclaren V., Urban sustainability reporting, in ―Journal of the American Planning Association‖, 
Spring, 1996, pp. 184-202. 
 
Nicolson C., A. Starfield, G. Kofinas, J. Kruse, Ten heuristics for interdisciplinary modelling 
projects, in ―Ecosystems‖, vol 5, 2002, pp. 376-384. 
 
Norris F., S. Stevens, B. Pfefferbaum, K. Wyche, R. Pfefferbaum, Community resilience as a 
metaphor, theory, set of capacities, and strategy for disaster readiness, in ―Americal Journal of 
Community Psychology‖, vol. 41, 2008 
 
Olabarria, J., Integrating fire risk into forest planning, University of Joensuu, Academic 
Dissertation, June 2006. 
 
Pereira, H.M., Domingos, T., Vicente, L., Portugal Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: State of 
the Assessment Report', Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa, 2004 
 
Polsky C., R. Neff, B. Yarnal, Building comparable global change vulnerability assessments: the 
vulnerability scoping diagram, in ―Global Environmetnal Change‖, vol. 17, 2007, pp. 472-485. 
 
Roberts N., F. Nadim, B. Kalsnes, Quantification of vulnerability to natural hazards, in 
―Georisk‖, vol 3:3, 2009, pp. 164-173. 
 
Root T., S. Schneider, Ecology and climate: research strategies and implications, in ―Science‖, 
vol. 269, 21 July 1995. 
 
Rose A., Defining and measuring economic resilience to disasters, in ― Disaster Prevention and 
Management‖, Vol. 13 Iss: 4, 2004, pp.307 – 314 
Salter L. et al., ―Mandated science. Science and scientists in the making of standars‖. Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1988. 
 
Sarewitz D., R. Pielke jr., R. Byerly (eds.) , Prediction. Science, decision making and the future 
of nature, Island Press, 2000. 
 
ENSURE Project (Contract n° 212045) Del. 4.1 
- 62 - 
Schuëller G., M. Shinozouka, J.T. Yao, Structural safety and reliability, in ―Proc. Of Icossar‘93- 
the 6th International Conference on Structural Safety and Reliability, Inssbruck, Austria, 9-13 
August 1993. 
 
Syphard, A.D., Radeloff, V., Keeley, J., Hawbaker, T.J., Clayton, M.K., Stewart, S.I., Hammer 
R.G., Human influence on California regimes, Ecological Applications 17, 2007, pp. 1388-1402  
 
Turner B.L., Kasperson R.E., Matson P.A., McCarthy J.J., Corell R.W., Christensen L., Eckley N., 
Kasperson J.X., Luers A., Martello M.L., Polsky C., Pulsipher A., Schiller A., ―A framework for 
vulnerability analysis in sustainability science,‖ in PNAS, 100 (14): 8074-8079, 2003, see 
www.pnas.org. 
 
Xanthopoulos G., Forest fire policy scenarios as a key element affecting the occurrence and 
characteristics of fire disasters, in ―Proceedings of the 4th International Wildland Fire 
Conference‖, May 13-17, 2007, Sevilla, Spain. 
 
Xanthopoulos G., Factors affecting the vulnerability of houses to wildland fire in the 
Mediterranean region, in ―Proceedings of the International Workshop Forest fires in the 
wildland-urban interface and rural areas in Europe‖, 15-16 May, Athens Greece, 2003. 
 
Weichelsgartner J., Obersteiner M., ―Knowing sufficient and applying more: challenges in 
hazard management.‖ Environmental Hazards 4: 73-77, 2002. 
 
Willbanks T., R. Kates, Global change in local places: how scale matters, in ―Climatic Change‖ 
vol. 43, 1999, pp. 601-628. 
 
Winograd M., A. Farrow, Sustainable development indicators for decision making: concepts, 
methods, definition and use, in ―Encyclopedia of Life Supporting Systems (EOLSS)‖, n.d., 
available at: http://www.eolss.net/ebooks/Sample%20Chapters/C13/E1-46B-02.pdf 
 
Winograd M., Sustainability and vunerability indicators for decision making: lessons learnd from 
Honduras, in ―Sustainable Development‖, vol. 10:1/2, 2007. 
 
Winograd M., Capacity strengthening in climate change vulnerability and adaptation strategy 
assessments, Background on frameworks, methodologies and tools for vulnerability and 
adaptation assessments, how to move from reactive to proactive approaches, report available 
at: http://c3d-unitar.org/c3d/userfiles/Module_2/EM2_Background.pdf, no date. 
 
Winter, P.L., Cvetkovich, G.T., A study of Southwesterns' opinions on the management of 
wildland and wilderness fires, Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDA Forest Service, 2003 
 
WWF., Ecological assessment of the wildfires of August 2007 in the Peloponnese, Greece, 
Athens, 2007 
 
Xanthopoulos, G.,  Who should be responsible for forest fires? Lessons from the Greek 
experience. Proceedings ‗II International Symposium on Fire Economics, Planning and Policy: A 
Global View‘, 2004, pp. 19-22, Cordoba, Spain. 
  
ENSURE Project (Contract n° 212045) Del. 4.1 
- 63 - 
6 Appendix A : Presentation of the entire set of 
matrices developed within the Ensure project 
 
Vulnerability assessment: the case of droughts 
Compared to other hazards, droughts are specific in that they are slow onset events. First, this 
means that all tools available for early warning are crucial for lowering the vulnerability of 
potentially affected areas and communities. In the meantime, recurrent drought that 
characterizes in particular arid and semiarid regions can be (should be?) dealt with not only 
satisfying the increasing demand but also (mainly?) governing it, reducing water wastage and 
increasing the efficiency of water services. Considering extreme drought events, preparedness, 
in terms of implementing contingency plans in appropriate ways can significantly reduce the 
impact on populations.  
Second, the slow development of the drought phenomena may render the distinction between 
physical and systemic vulnerability inconsistent, because it is hard to distinguish an ―impact‖ 
moment, as the lack of water is experienced over time with cumulative rather than sudden 
effects on the one end; on the other because the damage is not due (or only to a very limited 
extent) to the drought itself, as to the lack of water services, which is considered in our 
framework as a consequence of losses, rather than the losses itself. In principle if water is 
available from tanks and other retain facilities, even though it does not rain, the consequences 
for different economic and social sectors may be much less relevant or even negligible. 
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―Water Resources Research‖, Vol. 39, 2003. 
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Vulnerability assessment: the case of floods 
Vulnerability assessments of floods have advanced quite significantly in the last years, 
particularly with respect to physical and systemic aspects. Damage curves have been 
developed by various research centres around the world and already adopted by national 
authorities. The purpose has been to draw dangerous zones and estimate the expected level of 
damage in given areas. Such curves are obtained by correlating some features of the hazard 
(water depth most typically) with some characteristics of the building (most typically number of 
floors). 
When developing and using vulnerability assessments to floods, one must take into 
consideration what type of flood are we considering, if mountain flash flood, with associated 
strong velocities and energies able to transport debris and sediment or plain floods, where the 
most relevant dimensions to be considered are the height of the water and the expected 
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duration of the event. To a certain extent, then, particularly as far as physical and systemic 
vulnerability are considered, differences must be accounted for the two types of phenomena. 
Another important aspect is related to the possibility of providing early warning to the 
population: in the case of flood (particularly floods in plains) the capability to forecast, model 
and alert both the civil protection and the population is an important parameter to take into 
consideration in the mitigation matrix. 
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Vulnerability assessment: the case of earthquakes 
As already mentioned and supported by references (see in particular Roberts et al., 2009), 
seismic vulnerability can be considered as the reference model for developing similar 
assessment tools for all other hazards. Seismic studies have been also among the first to 
introduce the resilience concept both for addressing what we call here systemic vulnerability 
(or the opposite of it) and the response capacity of organizations and communities (see 
Bruneau et al., 2003). 
In the seismic field attention has been put also on the vulnerability of the historic patrimony, 
with attempts to establish assessments and retrofitting techniques that respect the traditional 
way of constructing buildings and monuments which still resisted several shakes over time.  
 
Vulnerability assessment: the case of volcanic eruptions 
Volcanic eruptions are somehow different from other cases as they are muti-hazard events, as 
different phenomena may be associated to them, particularly in the case of explosive activity. 
Therefore it is necessary in the matrices to account for the different phenomena (tephra, 
ballistics, lahars, etc.) as they stress differently the built environment. The current state of 
development of physical vulnerability assessments can be considered as intermediate for 
volcanic activity. Some recent studies, particularly after the Montserrat event, have provided 
some clues regarding the survival conditions inside houses and of the structures themselves 
under different phenomena and relative severity.  
Furthermore it must be pointed out that some phenomena induce direct systemic damage 
simultaneously to physical damage. Ashes provide a good example: whilst they do not break 
road networks, they hamper though normal traffic, as they make the asphalt slippery and 
dangerous.  
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Another relevant aspect to consider particularly as far as resilience is considered is the potential 
duration of the event, which may torn communities‘ capacity to continue coping with a 
phenomena that is continuously hindering their efforts to return to a ―normal‖ life. 
 
References 
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―Natural Hazards‖ and Earth System Sciences, 5, 477-494. 
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Science", vol. 133, 2004. 
 
Vulnerability assessment: the case of landslide 
Vulnerability assessment to the landslide threat is still at an initial stage. Very few attempts 
have been made to develop methodologies to assess the vulnerability of territories and 
communities to the landslide hazard. In many cases vulnerability is equalled to exposure and 
the expected damage results from the overlapping of the landslide hazard map to the exposed 
elements. But even in this case, few examples are available, as the same damage accounting 
after landslide is rather deficient. 
This situation can be explained with a variety of reasons. First, the poor damage reporting is 
often due to the fact that damage to landslides is confounded with damage to floods, 
meteorological events, etc, as they may occur simultaneously; second, there is a large 
difference between types of landslides as classified by Cruden and Varnes (1996). In particular 
a relevant distinction should be made between fast and slow movements: while the latter may 
be extremely dangerous and leave little time for pre alerting systems, the second can be 
monitored and predicted to a certain extent and cautionary measures can be taken before the 
event actually occurs.  
Different types of monitoring systems and early warning decisions must be made with respect 
to the two types of events, with a different treatment of contingency plans and decisions to 
evacuate. 
Also the severity of damage may be different, as fast movement, including rock falls, debris 
and mudflows leave little room for saving goods (and many times also human lives) and their 
energy and velocity can be devastating. 
In the application of the general methodology of the proposed framework, it was therefore 
decided: 
To distinguish particularly physical vulnerability to the different types of movement; while in 
the case of systemic vulnerability the distinction between fast and slow movements has been 
kept. 
The parameters and indicators reflect on the one side the application to the case of landslides 
of general arguments, particularly when mitigation capacity and post event resilience have to 
be considered. It must be brought in mind that landslides are local events as far as the hazard 
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spatial scale is concerned. It is the most ―local‖ event with respect to the other ones considered 
in the project. 
The parameters related to physical vulnerability address the very little is known regarding how 
structures typology, material, quality of construction influence the final impact effect; while the 
parameters related to systemic vulnerability acknowledge the fact that lifelines are particularly 
vulnerable to landslides and may create local disruption and discomfort for relatively long time 
in mountain areas where redundancy of utilities and accesses is generally low.   
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Matrix to assess mitigation capacity  
 
 
First Matrix: Resilience: Mitigation capacity 
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Natural hazards identification and mapping Hazard maps availability
yes/no; level of detail with respect to
scale of decisions
Available knowledge updating Hazard maps updating Frequency of updating
Hazards monitoring
Yes/no; quality and distribution 
of monitoring networks
binary; expert judgement upon the
quality of networks
Integration of monitoring systems 
forecasting modelling systems
Yes/no; quality and reliability of 
forecasting models; match of 
monitored data to forecasting 
models
binary; expert judgement upon the
quality of models; back analysis
Structural defence measures
yes/no; quality of defences; 
state of maintenance
Vulnerability assessment of 
exposed built stock
yes/no ; updating frequency
Risk maps and scenarios, 
including enchained events
yes/no
Vulnerability and exposure 
assessment considered in 
ordinary plans (example land 
use)
yes/no; mode of inclusion
Building codes/rules yes/no; updated
Traditional building practice 
based on hazard knowledge
yes/no; capacity to re-produce
traditional techniques correctly
Maintenance of building stock yes/no
Land use plans embedding 
risk mitigation and vulnerability 
reduction
yes/no; sectoral/comprehensive;
specific/generic
Implementation capacity
yes/no; frequency of inspections;
trained personnel for inspections
Integration to other measures
(insurance)
yes/no
Vulnerability assessment of 
critical infrastructure
yes/no ; updating frequency
Maintenance programs 
embedding mitigation
yes/no
New projects based on 
hazard/risk assessment 
yes/no
Level of coordination among 
stakeholders
low/medium/high
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites
yes/no ; updating frequency
Retrofitting measures for 
existing production sites
yes/no
New projects based on risk 
assessment 
yes/no
Na-tech explicitly accounted 
for in hazardous installations 
emergency plans
yes/no; expert judgement on quality
Risk perception/ awareness inexistant/average/good
Individual preparedness
regarding specific self protective
measures; regarding measures
included in emergency plans
Participation in development 
and prevention/mitigation 
strategies
Education programs & media 
campaigns 
Coordination and cooperation 
among institutions in charge of 
risk prevention/ mitigation 
People/individuals
Rules and tools for risk 
mitigation
Availability, quality and efficacy of 
mitigation rules
Community and 
Instituions
Involvement of a community into decision-
making processes related to risk 
prevention and mitigation, the capacity of 
institutions  of improving risk awareness 
and the level of cooperation among 
different institutions in charge of risk 
prevention/ mitigation.
N
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tu
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Natural Hazards
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Inclusion of vulnerability and exposure 
assessments in land use plans
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s
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a
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ts
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fr
a
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tr
u
c
tu
re
 a
n
d
 p
ro
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 s
it
e
s
Existence of vulnerability assessments for 
production sites; consideration of na-techs
Production sites
Existence of vulnerability assessments for 
critical facilities; level of consideration of 
vulnerability in programs regarding critical 
facilities
Critical infrastructures
Evaluation of the capacity of individuals 
living in prone hazard areas of coping with 
hazardous events
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Matrix to assess physical vulnerability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second Matrix: Physical vulnerability: Vulnerability to stress (hazard)
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Fragility of natural ecosystems to 
hazard(s)
yes/no; parameters assessing 
specific response potential to 
different stresses
hazard specific
Possibility of enchained effects due to the 
interaction of natural systems with the 
triggering hazard
yes/no; how natural 
ecosystems condition may 
worsen hazards' impact
hazard specific
Vulnerability of ecosystems to mitigation 
measures taken during emergency
yes/no; how natural 
ecosystems may be impacted 
by mitgiation measures
hazard specific
Vulnerability assessment of 
residential buildings
hazard specific (though generally
considering material, age of
construction, structural features,
maintenance conditions
Vulnerability assessment of 
public facilities
hazard specific, considering also
content (machinery, documents,
etc.)
Vulnerability of the urban fabric
hazard specific (though generally
considering building density, height
of buildings, morphology, etc.)
Vulnerability assessment of 
critical infrastructure
hazard specific; different for each
lifeline
Vulnerability due to physical 
interaction among lifelines
depending on location, age, degree
of maintenance
Vulnerability due to physical 
interaction with vulnerable 
buildings
depending on the type of damage
that may affect or not lifelines
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites
hazard specific, though generally
considering both structures,
machinery, stocked material
Vulenrability due to 
dependency on lifelines
depending on the degree of
dependance upon external
vulnerable lifelines
Location with respect to 
vulnerable buidlings, roads, 
industrial sites
location in conditions where damage 
to structures may affect people
Preparedness hazard specific
Specific sensitivity to hazards 
(smoke; ash, heat, etc.)
hazard specific
Age; mobility impairment, other 
impairment
difficulties to comply with evacuation
orders; difficulties in escaping
Population density in 
vunerable areas
N
a
tu
ra
l 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
Natural ecosystems 
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Factors that make buildings, the urban 
fabric and public facilities vulnerable to the 
stress
B
u
il
t 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
Factors that may lead to injuries and 
fatalities
People/individuals
Community and 
Instituions
Factors that may lead to large number of 
victims
In
fr
a
s
tr
u
c
tu
re
 a
n
d
 p
ro
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 
s
it
e
s
Factors that make production sites 
vulnerable (including na-tech potential)
Production sites
Factors that make critical infrastructures 
vulenrable (mainly lifelines
Critical infrastructures
S
o
c
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l 
s
y
s
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m
 (
a
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)
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Matrix to assess systemic vulnerability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Third Matrix: Systemic vulnerability: Vulnerability to losses
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Fragility of ecosystems  to  potential 
secondary effects of hazard(s)
yes/no; parameters assessing 
specific response potential to 
different stresses
hazard specific
Possibility of enchained effects due to the 
interaction of natural systems with the 
triggering hazard
yes/no; how natural 
ecosystems condition may 
worsen hazards' impact
hazard specific
Vulnerability of ecosystems to mitigation 
measures taken during emergency
yes/no; how natural 
ecosystems may be impacted 
by mitgiation measures
hazard specific
Existance of public facilities 
and resources to face the 
emergency
yes/no; a scoring system can be
developed depending on a
hierachical assessment of
resources relevance for emergency
management
Accessibility to vulnerable 
areas
redundancy; quality of roads;
usability; expected travel time
Accessibility to public facilities
existance in the area, redundancy;
quality of roads; usability; expected
travel time
Existance of lifelines yes/no
Degree of interdependance 
among lifelines
redundancy; emergency devices;
autonomous capacity
Continuity plan for lifelines, 
individually and in a 
coordinated fashion
yes/no; considers all potential
threats/does not
Degree of dependance of 
critical public facilities from 
lifelines
redundancy; emergency devices;
autonomous capacity
Degree of dependance of 
production sites from lifelines
redundancy; emergency devices;
autonomous capacity
Accessibility to the plant and to 
markets
redundancy; quality of roads;
usability; expected increase in travel
time
Contingency plan for na-tech
yes/no; considers all potential
threats/does not
Business continuity plan Yes/no
Access to understandable 
information
yes/no
Trust in information provisers yes/no or percentage
Preparedness in case of event yes/no 
Presence of impaired groups 
(elderly, sick persons, etc.)
yes/no; percentage and location
Existance of contingency plan 
fro threats at stake
yes/no; date of last production or
update
Training using the contingency 
plan
yes/no; frequency of training
Overlapping responsiblities 
among agencies
Low/medium/high
Established protocols for 
information sharing
yes/no
Established protocols for use 
of resources to manage the 
crisis
yes/no/partial
Factors that may reduce coping capacity 
during crisis
People/individuals
Community and 
Institutions
Factors that may hamper effective crisis 
management
In
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Factors that may lead to halting productionProduction sites
Factors that make critical infrastructures 
stop functioning
Critical infrastructures
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Natural ecosystems 
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Factors that make buildings, the urban 
fabric and public facilities vulnerable to 
losses
B
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t
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Matrix to assess resilience 
 
Fourth Matrix: Resilience: response capability in the long run
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Ecosystems capacity  to recover from 
damages
resilience of natural 
ecosystems to the stress 
provoked by the natural 
hazard(s)
refer to studies in ecology; hazard
dependant
Ecosystems capacity  to recover from 
secondary negative effects of emergency 
mitigation measures
resilience of natural 
ecosystems to the stress 
provoked by human 
intervention in the attempt to 
prevent losses to settlements 
and infrastructures
refer to studies in ecology
Temporary transferability of 
facilities relevant for the 
settlement/city community life 
and economy
Yes/no
Existance of plans for 
reconstruction in case of 
severe destruction scenarios 
Yes/no
Existance of skilled 
workers/firms for repairs and 
reconstruction (example 
historic sites)
Yes/no; availability with respect to
expected need
Level of sharing among 
stakeholders of reconstruction 
plans
High/low; only formal/substantial
Level of integration of physical 
reconstruction with community 
healing processes
High/low; room for interpreting in the
new/restored setting the meaning of
the destruction
Relevance of potentially 
affected settlements in 
geographic/economic terms
Central/peripheral
Computerized mapping 
systems of infrstructures
yes/no
In site devices for quick survey 
of damaged parts
yes/no
Availability of spare materials 
for fast repairs
yes/no; time needed to bring on site
spare materials
Availability of personnel for 
repairs
on site/in distant areas; number of
available technicians with respect to
expected need
Existance of protocols to 
proceed with repairs requiring 
inter-lifelines interventions
yes/no/partial; number of different
stakeholders to be coordinated in
repair efforts
Temporary transferability of 
production in case of need
applicable/not applicable
Existance of funds for fast 
repairs
yes/no
Existance of inspection and 
guiding personnel for correct 
repairs
yes/no/forecasted in the recovery
plans
Economic sectors
Diversified or concentrated on few
sectors
Availability of psychological 
support for adults and children
yes/no/making part of ordinary
practices
Availability of private resources 
to resettle/repair
yes/no/support by public agencies
Access to insurance yes/no/percentage of coverage
Age structure Aging population; low fertility rates
Local condition of aged 
population
autonomous/not autonomous;
relatively healthy/not healthy
Employment rate high/medium/low
Annual population growth rate 
(over the last five years)
high/medium/low/negative
Immigration index high/medium/low/negative
Social networking high/medium/low/negative
Criminality rate high/medium/low
Conflict among social/ethnic 
groups
high/medium/low
Degree of trust in institutions
high/medium/low (from sociological
surveys when available)
Transparency in funds 
allocation
Existance of public information and
independent control mechanisms
Long term vision
Existance of strategic
development/land use plans
Insurance coverage Yes/no/percentage
Dependance of economic 
actors on loss of 
environmental goods
Prevalent tourist acitvity; agricoltural
activity
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Natural ecosystems 
Community
Affected community's resilience to the 
consequences of a catastrophe
Transparency, reliability and trustability of 
institutions in charge of reconstruction
Institutions
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Urban fabric/built environment capacity to 
recover reducing pre-event vulnerability
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People's resilience in the face of the  
catastrophe induced trauma
People/individuals
Economic stakeholders
Capacity and willingness of stakeholders  
to reinvest in affected areas
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Availability of tools to recover production 
sites rapidly and at low costs
Production sites
Availability of tools to recover critical 
infrastructures rapidly and at low costs
Critical infrastructures
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Matrix to assess mitigation capacity to drought 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk: drought First Matrix: Resilience: Mitigation capacity 
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories Application to case study
binary yes/no yes (Ministry of Agriculture,Israel Meteorological Service)
mapping scale
level of detail with respect to scale
of decisions regarding land uses
suitable to decisions regarding agricultural and herding practices
Hazard maps and assesment 
considers climate change
binary yes/no yes
Available knowledge updating Hazard maps updating Frequency of updating approx. every 5 years yes
Hazard monitoring
Yes/no; quality and distribution 
of monitoring networks
binary; expert judgement upon 
the quality of networks
yes/no; rainfall and hydrological
network available/not available
yes (Ministry of Agriculture,Israel Meteorological Service)
Integration of weather and precipitation 
monitoring systems with drought 
forecasting models
Are there early warning 
systems
relying on what type of indexes
indexes tailored to the context/not
tailored
yes by the Israel Meteorological Service at the beginning of the winter. Yet it has a
limited success of cerca 60%
availability/capacity to drill new 
wells; connect among 
acqueducts; runoff harvesting; 
waste water purification
mc of additional water Yes
capacity to reuse water numer of reuse cycles yes, three
remediation projects for 
contaminated rivers
binary; clear timing of clean up 
programs
yes/no
partially, some remediation projects have been carried out; still problems with
chemical contamination
purification of reused water degree of achieved quality good/acceptable/insufficient good
Risk scenarios availability binary yes/no yes 
Risk scenarios integrating 
climate change and induced 
hazards (like fires)
binary yes/no yes
Vulnerability and exposure 
assessment considered in 
ordinary plans (example land 
use)
yes/no; mode of inclusion
binary; only formally/substantially 
with limitations and specific 
requirements
yes
Building codes/rules 
building codes embed 
measures for water saving
yes/no
partially, faucet installation aimed at reducing the amount of water used and
controlling the amount of water used during flushing
Traditional building practice 
based on hazard knowledge
capacity to re-produce 
traditional techniques correctly
yes/no; judgement about the
capacity to conform to the "code of
practice"
Measured are implemented to increase insulation; Yet it is part of the climate and is
not necessarily linked to droughts
Land use plans embedding 
risk mitigation and vulnerability 
reduction
binary; 
sectoral/comprehensive; 
specific/generic
yes/no; expert judgement Yes, by the Ministry of Agriculture
Implementation capacity pricing policy for wasting water yes/no Yes, by the Ministry of Agriculture
Integration to other measures
(insurance)
binary yes/no Yes
Existance of double piping 
system for rain/grey water
yes/no yes for many rural sttlements
Maintenance programs 
embedding mitigation
yes/no; frequency of maintenance yes, maily in chrge by the Ministry of Agriculture
New projects based on 
hazard/risk assessment 
yes/no yes
Treatment plants operationality
fully operational and frequently 
inspected/missing plants, lack of 
inspection procedures
yes. Enlargement of existing plans and new plans are constantly taking place
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites
with respect to water crisis yes/no yes
Production buildings and 
activities designed to save 
water
binary yes/no partially
Self storage of emergency 
water 
binary yes/no partially
Risk perception/ awareness degree inexistent/average/good good
Early warning systems
information addressing all 
components of communiy(ies)
% of coverage 100%
Individual preparedness
regarding specific self 
protective measures; regarding 
measures included in 
emergency plans
inexistant/average/good Overall good for the Jewish farmers and insufficient for the Bedouin farmers
Participation in development 
and prevention/mitigation 
strategies
degree inexistent/average/good good for Jewish community and average for Bedouins?
Level of coordination among 
institutions
degree low/medium/high
Level of coordination betweenthe Land-use administration responsible for most state-owned land in the
Negev; the Jewish National Fund (JNF) responsible for the forested plots, Mekorot: the national water
company, responsible for channeling drinking water from the center and northern parts of the country to the
Negev and for the purification and channeling of sewage water from the Tel-Aviv metropolitan to the Negev,
the Ministry of Agriculture: responsible for research and development and professional instructions, and the
Ministry of Finance that introduced the "drought line" demarcating an area as prone to droughts, where
farmers are guaranteed the return of expenses in case of droughts is generally good. High levels of
solidarity between JFA members, makes JFA a powerful actor vis-à-vis the governmental and financial
institutes.
Councelling for best 
agricoltural and herding 
techniques
binary yes/no yes, the Ministry for Agricolture is responsible and programs do exist
frequency and coverage
very frequent/rare; extended to the 
entire population at risk/only to 
limited groups
frequent; addressing also the Bedouin community for shifting from extensive to
intensive herding 
thaught at school in ordinary 
programs
yes/no yes
Cooperation among different 
ethnic communities
high/low/conflict situation
Both conflicts and cooperation between Jewish and Bedouin farmers and between institutional and
governmental agents are frequent in the Negev. Theft of Jewish agricultural equipment, crops and water
from Mekorot by Bedouins are a common scenario in the Negev, as well as illegal occupation of state-
owned land by Bedouins. Evacuation of the invaders from the land that is cultivated, at least, once, is
difficult following verdicts by the Israeli Supreme Court. In addition, if their tents are legally destroyed, the
state pays compensation to Bedouins. Socio-economic relations between the Bedouin populations and
Jewish institutions are characterized by mutual help and cooperation. Land-use authorities allow for sheep
grazing on the state-owned lands, and JNF allows, grazing (subject to some restrictions) in its forests. The
Ministry of Agriculture actively acquires permissions from the army for entering Bedouin herds into army
training zones during the weekends. Bedouin and Jewish guides employed by the Ministry of Agriculture
facilitate adequate professional instructions to the sheep owners and farmers. The interaction between the
Jewish farmers and the Bedouins include purchasing the right to use waste water of Bedouin towns by the
Jeasish farmers. Bedouin workers are widely employed by the Jewish farmers while Bedouin sheep owners
purchase from the Jewish farmers the rights to graze on the wheat straw. Jewish farmers also directly sell to
the Bedouin sheep owners straw, hay and grains.
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Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Inclusion of vulnerability and exposure 
assessments in land use plans
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Rules and tools for risk 
mitigation
Availability, quality and efficacy of 
mitigation rules
Natural Hazards
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Existence of vulnerability assessments for 
production sites; consideration of na-techs
Production sites
Existence of vulnerability assessments for 
critical facilities; level of consideration of 
vulnerability in programs regarding critical 
facilities
Critical infrastructures
Evaluation of the capacity of individuals 
living in prone hazard areas of coping with 
hazardous events
People/individuals
Community and 
Institutions
Hazard maps availability, 
reporting climatic and 
hydrological conditions in the 
area
Natural hazards identification and mapping
Vulnerability assessment of 
water system
Education programs & media 
campaigns 
Involvement of a community into decision-
making processes related to risk 
prevention and mitigation, the capacity of 
Instituions of improving risk awarenees 
and the level of cooperation among 
different institutions in charge of risk 
prevention/ mitigation.
possibility and capacity to use 
additional water sources
Structural defence measures
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Matrix to assess physical vulnerability to drought 
Risk: drought Second Matrix: Physical vulnerability: Vulnerability to stress (drought) and to losses (water scarcity crisis)
In the case of drought it seems that the distinction between physical and systemic vulnerability as for other hazards does not make sense.
First because of the duration of the event, that can last for several months; second because the actual "damage" is the loss of an ecological service (water)
which provokes the loss or the scarcity of water in pipes and in rivers. So the two aspects of damage and loss of function seem to coincide 
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories Application to case study
relative resistance to lack of 
precipitation 
number of days/minimum mm
rain/year
Selected crops have a high resistance to
droughts; may yield 10-20% more grains
with given precipitation.
dependence on precipitation
totally rain-fed/irrigation (reused
water)
Long-term trend of increasing the water sources and
irrigated area in the Negev results in high robustness of
the Negev territorial system to droughts. Thirty Years
ago 90% of the Negev's fields' crop was wheat; these
fields could be used for sheep grazing after the harvest.
Currently, half of the cultivated areas are connected to
the irrigation systems and are not available for grazing
during years when semi-industrial crops or vegetables
are grown on these plots. 
sheep and goat
relative resistance to lack of 
precipitation 
number of days/minimum mm
rain/year
During severe droughts, when the grain did not reach
maturation and harvesting is cancelled. Bedouin herds
are allowed to graze on the un-harvested plots during
these years, the sheep numbers will grow and their
feeding during the next years becomes problematic. A
decision to increase the herd due to the high food
availability during extreme droughts will cause capital
loss during consecutive "normal" droughts when food is
less available.
type of treatment
tillage/no-tillage; use of organic
matters: yes/no
The use of the no-tillage cultivation techniques and
special machinery that increase the soil water storage
result in an increase in the moisture content of the soil
(Bonfil, 1999). Similarly, the addition of organic matter
which serves to increase the moisture content of the soil
(Cantón et al., 2004) may contribute to the "success" of
certain fields. Higher moisture content may also
characterize "sun-shaded" aspects such as the northern
aspect in the Negev.
type of rotation
using productions that deplate
water content/save water content
The decision to sow a more drought-resistant crop such
as barely instead of the more drought-sensitive wheat
may determine future vulnerability as well as more
general decision on rotation of crops within a field.
Despite the general necessity of rotation that aims at
reducing the risk of exhausting the fields and the
development of diseases, rain-fed wheat may be
affected during a next drought year.
crops and other agricoltural 
products by type
vulnerability to emergency 
water sources (i.e. desalinized 
water)
high/medium/low
Emergency water (from runoff or sewage).
Only purified sewage water is used. As a
rtsult there is no risk of using this water. 
sheep and goat
vulnerability to emergency 
water sources (i.e. desalinized 
water) and emergency actions
high/medium/low
On a national level, desalinized water is
used. Yet this water is mixed with ions
before reaching the fields and thus risk that
stem from lack of necessary cations and
anions is avoided. As for sheep and goat,
during severe droughts actually the food for
herd increses leading to a more vulnerable
situation
type and maintenance of 
pipes; needed pressure to 
have water at taps
designed for dry climate/ordinary
pipes; large pressure needed/low
pressure 
The existence of a double system (for
domestic use and for agriculture) reduces
the vulnerability of the system 
emergency water storage yes/no
Local reservoirs of runoff and sewage
water. Yet, one has to note that these
systems are not designed for emergency
periods but one there, they may be used
during such periods
minimal water need/day/type 
of building use
l/day/type of use: residential, 
hospital, school, other public 
facilities
DO YOU MEAN(?): shortage of water
sources and water quata, inproper
cultivation techniques.
average lifelitime of wells months
Inadequate planning of water usage;
technical difficulties in operating the
facilities used for waste water purification
minimal threshold of water 
needed in tanks and reservoirs
cm
Since all water of the entire country is
centrally controlled, over pumping and
excess of water usage will ffect the entire
country and may not be confined to one
particular region
Availability/capacity to use 
emergency alternative sources
binary; estimation of mc that 
may be addeded to the system
yes/no; mc see above
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites
degree of dependence of 
activity on water
high/medium/low
low; Since irrigated crops are sown prior to
any knowledge regarding drought and are
hardly affected by drought, only production
that is based on rain-fed wheat and summer 
crops (which are mainly planted following a
wet year) will be affected
emergency water storage yes/no; days of autonomy see above
Access to water sources per 
type and quality
degree
to all sources/partial/severely 
restricted
Both sources, dribking and purified water
are used by both communities. Yet, as the
usage of purified water necessitate high
solidarity between the farmers and a strong
"lobby" that will act to acquire bank funding,
Jewish farmers can much easily invest in
the costly facilities that purify wate and
therefore are the main consumeres of
purified water
Population living in the driest 
areas
Number l/day availble in drought conditions
No evacuation of people due to drought
takes place. Yet, at a long run, immigration,
especially of the Bedouin population from
the rural settlements to the cities may take
place due to reduced income
Preparedness degree high/medium/low
high for the Jewish sector, medoium for the
Bedouin sector
Access to information about 
water saving strategies
degree of coverage
> 70%population/< 50% 
population
high for the Jewish sector, medoium for the
Bedouin sector
Contingency plan binary
yes/no; shared among 
stakeholders/known by few
high 
Access to information about 
compensation and alternative 
sources of revenue
degree of coverage
> 70%population/< 50% 
population
Despite the compensation, the fields within the "drought
line" do not yield income and the compensation cannot
prevent the severe economical influence of drought on
the farmers. Compensation relates to the expenses but
not to the loss of revenue
note: there are some measures taken to reduce vulnerability to severe droughts that create vulnerability
to more frequent droughts. (the vice versa can also be the case. Interesting)
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People/individuals
Community and 
Institutions
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Critical infrastructures
Production sites
Factors that create discomfort for the 
population and as an ultimate resource the 
need to evacuate
Factors that make production sites 
vulnerable (including na-tech potential)
soil capacity to maintain 
moisture
crops and other agricoltural 
products by type
Factors that make critical infrastructures 
vulenrable (mainly lifelines)
Factors that make exposed systems 
vulnerable to drought
Vulnerability assessment of 
buildings 
Vulnerability assessment of 
water system
Fragility of ecosystems  to  potential 
secondary effects of hazard(s)
Vulnerability of ecosystems to mitigation 
measures taken during emergency
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Matrix to assess resilience to drought 
 
Risk: drought; case study: the Northern Negev area Fourth Matrix: Resilience: response capability in the long run
System Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment Descriptors Application to case study
Ecosystems capacity  to recover from 
secondary negative effects of emergency 
mitigation measures
Process of crops and other 
agricoltural productions 
recovery
Needed time and water Months; minimal mm precipitation
Capacity to introduce all mitigation 
measures  envisaged in the first matrix 
during the window of opportunity opened 
during recovery
See first matrix as far as 
monitoring and structural 
defences are considred
binary yes/no
Existance of plans/adjustments 
for recovery after severe 
drought periods
binary yes/no
Droughts trigger the search for technical means to alleviate the effect
of the drought, increases investments in water supply, and establishes
economic mechanisms of crediting investments during the crises.
Adaptation of new varieties of sheep, new insemination techniques,
development of intensive sheep raising contribute to the resilience of
the Bedouin sector to droughts. Investments and development of new
water sources, extending the pipeline network, introducing new wheat
varieties, increasing the moisture stored at the soil with the new
agricultural techniques, all these consistently increases the coping
capacity of the Jewish sector. 
Do adjustments reduce 
vulnerability to future droughts
binary
yes/no * careful assessment needed
regarding adjustments for
frequent/severe droughts that may
be counterproductive in case of
frequent/severe droughts
The use of purified sewage water for irrigation. Extension of the
irrigated areas is the most important part of the northern Negev
development during the last 20 years. The revenues from the irrigated
crops are several times higher than that from the rain-fed crops, thus
substantially increasing farmers' capacity to cope with the unfavorable
weather conditions.
Relevance of potentially 
affected settlements in 
geographic/economic terms
Type of settlement
rural low density areas/ urban 
areas/cities
In the project cities like Beer Sheva were excluded and attention was
concentrated on the two types of settlements pertaining to the two
communities. The Jewish farmers live in Moshav and Kibbutz
structures, while the Bedouins are organised in families. Attempts to
structure Bedouins' communities in settlements served with lifelines
and other services succeeded only in part. While illegal occupation of
State owned land is still very frequent and in those cases access to
facilities is substantially less secure.
Computerized mapping 
systems of infrstructures
binary yes/no yes
Possibility to improve the water 
system
binary yes/no yes
Availability of extra water 
sources
binary and number yes/no; mc estimated yes
Availability of technologies to 
reuse water
binary; type of technology yes/no yes reference to the table provided in the text
Availability of technologies and 
practices to save water
biinary; type of technology yes/no
yes, the use of the drip irrigation (saves half the
amount of water in comparison to the traditional
systems); use of domestic means that save domestic
water use
Temporary transferability of 
production in case of need 
within region/country
binary yes/no no
Existance of funds for repaying 
costs and new investments
binary; amount yes/no
The ministry of finance provides financial umbrella to the insurance of
the farmers against the drought's hazard and, also, to immediate
financial compensation provided to the farmers following droughts.
Despite the compensation, the fields within the "drought line" do not
yield income and the compensation cannot prevent the severe
economical influence of drought on the farmers.
People/individuals
People's resilience in the face of the  
catastrophe induced trauma
Availability of private resources 
to resettle/recover
binary
yes/no; support by public 
agencies/relying only on private 
funds
Yes, public funding. Strong lobbying by the Jewish
farmers association.
Presence of elderly and 
particularly vulnerable 
people(sick, impaired)
percentage
Employment rate degree high/medium/low
high in the Jewish sector; much lower in the Bedouin
sector
Annual population growth rate 
(over the last five years)
degree high/medium/low/negative
medium in the Jewish sector; extremely high in the
Bedouin sector (the highest in the world)
Immigration index degree high/medium/low/negative Low
Social networking degree high/medium/low
A positive social effect of the drought is the
intensification of the intra-relationships and solidarity
between the community members, especially in the
aJewish sector.
Conflict and cooperation 
among social/ethnic groups
degree high/medium/low
Droughts affect interaction between the Jewish farmers and the
Bedouin sheep owners. Jewish farmers may allow grazing while the
Bedouin sheep owners may decide whether to purchase the right to
graze on agricultural fields or rather to purchase hay to feed the sheep 
at the barn or paddock in their own property. The decision of the
Jewish farmers to restrict grazing on agricultural fields may, on one
hand, reduce the number of herds in the Northern Negev; on the other
hand this may enforce new husbandry techniques. A decision of the
sheep owners not purchase the right to graze on the fields may
enforce Jewish farmers to use the straw as mulch.
Degree of trust in institutions degree high/medium/low high for the Jewsish farmers; medium for the Bedouins
Transparency in funds 
allocation
Existance of public information 
and independent control 
mechanisms
yes/no yes
Existance of strategic 
development/land use plans
yes/no yes
Level of sharing among 
stakeholders of recovery plans 
and adjustments
High/low; only formal/substantial
Currently, half of the cultivated areas are connected to the irrigation
systems and are not available for grazing during years when semi-
industrial crops or vegetables are grown on these plots. The amount
of fields available for grazing is thus constantly decreasing.
Consequently, the pressure, on the Bedouin farmers, to switch from
extensive to intensive sheep-raising is increasing. This is
accompanied by Internal changes of the Bedouin society, higher
education demand and refusal of the young generation to serve as
shepherds. Yet, the reduction in the Bedouin sheep-feed areas is
accompanied by higher yield of wheat from the plots irrigated a year
before. Indeed, following crop rotation, wheat is often grown on plots
that were used for irrigated semi-industrial crops or vegetables a year
before. As a result, the amount of straw at these plots is substantially
higher than on plots that were not irrigated. In this way the irrigated
plots may compensate, at least partially, for the reduction in the
amount of the fields available for Bedouin grazing. 
Compensation mechanisms 
integrate risk mitigation 
measures
yes/no
Currently, the investments of the Jewish farmers into new water
sources are continuously increasing. The tendency of the Bedouin
sheep owners to switch to intensive raising is also noted. We do not
have yet a definite answer whether a reduction in the grazing area
could enforce the switch from extensive to intensive sheep raising.
Yet, our preliminary results point to such a possibility.
Insurance coverage Coverage %
all Jewish sttlements; only a small part of the Bedouin
farmers
Dependance of economic 
actors on loss of 
environmental goods
Prevalent tourist acitvity; 
agricultural activity
percentage on GNP (of the 
region/country)
Agricultural yield is responsible for above average
GNP due to the Negev advantage in early maturation
of winter crops and the high proces received for theses
goods abroad
Economic stakeholders
Willingness and capacity of economic 
stakeholders to reinvest in affected areas
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Availability of tools to recover production 
sites rapidly and at low costs
Production sites (other 
than agricolture)
Availability of tools to recover critical 
infrastructures rapidly and at low costs
Critical infrastructures
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Are institutions in charge of reconstruction 
transparent, reliable and trustable?
Institutions
Hypothetically, drought may cause large abandonment of the Jewish 
settlements and immigration of the Bedouin population from the rural 
settlements to towns. However, such an extreme scenario is 
unrealistic. Droughts serve as a trigger for irrigating rain-fed plots and 
enforce Jewish farmers to increase the investments in water supply. 
By forming a lobby in favor of government investment in the 
development and transfer of water from the wetter parts of the 
country, and in additional local water sources, Jewish farmers 
substantially increased the system resilience. An increase of the 
urban population instead causes steady increase in the amount of the 
sewage water that serves in turn for irrigation (following purification)
Long term vision
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Urban fabric/built environment capacity to 
recover reducing pre-event vulnerability
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Community
Affected community's resilience to the 
consequences of a drought
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Matrix to assess mitigation capacity to flood 
Risk: flood; Case study: Severn, flood 2007 First Matrix: Mitigation capacity 
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories Application to case study
Hazard maps availability binary 1. yes/no
Hazard maps scale
scale and level of detail with 
respect to planning decisions
county level, neighborhood level,
single building level
Considers domino effects Considers potential na-tech yes/no, only partially
Hazard maps considers 
climate change
binary yes/no
Dos a monitoring network 
exist?
binary yes/no
quality and distribution of 
monitoring networks
expert judgement upon the 
quality of networks
high/low
Does an instrumented flood 
detection and monitoring 
system exist (i.e. a hydrometric 
network) ? How much of the 
geographical area does it 
cover ?
Binary, % area coverage Yes/No,  <30%, 30-60%, >60%
Capacity to take preventative action for pluvial
flooding is limited because of the time taken to
react (especially at night-time) and short
warning lead times. Capacity to respond to
fluvial flood warnings is relatively good. 
are there early warning 
systems?
binary; quality yes/no; expert judgement
Flood forecasting Flood forecasting capability Resolution capability Low, medium, high
Is severe weather warning 
integrated with flood warning 
to lengthen the overall warning 
lead time ?
Binary Yes/No
Flood warning timeliness Warning lead time
Very short (<30 mins), short (30-
180 mins), medium (181 mins - 12
hrs), long (>12 hrs)
Do they exist, what is the 
defence standard
binary; Return Period for which 
protection is set
Yes/No, 50, 80, 100, >100 yrs
The Lower Severn sub-region has few raised
structural flood defences (there are some low
earth embankments and pumped drainage
systems) to protect against fluvial flooding,
although there are flood embankments around
the edge of the estuary which provide a high
level of protection against tidal flooding.
Structural flood protection for fluvial flooding is
largely impracticable because of floodwater
displacement and transfer implications.
Do protection standards take 
climate change into account ?
Binary Yes/No
Condition of defences
Is condition assessed regularly 
(a) point installations: binary 
(b) linear defences: binary ?
(a) Yes/|No, %age in excellent,
good, poor condition (b) Yes/No,
%age in excellent, good, poor
condition
Point installations include flood gates,
pumping stations etc.
Maintenance
(a) Does a systematic plan 
exist for maintenance: binary 
(b) is maintenance budget 
guaranteed: binary ?
Yes/No, Yes/No
Is space available to construct, 
reconstruct or realign defences 
?
Binary Yes/No
Flood retention areas (a) Do 
they exist ? (b) Does land use 
planning allow for potential 
retention areas for the future to 
be protected from 
development ?
(a) Binary (b) Binary Yes/No, Yes/No
Are natural flood buffer zones 
maintained and/or reinstated 
when lost ?
Binary Yes/No
These include beaches, marshes,
mudflats and natural habitats
Vulnerability assessment of 
exposed built stock
binary ; updating frequency yes/no; every 5 ys/only after floods
Risk maps and scenarios, 
including enchained events
binary; RP considered
yes/no; only frequent events/also
rare events
Vulnerability and exposure 
assessment considered in 
ordinary plans (example land 
use)
binary; mode of inclusion
yes/no; only formally/substantially 
with limitations and specific 
requirements
As the floodplain settlements of Gloucester
and Tewkesbury have grown in response to
economic growth, so they have further
extended in some cases into the floodplain
because of the absence of alternative
development land in attractive locations.  Even 
so since 1947 the planning and development
control system has restrained development in
flood zones.
Building codes/rules binary; updated
yes/no; judgement of effectiveness
upon "age" of rules with resepct to
state of the art
Capacity to control building standards came
with the introduction of building codes which
have a long history in the UK. These codes,
now well enforced, will have avoided gross
instances of a lack of basic structural integrity
and resilience to flooding. Today's building
codes do not include detailed flood resilience
standards but there are plans to correct this.
Rules for retrofitting Binary Yes/No
Flood resilience built into new 
projects and programmes
Binary Yes/No
Traditional building practice 
based on hazard knowledge
binary; capacity to re-produce 
traditional techniques correctly
yes/no; judgement about the
capacity to conform to the "code of
practice"
Maintenance of building stock binary; economic incentives yes/no; exist/not foreseen
Land use plans embedding 
risk mitigation and vulnerability 
reduction
binary; expert judgement
binary; sectoral/comprehensive;
specific/generic
In response to the spreading of urbanisation
into the countryside in England and Wales, in
1947 the nation introduced a universal land
use control system (the Town and Country
Planning System). This required most
development proposals to acquire planning
consent before development could take place. 
Implementation capacity
binary; frequency of
inspections; trained personnel
for inspections
yes/no; availability of budget for
personnel to advice and inspect
Integration to other measures
(insurance)
binary yes/no (what conditions)
Flood insurance premiums have a limited fit to
level of flood risk. Flood insurance companies
do not yet reduce premiums for those who
have installed resilience measures.
Projects of access ways to and
within hazardous areas
binary yes/no
It has proved very difficult to develop a
transportation system for the Lower Severn
which is not flood prone. As a consequence
many roads and some rail lines are flooded
from time to time. Adoption of Sustainable
Urban Drainage Systems (SUDS) has now
become mandatory and this will help limit
surface water flooding of road systems.
Vulnerability assessment of 
critical infrastructure
binary ; updating frequency
yes/no; anytime new project/repair
needed/only after floods
Capacity to locate utility installations in flood-
free locations has been limited. There has
been a long-standing tendency to locate utility
installations on areas of low-lying ground
which were apparently 'waste' land and not
used for other purpose - developing a legacy
of flood prone infrastructure 
Maintenance programs 
embedding mitigation
binary yes/no
New projects based on 
hazard/risk assessment 
binary yes/no
Detailed studies have recently been done to
develop and publicise flood resilience and
flood resistance measures for critical and
other infrastructure (McBain et al., 2010). New
infrastructure will need to proceed through
flood risk assessment procedures in future
and processes now exist for this.
Level of coordination among 
stakeholders
expert judgement low/medium/high
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites
binary ; updating frequency
yes/no; anytime new project/repair
needed/only after floods
Retrofitting measures for 
existing production sites
binary yes/no
New projects based on risk 
assessment 
binary yes/no
Na-tech explicitly accounted 
for in hazardous installations 
emergency plans
binary; expert judgement on 
quality
yes/no; in generic terms/through
detailed assessment
Commercial flood insurance Binary; extent of coverage Yes/No, low/medium/high
Risk perception/ awareness 
questionnaires, surveys, 
judgement after event
Negligible or low/average/good
In Gloucester 34.9% of residents have lived in
their house for less than 5 years (the
equivalent statistic for Tewkesbury is 35.2%)
(Gloucestershire County Council 2009).
Although these statistics do not relate
specifically to the portion of these settlements
which are flood prone, they are an indicator of
the degree to which the local population has
the capacity to manage flood risk and is likely
to be inexperienced in flood risk and its
successful management. Such residential
mobility is a feature of a relatively prosperous
urban society of which the Lower Severn area
is part.
Access to flood information 
including flood maps, 
explanation of warning codes, 
appropriate actions
Binary; map quality Yes/No; map quality good/fair/poor
Flood insurance Binary; coverage Yes/No, low/medium/high
Training and experience of 
population/communities
Qualitative judgement Low/medium/high
Individual preparedness
regarding specific self 
protective measures; regarding 
measures included in 
emergency plans
Negligible or low/average/good
Everyone with access to the internet (internet
access is around 80%) is able to access
indicative flood maps provided by the
Environment Agency. By clicking on the
precise location of a property, a property
owner can read an assessment of the risk of
flooding to that property. This data is
publicised by the Environment Agency at local
farmers' markets and special flood fairs, as
well as in other ways.
Participation in development 
and prevention/mitigation 
strategies
binary and level of involvement
yes/no; only formal/encouraged 
participation
Education programs & media 
campaigns 
binary and frequency
yes/no; regularly carried out/only 
occasionally
flood risk awareness and how best to prepare
for flooding is not as well comprehended as it
needs to be in these communities despite
recent flood events. Through mechanisms
such as the above roadshows and the Flood
Information Network, local capacity has been
developed to introduce local people to flood
products which can increase the resilience of
homes and other structures to flooding.
Awareness programs as part 
of ordinary teaching programs
binary yes/no
Capacity to invest in mitigation Qualitative judgement Low/medium/high
Coordination and cooperation 
among institutions in charge of 
risk prevention/ mitigation 
judgement good/partial/low
Capacity to invest in mitigation Qualitative judgement Low/medium/high
Business continuity plans binary yes/no
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Existence of vulnerability assessments for 
production sites; consideration of na-techs
Production sites
Existence of vulnerability assessments for 
critical facilities; level of consideration of 
vulnerability in programs regarding critical 
facilities
Critical infrastructures
Evaluation of the capacity of individuals 
living in prone hazard areas of coping with 
hazardous events
People/individuals
Community and 
Instituions
Involvement of a community into decision-
making processes related to risk 
prevention and mitigation, the capacity of 
Instituions of improving risk awarenees 
and the level of cooperation among 
different institutions in charge of risk 
prevention/ mitigation.
Economic stakeholders
Level of preparedness of key economic 
stakeholders 
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Natural Hazards
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Inclusion of vulnerability and exposure 
assessments in land use plans
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Natural hazards identification and mapping
Hazard monitoring
structural defence measures
Rules and tools for risk 
mitigation
Integration of weather and flood detection 
and monitoring systems with hydraulic and 
hydrologica/hydrographic flood forecasting 
models
Flood warning
Availability, quality and efficacy of 
mitigation rules
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Matrix to assess physical vulnerability to flood 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk: flood; Case study: Severn, flood 2007 Second Matrix: Physical vulnerability: Vulnerability to stress (hazard)
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories Application to case study
Fragility of natural ecosystems to 
hazard(s)
Are different crops/agricolture 
productions vulnerable?
height of water; quality of 
flooding water; duration of 
flood
mt; concentration of contaminants;
days
Average agricultural flood damage cost were
about £1,150 per flooded hectare when
weighted by land use 
Possibility of enchained effects due to the 
interaction of natural systems with the 
triggering hazard
Is there a possibility of solid 
trasport mechanisms
binary/expected volume of 
material
yes/no; mc
Vulnerability of ecosystems to mitigation 
measures taken during emergency
River diversions taken to 
reduce the hazard severity 
may subtract water from areas 
that need it?
binary yes/no
timber/mud/stone/bricks/reinfor
ced concrete
timber/mud/stone/bricks/reinforced 
concrete
Different depth-damage curves for each house
type to be allocated to properties in flood risk
zones.
Number of floors 1/2/ >2
Number of high rise buildings is very low in
terms of proportion of total.
Level of the first floor with 
respect to expected flood
lower level/same/higher level
Existance of basement yes/no
Properties within flood risk 
zone
Number and type of properties
Numbers from survey or
secondary data
Position with respect to 
hazardous zones
Distance and position with 
respect to expected flood 
height
in the rapid inundation zones/at
higher levels
It was the strategic position of Gloucester at a
bridging point of the River Severn that led to
the creation of the original settlement which
then gradually spread out the wide estuarial
floodplains. The town of Tewkesbury has
similar origins being located strategically at
the confluence of the Rivers Severn and Avon.
This town has a population today of 10,000
and its growth and development has been
very significantly constrained by the flood risk
zones which surround it.
Content of buildings valuable objects in first floors yes/no; type of valuable objects
Resistance and resilience of 
structural mitigation measures
Vulnerability to stress, 
maintenance regimes etc.
Qualitative judgement -
low/medium/high
Non-structural mitigation 
measures e.g. early warning 
systems
Binary Yes/no
Proximity to hazardous land 
uses
Type of land use and distance
Estimate of distance e.g. <500m,
500m - 1,000m etc.
Vulnerability assessment of 
public facilities
As for buildings but 
distinguishing by function
Vulnerability of the urban fabric
Consiering entire 
neighborhoods
Population density: high, medium, 
low
Average house damage insurance claims
were £30,000 - £40,000
Distance and position with
respect to expected flood
in the most critical zone/in a rarely
flooding zone
The principal vulnerable installation is the
Mythe Water Treatment works which was
flooded in 2007. Physical damage to these
works are estimated at £29.6 millions, without
considering costs o distribution of water
bottles. The Castlemeads Electricity
substation was also flooded.11 Sewage
Treatment Works and 40 Sewage Pumping
Stations were flooded and all had to have
equipment replaced afterwards.  
Ordinary maintenance yes/no
Existance of emergency
provisions to protect from
floods
yes/no
The much larger Waltham Electricty Station
supplying millions of consumers cam within 4
cms of flooding but was saved from flooding
by emergency resilience measures
Na-techs are considered in
emergency procedures
yes/no
Distance and position with
respect to expected flood
in the most critical zone/in a rarely
flooding zone
500 businesses directly affected by flooding
Existance of emergency
provisions to protect structures
from floods
yes/no
Na-techs are considered in
emergency procedures
yes/no
Existance of provisions to
protect stocked material and
machinery
yes/no
Vulnerability due to 
dependence on lifelines
Qualitative judgement Low/medium/high
Proximity to dangerous land 
uses
Type of land use and distance
Estimate of distance e.g. <500m,
500m - 1,000m etc.
Location with respect to 
vulnerable buidlings, roads, 
industrial sites
People that may be trapped in 
flooding buildings of different 
types (residential, public, etc.)
number of people; location in 
maps
The potential of floods to kill people in the
Lower Severn area is normally low because
flooding is usually shallow. Two people died in
the summer 2007 floods in Gloucestershire as
an indirect effect of flooding.
Preparedness
People know what to do in 
case of flood warning
yes/no; extent of compliance with 
norms in emergency plans
Age; mobility impairment, other 
impairment
difficulties to comply with 
evacuation orders; difficulties 
in escaping
number of people; location in 
maps
Depth of flood dangerous for 
individuals
Curves depth/individuals 
stability
Number of storeys in buildings 
where people live
Single-storey buildings e.g 
bungalows
%age of housing stock which is 
single storey
Temporary houses with low 
robustness hosting people
Caravans/mobile 
homes/chalets
Number of people living in these
Lack of high level exit routes 
and safe havens for people to 
escape
Yes/no
Population density in 
vunerable areas
Population density in different 
hazard areas
Maps
Numbers of tourists/visitors in 
vulnerable areas
difficulties to comply with 
evacuation orders and 
knowing what to do 
Number of tourists/visitors
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Natural ecosystems 
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Factors that make buildings, the urban 
fabric and public facilities vulnerable to the 
stress
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Community and 
Instituions
Factors that may lead to large number of 
victims
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Factors that make production sites 
vulnerable (including na-tech potential)
Production sites
Factors that make critical infrastructures 
vulenrable (mainly lifelines)
Critical infrastructures
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Buildings structural 
vulnerability
Water treatment plants; 
electical power plants;  other 
lifelines plants
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites
Factors that may lead to injuries and 
fatalities
People/individuals
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Matrix to assess systemic vulnerability to flood 
 
 
Risk: flood; Case study: Severn, flood 2007 Third Matrix: Systemic vulnerability: Vulnerability to losses
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories Application to case study
Are crops and other 
agricoltural productions 
vulnerable to contaminated 
water
by type of production and 
concentration/type of 
contaminant
detailed analysis of potential
contaminants sources in the area
needed
Areas that may be vulnerable 
to secondary contamination
along the river, considering 
dispersion mode of 
contaminants
Contaminants, rock, stones,
boulders, mud; transportation
pocesses 
Existance of public facilities: 
hospitals, fire brigades, 
emergency control rooms 
yes/no; functional capacity of 
such facilities
assessment of functional potential
of facilities
Facilities which posses 
underground elements such as 
access routes, basements, 
tunnels
Binary, extent
Yes/No; lengths of routeways,
proportion with underground
facilities
Lack of safe (e.g. high level) 
exit routes from underground 
facilities or from flooded 
buildings
Binary, extent
Yes/No; lengths of routeways,
proportion with underground
facilities
Range of service of public 
facilities
Importance of facilities in the 
potentially stricken areas
Local facilities/regional/national
relevance
Accessibility to vulnerable 
areas
redundancy; quality of roads; 
usability; expected travel time
10,000 motorists stranded on motorway
system. 500 rail passengers stranded. Tens
and thousands more with disrupted travel for
several weeks. Aaccess to Tewkesbury was
maintained by a single rail line during the
summer 2007 floods.
Accessibility to public facilities
redundancy; quality of roads; 
usability; expected travel time
Existance of lifelines binary yes/no
Degree of interdependance 
among lifelines
level of redundancy; binary
high redundancy; emergency
devices exist/do not; autonomous
capacity exist/does not
Continuity plan for lifelines, 
individually and in a 
coordinated fashion
binary
yes/no; considers all potential
threats/does not
Degree of dependance of 
critical public facilities from 
lifelines
binary
autonomous plants exist/do not; 
alternative resources available/not 
available
People and areas depending 
on lifelines in potentially 
affected zones
number/area dimension
number of customers who may be
affected; geographic area
Number affected through loss of potable water
supplies: 135,000 homes or 350,000 people
for 17 days: i.e. 340,000 people outside the
flood risk zone. Adaptation comprised
providing large number of bottled water
supplies but not without availability problems
in some areas.
Duration of outages hours/days few hours/> 24
Number affected by loss of electricity power
supplies: 48,000 homes or 111,840 people for
up to 2 days: i.e. c100,000 affected outside of
flood risk zone.
Degree of dependance of 
production sites from lifelines
binary
autonomous plants exist/do not; 
alternative resources available/not 
available
500 businesses directly affected by flooding,
additional 7,500 businesses outside of flood
risk zone affected by loss of water supplies for
17 days 
Transferability to other 
production site(s)
Binary or degree Yes/no or none/partial/most
Accessibility to the plant and to 
markets
redundancy; quality of roads; 
usability; expected increase in 
travel time
only 1 road/more alternatives;
local/regional/state roads;
<2hours/>4 hours
Relatively high level of redundancy in road
system (except many roads normally run near
capacity at rush hour) and for lateral routes
across Severn valley which will have involved
lengthy diversion routes (e.g. 100 kilometres).
Traffic diversions enabled transferability of
travel in many cases but increase in costs as
a consequence.
Contingency plan for na-tech binary
yes/no; considers all potential
threats/does not
Business continuity plan binary yes/no
Business continuity planning has become
relatively well developed in the UK in the past
decade and so we would expect many flood
risk firms to have considered how they would
ensure business continuity during a flood
disaster. How many would probably not have
considered prolonged loss of potable water
supplies caused by flooding in the summer
2007 floods.
Access to understandable 
information
binary and redundancy
yes/no; radio and TV/special 
telephone number/internet
Everyone is able to obtain geographically
specific flood warning information and flood
advice (including on flood resilience
measures) by telephoning the Environment
Agency's FLOODline. Radio information is
also available.
Trust in information provisers binary or degree yes/no; good/average/ low
Preparedness in case of event degree good/partial/low
People received severe weather and flood
warnings but most did not expect utilities to
suffer outages and so they were not prepared
for this in most cases.
Existance of 
individual/community plan for 
evacuation
binary yes/no
Availability of temporary 
shelters
degree good/partial/low
825 homes (1950 people) were evacuated to
rest centres provided by the local authorities 
Availability of temporary 
location for patients/ill people
binary yes/no
Existance of contingency plan 
fro threats at stake
binary; date of last production 
or update
yes/no; recent/old
Training using the contingency 
plan
binary; frequency of training yes/no; every 2 years/>2 years
Overlapping responsiblities 
among agencies
degree Low/medium/high
Established protocols for 
information sharing
binary yes/no
Established protocols for use 
of resources to manage the 
crisis
degree yes/partially/no
Capacity to run economy and 
respond to crises
degree yes/partially/no
Capacity to invest in recovery 
and take preventive actions
Binary or degree Yes/no or none/partial/high
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Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Factors that make buildings, the urban 
fabric and public facilities vulnerable to 
losses
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Fragility of ecosystems  to  potential 
secondary effects of hazard(s)
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People/individuals
Factors that may reduce coping capacity 
during crisis
Community and 
Institutions
Factors that may hamper effective crisis 
management
Economic stakeholders
Economic stakeholders preparedness to 
face crises
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Factors that may lead to halting productionProduction sites
Factors that make critical infrastructures 
stop functioning
Critical infrastructures
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Matrix to assess resilience to flood 
 
Risk: flood; Case study: Severn, flood 2007 Fourth Matrix: Resilience: response capability in the long run
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories Application to case study
Ecosystems capacity  to recover from 
damages
Resilience of crops and other 
agricoltural production to 
floods
Depending on depth and 
duration of flood water 
contamination and type of 
crops/production
Resilient/partially resilient/non-
resilient
Ecosystems capacity  to recover from 
secondary negative effects of emergency 
mitigation measures
Water quality in river
Binary
Remediation required/not required
Retention areas binary/legal provisions
can be accomodated/cannot; legal
impediments to taking/subtracting
to development
Central government and the Environment Agency are 
following a flood risk management strategy called 
'Making Space for Water' which is based on the 
concept of addressing flood hazards by employing a 
creative mix of structural and non-structural flood 
measures (Defra 2005).
Levees binary/funding
can be built/cannot be built;
funding mechanisms in the
reconstruction program
Demountable flood defences
Applicable: binary, available: 
binary
Yes/No, Yes/No
New development and 
refurbishing programs include 
risk prevention as a 
routine/everyday practice
degree or extent yes/partially/no
Detailed formal flood risk assessment procedures for 
siting of new buildings exist in the study area and the 
whole of England and Wales (DCLG 2010). These 
must be undertaken at a range of resolutions from 
strategic to site scales. Even so, 7% of new dwellings 
constructed in 2008 were located in high flood risk 
zones in South-West England which is the planning 
region within which Gloucestershire is located 
Detailed analysis of damage degree and scale
yes/partially/no; at individual
building/neighborhood/municipal 
scale
Detailed damage analysis at individual building scale 
has been carried out
Building codes address flood 
risk for new construction and 
retrofitting
degree; compliance yes/partially/no
However, flood resilience measures are not yet 
included in these building codes but will be in the next 
few years. There are now about 400 ‘flood products’ on 
the market which property owners can purchase and 
install.  So far relatively few properties have been 
retrofitted with flood resilience measures in the case 
study area although a few have.
Availability of partial relocation 
programs during 
reconstruction for the most 
critical situations
binary yes/no
Not known
Ability to incorporate 
recovery/resilience measures 
in future urban redevelopment 
plans
Binary, degree Yes/no, none/partial/high
Level of sharing among 
stakeholders of reconstruction 
plans
binary High/low; only formal/substantial
The Environment Agency's is working on a number of 
key flood alleviation schemes, which amount to a 
further £5.2 million of activity. A wide range of jointly-
funded project drainage and culvert works, de-silting, 
the raising of banks and flood reinforcement are being 
carried out to reduce the county's vulnerability  to 
flooding. The County Council is working closely with 
the district and borough councils on over 50 major 
drainage improvement projects which will cost a total 
of £1.9 million 
Existence of skilled workers for 
reconstruction activites
degree yes also with specific skills/yes/no
important to understand whether or not there are 
skilled workers for example in the sector of historic 
buildings restoration
Relevance of potentially 
affected settlements in 
geographic/economic terms
degree of relevance Central/peripheral
Computerized mapping 
systems of infrstructures
binary yes/no
In site devices for quick survey 
of damaged parts
binary yes/no
Availability of spare materials 
for fast repairs
binary; time needed to bring on 
site spare materials
yes/no; < a day/>1 day
Availability of personnel for 
repairs
binary; number of available 
technicians with respect to 
expected need
on site/in distant areas;
proportional to needs/few workers
Existance of protocols to 
proceed with repairs requiring 
inter-lifelines interventions
degree; number of different 
stakeholders to be coordinated 
in repair efforts
yes/partially/no; protocols among
all companies or coordinated by
authorities/limited agreements
Temporary transferability of 
production in case of need
binary applicable/not applicable
Existance of funds for fast 
repairs
binary yes/no
Existance of inspection and 
guiding personnel for correct 
repairs
binary
yes/no/forecasted in the recovery
plans
Economic sectors
Diversified or concentrated on 
few sectors
Few/many different economic
sectors in the area
Gloucestershire has a diversified urban economy 
according to the Provisional Economic Strategy 2008-
2015 (Gloucestershire First 2007) but the rural 
economy remains too dependent upon the agricultural 
sector.
Availability of psychological 
support for adults and children
binary
yes/no;making part of ordinary 
practices/exceptional
Availability of psychological 
and physical support for those 
with special needs 
Binary; degree of support Yes/no, good/fair/poor
Level of skills and capacity to 
learn and adapt
Qualitative jjudgement Low/medium/high
Availability of private resources 
to resettle/repair
binary and level of support by 
public organisations
yes/no; higly supported/lack of 
advisory personnel
Income polarisation is a persistent problem that has 
proved resistant to reduction. Gloucestershire has 
small pockets of deprivation (financial as well as other 
forms of deprivation).  A range of welfare and other 
policies exist which seek to target this problem but 
success has not yet been achieved.
Access to public relief funds, 
and funds and advice from 
public organisations
Binary, level of support Yes/no; high/medium/low support
Access to insurance binary; percentage of coverage yes/no; %without insurance
In Gloucestershire, 1,300 houses suffered significant 
contents damage, and of these 270 had not purchased 
contents insurance (i.e. 20.8%)  
Age structure age groups and fertility
Aging population; low fertility 
rates/young
Local condition of aged 
population
percentage of autonomous 
and healthy population
autonomous/not autonomous; 
relatively healthy/not healthy
Employment rate degree high/medium/low
Annual population growth rate 
(over the last five years)
trend high/medium/low/negative
Immigration index new immigrants/emigrants high/medium/low/negative
Social networking qualitatie judgement high/medium/low/negative
Criminality rate degree high/medium/low
Conflict among social/ethnic 
groups
degree high/medium/low
Degree of trust in institutions degree
high/medium/low (from 
sociological surveys when 
available)
Transparency in funds 
allocation
binary
Existance (yes/no) of public 
information and independent 
control mechanisms
Grants are now available to the public for installing 
flood resilience measures. 
Ability to learn from past 
events
degree high/medium/low
Long term vision
Existance of strategic 
development/land use plans
yes/no/only formal
Capacity to avoid income 
polarization
degree
existence of specific plans/generic 
statements
Corruption degree abnormal/average/minimal
Insurance coverage for direct 
damage and loss of workdays
binary; percentage of coverage yes/no; %without insurance
Dependance of economic 
actors on loss of 
environmental goods
Prevalent tourist acitvity; 
agricoltural activity
percentage
Access to knowledge about 
flood resistant structures 
degree high/medium/low
Access and information about 
funds for reconstruction
degree high/medium/low
Degree of diversification and 
capacity to spread risks
degree high/medium/low
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Community
Affected community's resilience to the 
consequences of a catastrophe
Transparency, reliability and trustability of 
institutions in charge of reconstruction
Institutions
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Urban fabric/built environment capacity to 
recover reducing pre-event vulnerability
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People's resilience in the face of the  
catastrophe induced trauma
People/individuals
Structural defences
Natural ecosystems 
Economic stakeholders
Capacity and willingness of stakeholders  
to reinvest in affected areas
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Availability of tools to recover production 
sites rapidly and at low costs
Production sites
Availability of tools to recover critical 
infrastructures rapidly and at low costs
Critical infrastructures
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Risk: Landslides First Matrix: Resilience: Mitigation capacity 
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories Comments
Natural hazards identification and mapping
Landsilides hazard maps 
availability
binary; scale of detail yes/no; local/regional
Available knowledge updating Hazard maps updating Frequency of updating
on the basis of regular surveys/
only occasionally
Hazard monitoring
are landlsides adequately 
monitored?
binary; quality and density of 
monitoring devices
yes/no; expert judgement
Connection of weather and rainfall 
monitoring connection to forecasting 
models
existence and quality of early 
warning systems for 
predictable landslides types
binary; expert judgement upon 
the quality of models; back 
analysis
yes/no; match of monitored data to 
forecasting models
Structural defence measures
existance and quality of 
structural defences/drainage 
works 
binary; expert judgement; 
movement status
yes/no; quality of defences; state 
of maintenance
Vulnerability assessment of 
exposed built stock
binary; updating frequency
yes/no; any time new buildings are
built/only occasionally
Risk maps and scenarios, 
including enchained events
binary yes/no
Vulnerability and exposure 
assessment considered in 
ordinary plans (example land 
use)
binary; mode of inclusion
yes/no; only formally/substantially 
with limitations and specific 
requirements
Building codes/rules 
binary;attempt to correlate 
between buildings 
characteristics and damage 
due to landslides
yes/no; taking/not taking into
account damage accounting in
specific databases
Traditional building practice 
based on hazard knowledge
binary; capacity to re-produce 
traditional techniques correctly
yes/no; judgement about the
capacity to conform to the "code of
practice"
Maintenance of building stock degree good/average/poor
Land use plans embedding 
risk mitigation and vulnerability 
reduction
binary; 
sectoral/comprehensive; 
specific/generic
yes/no; expert judgement
Integration to other measures
(insurance)
binary yes/no
Vulnerability assessment of 
critical infrastructure
binary ; updating frequency
yes/no; each time new projects are
drawn/only occasionally
Maintenance programs 
embedding mitigation
binary ; updating frequency yes/no
New projects based on 
hazard/risk assessment 
binary yes/no
Level of coordination among 
stakeholders
degree low/medium/high
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites
binary ; updating frequency
yes/no; each time new plants or
transformation of existing ones
occurs
Retrofitting measures for 
existing production sites
binary yes/no
New projects based on risk 
assessment 
binary
yes/no; special provisions for 
hazardous plants/generic rules
Na-tech explicitly accounted 
for in hazardous installations 
emergency plans
binary; expert judgement on 
quality
yes/no; good/poor quality
Risk perception/ awareness degree inexistant/average/good
Early warning systems
information addressing all 
components of communiy(ies)
% of coverage
Individual preparedness
availability of masks and 
sholves
yes/no
Known evacuation procedures binary; training
yes/no; training every few years/ 
only occasionally
Participation in development 
and prevention/mitigation 
strategies
degree low/average/high
binary; frequency
yes/no; every two years/only 
occasionally
embedded in school programs
yes/no; every two years/only 
occasionally
Coordination and cooperation 
among institutions in charge of 
risk prevention/ mitigation 
degree low/average/high
GDP; GVA (Gross added 
value, measure of productivity 
and size of economy)
level rich/average/poor country
extent of marginalized groups
dimension of 
poverty/marginalization
percentage of people living with 
less than x/year
Education programs & media 
campaigns 
People/individuals
Community and 
Instituions
Economic stakeholders
Economic capacity to mitigate of the 
various stakeholders; the access to 
financial resources for mitigation
Involvement of a community into decision-
making processes related to risk 
prevention and mitigation, the capacity of 
Instituions of improving risk awarenees 
and the level of cooperation among 
different institutions in charge of risk 
prevention/ mitigation.
Rules and tools for risk 
mitigation
Availability, quality and efficacy of 
mitigation rules
N
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Natural Hazards
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Inclusion of vulnerability and exposure 
assessments in land use plans
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Existence of vulnerability assessments for 
production sites; consideration of na-techs
Production sites
Existence of vulnerability assessments for 
critical facilities; level of consideration of 
vulnerability in programs regarding critical 
facilities
Critical infrastructures
Capacity of individuals living in prone 
hazard areas of coping with hazardous 
events
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Risk: Landslides Second Matrix: Physical vulnerability: Vulnerability to stress (hazard)
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment Parameters value/categories Scoring
lateral 
slide
rotational/tran-
slational slide
debris 
flows mudflows rock falls
Fragility of natural ecosystems to 
hazard(s)
presence of vegetation and 
forests on sliding slopes
binary; coverage and type yes/no; % and type 0.5 0.5 1 1 0
Possibility of enchained effects due to 
the interaction of natural systems with 
the triggering hazard
slope morphology channels spread/rare; depth 1 1 0
Vulnerability of ecosystems to 
mitigation measures taken during 
emergency
presence of ecosystems that 
may be endangered by lava 
flows deviations
binary; type
yes/no; type of vegetation and
other species
1 1 1 1
connection to structure good/poor
shape large inclination/plane 1
material
steel, reinforced concrete,
masonry (different types), other
1 1 1
type of connection among 
parts
good/poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
foundation depth and type non-existent,  deep, superficial 1 1 1 1 1
spans between resistant 
elements
distance in m.
> 3 mt; < 3 mt (for masonry
mainly)
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0
openings
number and dimension of
windows/doors
0 0 1 1 0
quality of openings may be easily sealed/not 0 0 1 1 0
maintenance building conditions very poor/  good 1 1 1 1
with respect to dangerous 
channels
parallel/perpendicular 0 0 1 1 0
position with respect to the 
moving mass
on the movement
mass/below/below at a distance/
lateral
1 1 1 1
Vulnerability assessment of 
public facilities
as for buildings
Vulnerability of the urban 
fabric
?
position of lines with 
respect to the mass 
movement
across the moving
mass/below/lateral
1 1 1 1 1
power station, telecom 
centre
see buildings assessment 1 1 1 1 1
position of gas conducts
across the moving
mass/below/lateral
1 1 1 1 1
connection to vulnerable 
buildings
vulnerable buildings/not
vulnerable)
1 1 1 1 0
position of water pipes
across the moving
mass/below/lateral
1 1 1 1 1
pipes condition
across the moving
mass/below/lateral
position with respect to the 
moving mass
across the moving
mass/below/lateral
1 1 1 1 1
defence walls/grids
weak/resistant (material, type,
shape); state of maintenance
good/poor
1 1 1 1 1
tracks and ski runs
position with respect to the 
moving mass
across the moving
mass/below/lateral
1 1 1 1 1
What are the factors that make 
production sites vulnerable 
as for buildings
Preparedness
prior training and exercises; 
information about what do 
do
yes/no; frequency of training 1 1 1 1 1
Evacuation plan binary and quality yes/no; expert judgement 1 1
1 (only with 
meteo alert)
1 (only with 
meteo alert)
0
Age; mobility impairment, 
other impairment
difficulties to comply with 
evacuation orders; 
difficulties in escaping
yes/no; number of people 0 1 1 1 0
concentration
resident and present 
population in dangerous 
areas
presence with respect to the 
moving mass 
1 1 1 1
B
u
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t 
en
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types of landslides
roof
structure 
shape
slow movement rapid movement
road and railways network
water and sewerage
gas
electricity and 
communication
Factors that make critical 
infrastructures vulenrable (mainly 
lifelines
Factors that may lead to large number 
of victims
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Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
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Critical 
infrastructures
Factors that may lead to injuries and 
fatalities
People/individuals
Community and 
Instituions
Natural ecosystems 
Factors that make buildings, the urban 
fabric and public facilities vulnerable to 
the stress
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Risk: Landslides Third Matrix: Systemic vulnerability: Vulnerability to losses
System Component Aspect Parameters parameters Criteria for assessment Parameters values/categories Scoring
slow 
movement
rapid 
movement
Fragility of ecosystems  to  potential 
secondary effects of hazard(s)
presence of 
forests/vegetation in 
denuded slopes
binary and extent yes/no; types and % of coverage 1 1
Vulnerability of ecosystems to 
mitigation measures taken during 
emergency
presence of forests and 
ecosystems in the path where 
structural works have to be 
built
binary yes/no; types and % of coverage 1 1
Existance of public facilities: 
hospitals, fire brigades, 
emergency control rooms 
yes/no; functional capacity of 
such facilities
assessment of functional potential of
facilities
0 1
Range of service of public 
facilities
Importance of facilities in the 
potentially stricken areas
Local facilities/regional/national
relevance
1 1
Existance of lifelines binary yes/no 1 1
Degree of interdependance 
among lifelines
level of redundancy; binary
large redundancy; emergency
devices exist/do not; autonomous
capacity exist/does not
1 1
Continuity plan for lifelines, 
individually and in a 
coordinated fashion
binary
yes/no; considers all potential
threats/does not
1 1
Degree of dependance of 
critical public facilities from 
lifelines
binary
autonomous plants exist/do not;
alternative resources available/not
available
1 1
People and areas depending 
on lifelines in potentially 
affected zones
number/area dimension
number of customers who may be
affected; geographic area
1 1
Availability of personnel 
and spare materials for 
quick repairs
binary yes/no 1 1
Duration of outages hours few hours/> 24 1 1
to strategic facilities more than 1 access/1 access/0 access 1 1
physical vulnerability of access 
ways
vulnerable/not vulnerable 1 1
condition and features of 
access ways
narrow/large (> or < 12 mt); inclination
(> or < 3%), twisting and curves
(yes/no), material (asphalt/not asphalt)
1 1
in residential areas more than 1 access/1 access/0 access 1 1
physical vulnerability of access 
ways
vulnerable/not vulnerable 1 1
condition and features of 
access ways
narrow/large (> or < 12 mt); inclination
(> or < 3%), twisting and curves
(yes/no), material (asphalt/not asphalt)
1 1
availbility of personnel and 
means for quick reopening
binary; distance in hours to be 
covered by personnel and 
means
yes/no; x < = 2h/ x> 2h 1 1
Degree of dependance of 
production sites from lifelines
binary; degree of presence of 
autonomous devices
yes/no; % 1 1
Accessibility to the plant and to 
markets
see internal and particulary 
external accessibility of the 
area
1 1
Contingency plan for na-tech binary
yes/no; considers all potential 
threats/does not
1 1
Business continuity plan binary yes/no 1 1
information on risk degree enough/sufficient/none 1 1
trust in authorities binary yes/no 1 1
continuouing monitoring binary yes/no 1 1
available equipments binary yes/no 1 1
potable water storage binary yes/no 1 1
civil protection plan binary yes/no 1 1
training and exercise degree
frequent/not frequent; involving the 
population /not involving
0.5 1
communication plan 
(multilingual)
binary yes/no 1 1
Factors that make production sites 
vulnerable
Factors that make buildings, the urban 
fabric and public facilities vulnerable to 
losses
B
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types of landslides
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Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
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Critical 
infrastructures
People/individuals
Community and 
Instituions
Natural ecosystems 
Production sites
internal accessibility 
Factors that make critical infrastructures 
stop functioning
accessibility from/to  damaged 
areas
Accesibility to and within vulnerable areas
Factors that may hamper effective 
crisis management
Factors that may lead to injuries and 
fatalities
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Risk: Landslides Fourth Matrix: Resilience: response capability in the long run
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories Comments
Ecosystems capacity  to recover from 
damages
Type of forests damaged by 
landslide
depending on vegetation 
characteristics
Ecosystems capacity  to recover from 
secondary negative effects of emergency 
mitigation measures
Type of forests damaged by 
landslide
depending on vegetation 
characteristics
Consolidation and drainage 
works
binary
feasible/not feasible; funding
mechanisms in the reconstruction
program
Defense grids binary/funding
can be built/cannot be built;
funding mechanisms in the
reconstruction program
New development and 
reconstruction programs 
include risk prevention as an 
everyday activity
degree yes/partially/no
Detailed analysis of damage degree and scale
yes/partially/no; at individual
building/neighborhood/municipal 
scale
Lessons from landslides 
impact is considered for new 
construction and retrofitting
degree yes/partially/no
Availability of partial relocation 
programs during 
reconstruction for the most 
critical situations
binary yes/no
Relevance of potentially 
affected settlements in 
geographic/economic terms
degree of relevance Central/peripheral
Computerized mapping 
systems of infrstructures
binary yes/no
In site devices for quick survey 
of damaged parts
binary yes/no
Availability of personnel and 
spare materials for  repairs
binary; time needed to bring on 
site spare materials
yes/no; < a day/>1 day
Existance of protocols to 
proceed with repairs requiring 
inter-lifelines interventions
degree; number of different 
stakeholders to be coordinated 
in repair efforts
yes/partially/no; protocols among
all companies or coordinated by
authorities/limited agreements
Lessons from landslides 
impact is considered for 
lifelines repair
degree yes/partially/no
Temporary transferability of 
production in case of need
binary applicable/not applicable
Existance of funds for fast 
repairs
binary yes/no
Existance of inspection and 
guiding personnel for correct 
repairs
binary
yes/no/forecasted in the recovery
plans
Availability of private resources 
to resettle/repair
binary and level of support by 
public organisations
yes/no; higly supported/lack of 
advisory personnel
Access to insurance binary; percentage of coverage yes/no; %without insurance
Employment rate degree high/medium/low
Annual population growth rate 
(over the last five years)
trend high/medium/low/negative
Immigration index new immigrants/emigrants high/medium/low/negative
Social networking qualitatie judgement high/medium/low/negative
Criminality rate degree high/medium/low
Conflict among social/ethnic 
groups
degree high/medium/low
Condition of affected part of 
the community with respect to 
the wider provincial context
degree
strongly 
connected/integrated/marginalized
Degree of trust in institutions degree
high/medium/low (from 
sociological surveys when 
available)
Transparency in funds 
allocation
binary
Existance (yes/no) of public 
information and independent 
control mechanisms
Capacity to pursue mitigation 
strategies
Degree yes/onlypartially/no
Insurance coverage for direct 
damage and loss of workdays
binary; percentage of coverage yes/no; %without insurance
Dependance of economic 
actors on loss of 
environmental goods
Prevalent tourist acitvity; 
agricoltural activity
percentage
Economic stakeholders
Capacity and willingness of stakeholders  
to reinvest in affected areas
In
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Availability of tools to recover production 
sites rapidly and at low costs
Production sites
Availability of tools to recover critical 
infrastructures rapidly and at low costs
Critical infrastructures
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Natural ecosystems 
Community
Affected community's resilience to the 
consequences of a catastrophe
Transparency, reliability and trustability of 
institutions in charge of reconstruction
Institutions
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Urban fabric/built environment capacity to 
recover reducing pre-event vulnerability
B
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t
People's resilience in the face of the  
catastrophe induced trauma
People/individuals
Structural defences
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Risk: volcanic First Matrix: Resilience: Mitigation capacity 
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories Comments
Natural hazards identification and mapping
Volcanic hazard maps 
availability
binary; scale of detail yes/no; local/regional
Available knowledge updating Hazard maps updating Frequency of updating
any time new knowledge is
available/ any time activity
changes/ only occasionally
Hazards monitoring
are volcanic hazards 
adequately monitored?
binary; quality and density of 
monitoring devices
yes/no; expert judgement
existence and quality of 
volcanic hazards monitoring 
systems
binary; expert judgement upon 
the quality of models; back 
analysis
yes/no; match of monitored data to 
forecasting models
are there early warning 
systems?
binary yes/no
Structural defence measures
yes/no; quality of defences; state 
of maintenance
Vulnerability assessment of 
exposed built stock
binary; updating frequency
yes/no; any time new buildings are
built/only occasionally
Risk maps and scenarios, 
including enchained events
binary yes/no
Vulnerability and exposure 
assessment considered in 
ordinary plans (example land 
use)
binary; mode of inclusion
yers/no; only formally/substantially 
with limitations and specific 
requirements
Building codes/rules binary; expert judgement
yes/no; taking into account new
knowwledge and info/only
occasionally updated
Traditional building practice 
based on hazard knowledge
?
Land use plans embedding 
risk mitigation and vulnerability 
reduction
binary; expert judgement
yes/no; sectoral/comprehensive; 
specific/generic
building codes/rules 
binary; frequency of
inspections; availability of
trained personnel for
inspections
yes/no; frequent/rare; yes/no and
number/total of construction sites
every year
Integration to other measures
(insurance)
binary yes/no
Vulnerability assessment of 
critical infrastructure
binary ; updating frequency
yes/no; each time new projects are
drawn/only occasionally
Maintenance programs 
embedding mitigation
binary ; updating frequency yes/no
New projects based on 
hazard/risk assessment 
binary yes/no
Level of coordination among 
stakeholders
degree low/medium/high
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites
binary ; updating frequency
yes/no; each time new plants or
transformation of existing ones
occurs
Retrofitting measures for 
existing production sites
binary yes/no
New projects based on risk 
assessment 
binary
yes/no; special provisions for 
hazardous plants/generic rules
Na-tech explicitly accounted 
for in hazardous installations 
emergency plans
binary; expert judgement on 
quality
yes/no; good/poor quality
Risk perception/ awareness degree inexistant/average/good
Early warning systems
information addressing all 
components of communiy(ies)
% of coverage
Individual preparedness
availability of masks and 
sholves
yes/no
Known evacuation procedures binary; training
yes/no; training every few years/ 
only occasionally
Participation in development 
and prevention/mitigation 
strategies
degree low/average/high
binary; frequency
yes/no; every two years/only 
occasionally
embedded in school programs
yes/no; every two years/only 
occasionally
Coordination and cooperation 
among institutions in charge of 
risk prevention/ mitigation 
degree low/average/high
GDP; GVA (Gross added 
value, measure of productivity 
and size of economy)
level rich/average/poor country
extent of marginalized groups
dimension of 
poverty/marginalization
percentage of people living with 
less than x/year
Integration of  detection and monitoring 
systems with forecasting models
Evaluation of the capacity of individuals 
living in prone hazard areas of coping with 
hazardous events
Education programs & media 
campaigns 
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Existence of vulnerability assessments for 
production sites; consideration of na-techs
Production sites
Existence of vulnerability assessments for 
critical facilities; level of consideration of 
vulnerability in programs regarding critical 
facilities
Critical infrastructures
People/individuals
Involvement of a community into decision-
making processes related to risk 
prevention and mitigation, the capacity of 
Instituions of improving risk awarenees 
and the level of cooperation among 
different institutions in charge of risk 
prevention/ mitigation.
Community and 
Instituions
Economic stakeholders
Level of preparedness of key economic 
stakeholders 
N
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t
Natural Hazards
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Inclusion of vulnerability and exposure 
assessments in land use plans
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Rules and tools for risk 
mitigation
Availability, quality and efficacy of 
mitigation rules
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Matrix to assess physical vulnerability of built environment to volcanic risk 
Risk: Volcanic Second Matrix: Physical vulnerability: Vulnerability to stress (hazard)
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment Parameters value/categories Score
gas tephra
pyroclastic 
flows ballistic lava flows lahars
Fragility of natural ecosystems to 
hazard(s)
presence of vegetation and 
forests on the volcanic 
slopes
binary; coverage and type yes/no; % and type 1 0.5 1 1
Possibility of enchained effects due to 
the interaction of natural systems with 
the triggering hazard
type of soil; vegetation 
rock/varioustypes of loose  
soil; trees with long and 
extended roots/no vegetation 
or with superficial roots
qualitative 0 0.5 1 -
Vulnerability of ecosystems to 
mitigation measures taken during 
emergency
presence of ecosystems that 
may be endangered by lava 
flows deviations
binary; type
yes/no; type of vegetation and
other species
0 0 1
Vulnerability assessment of 
public facilities
internal machinery sensitive 
to the volcanic hazards
yes/no; type of machinery 0.5 1 1 1
Average vulnerability at the 
municipal scale, considering 
settlements or urban 
partitions
Considering parameters 
provided in the attached 
specific  table
Low-medium-high vulnerability 1 1 1 1 1 1
lines aerial lines/underground 1 1
power station, telecom 
centre
see buildings assessment 1 1 1 1
position of gas conducts across hazardous zones 1 1 1
connection to buildings
vulnerable buildings/not
vulnerable)
position of water pipes across hazardous zones
1 (across
landslide)
1
pipes condition obsolete/new
position
distance from dangerous 
areas
inside/outside potentially affected
areas (scenario dependent)
1 1 1
point shaped elements bridges weak/resistant (material, type, 1(debris 1 1 1
Factors that make production sites 
vulnerable 
presence of flammable 
materials
binary; amount yes/no; quantities
Preparedness
prior training and exercises; 
information about what do 
do
yes/no; frequency of training 1 1
need to be 
evacuated
need to be 
evacuated
need to be 
evacuated
Sensistivity to health effects 
of volcanic hazards
means of self protection yes/no; 1 1 - - - -
Age; mobility impairment, 
other impairment
difficulties to comply with 
evacuation orders; 
difficulties in escaping
yes/no; number of people 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1
concentration
resident and present 
population in dangerous 
areas
inside/outside potentially affected 
areas (scenario dependent)
1 1 1 1 1
Relevance with respect to volcanic hazards
water and sewerage
gas
electricity and 
communication
Factors that make buildings, the urban 
fabric and public facilities vulnerable to 
the stress
B
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Factors that may lead to large number 
of victims
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Natural ecosystems 
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
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Factors that make critical 
infrastructures vulenrable (mainly 
lifelines)
Critical 
infrastructures
Factors that may lead to injuries and 
fatalities
People/individuals
Community and 
Instituions
Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameter value 
/categories gas tephra
pyroclastic 
flows ballistic lava flows lahars
connection to 
structure
good/poor 1 1
weight heavy/light 1
shape
large 
inclination/plane
1 (pitch > 15°
ok)
0.5
material
iron, reinforced
concrete, 
masonry 
(different types),
other
0,5 (worse:
timber)
0,5 (best: r.c, masonry if
homog. resistance; worse:
timber)
homogeneity
large/largely 
disomogenous
1 1 1
type of connection 
among parts
good/poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
floors rigidity rigid/non rigid
foundation depth and type
non-existent,  
deep, superficial
1 1
spans between resistant 
elements
distance in m.
> 3 mt; < 3 mt
(for masonry
mainly)
0.5
openings
number and
dimension of
windows/doors
1 1 1 0.5
quality of openings
may be easily
sealed/not
1 1 1
basement
existant/non 
existant
1
inflammable 
objects
existant/non 
existant
1 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5
sources of 
radiation or toxic 
chemicals
existant/non 
existant
maintenance building conditions very poor/ good 1 1 1 1
soil on which the 
building is built 
(crest, alluvial 
deposits, etc.)
amplification 
soils yes/no
0.5
with respect to 
dangerous 
channels
parallel/perpendi
cular
1 1
distance from 
dangerous areas
inside/outside 
potentially 
affected areas
(scenario 
dependent)
0.5 0.5 1 1 1
Factors that make 
buildings and public 
facilities vulnerable to 
the stress
Vulnerability 
assessment of 
residential buildings 
and public facilities
roof
structure 
shape
position
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Risk: volcanic Third Matrix: Systemic vulnerability: Vulnerability to losses
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories Scoring
Fragility of ecosystems  to  potential 
secondary effects of hazard(s)
binary; extent yes/no; maps
Possibility of enchained effects due to the 
interaction of natural systems with the 
triggering hazard
meteorological assessment in 
the days after the initial crisis
rainy/dry
Vulnerability of ecosystems to mitigation 
measures taken during emergency
presence of forests and 
ecosystems in the path where 
lava flows are going to be 
deviated
binary yes/no; types and % of coverage
Quality of temporary shelters 
(first emergency)
with heating or conditioning; 
sanitation; density
yes/no; a>1/50 people/ a < 1/50
people; d < 1tent per family/d > 20
persons/tent
Quality of more permenent 
temporary shelters
dimension; availability of 
services
d > 14 mq/4 persons/ d < 10 mq/4
persons; yes/no
Accessibility to potentially 
damaged areas from 
temporary shelters
on foot; transportation
d < 500 m/ d> 500 m; available/not
available; frequent/not frequent
Accessibility to work sites from 
temporary shelters
on foot; transportation
d < 500 m/ d> 500 m; available/not
available; frequent/not frequent
Accessibility to public facilities on foot; transportation
d < 500 m/ d> 500 m; available/not 
available; frequent/not frequent
existence and redundancy more than 1/ 1/ 0
fucntional vulnerability to 
physical damage (physical 
vulnerability)
vulnerable components crucial for
functioning: yes/no
dependency from other 
systems
dependent/autonomous
to strategic facilities
more than 1 access/1 access/0
access
physical vulnerability of access 
ways
vulnerable/not vulnerable
condition and features of 
access ways
narrow/large (> or < 12 mt);
inclination (> or < 3%), twisting
and curves (yes/no), material
(asphalt/not asphalt)
in residential areas
more than 1 access/1 access/0
access
physical vulnerability of access 
ways
vulnerable/not vulnerable
condition and features of 
access ways
narrow/large (> or < 12 mt);
inclination (> or < 3%), twisting
and curves (yes/no), material
(asphalt/not asphalt)
existent/non existent
accessibility from settlements (as
accessiblity to strategic facilities)
physical vulnerability (as roads
position parameter)
gathering zones close
existent/non existent
accessibility from settlements (as
accessiblity to strategic facilities)
physical vulnerability (as roads
position parameter)
gathering zones cloes
Degree of dependance of 
production sites from lifelines
binary; degree of presence of 
autonomous devices
yes/no; %
Accessibility to the plant and to 
markets
see internal and particulary 
external accessibility of the 
area
Contingency plan for na-tech binary
yes/no; considers all potential 
threats/does not
Business continuity plan binary yes/no
self protection means yes/no 1 (masques) 1 (shovels)
information on risk enough/sufficient/none 1 1
trust in authorities yes/no 1 1
permanent staff yes/no 1 1
continuouing monitoring 
(>weight if early warning 
possible)
yes/no 1 0.5
available equipments yes/no 1 (masques) 1 (drill)
potable water storage yes/no 1 1
civil protection plan yes/no 1 1
training and exercise
frequent/not frequent; involving 
the population /not involving
1 1
communication plan 
(multilingual)
yes/no 1 1
induced lahars; induced  
landslides
gas, water, electricity, telecom
accessibility from damaged 
areas
internal accessibility 
external accessibility
Community and 
Institutions
Factors that may hamper effective crisis 
management
heliports
ports
S
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Factors that may lead to halting productionProduction sites
Factors that make critical infrastructures 
stop functioning
Critical infrastructures
Factors that may reduce coping capacity 
during crisis
People/individuals
N
a
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ra
l 
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n
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n
m
e
n
t
Natural ecosystems 
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Factors that make buildings, the urban 
fabric and public facilities vulnerable to 
losses
B
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n
v
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o
n
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n
t
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Risk: volcanic Fourth Matrix: Resilience: response capability in the long run
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories Scoring
Ecosystems capacity  to recover from 
damages
can it be as ofr fires?
Ecosystems capacity  to recover from 
secondary negative effects of emergency 
mitigation measures
can it be as ofr fires?
Temporary transferability of 
facilities relevant for the 
settlement/city community life 
and economy
binary; type of relocation yes/no; temporary/permanent
Existance of plans for 
reconstruction in case of 
severe destruction scenarios 
binary yes/no
Level of sharing among 
stakeholders of reconstruction 
plans
degree High/low; only formal/substantial
Level of integration of physical 
reconstruction with community 
healing processes
degree
High/low; room for interpreting in 
the new/restored setting the 
meaning of the destruction
Relevance of potentially 
affected settlements in 
geographic/economic terms
level of importance Central/peripheral
Computerized mapping 
systems of infrstructures
binary yes/no
In site devices for quick survey 
of damaged parts
binary yes/no
Availability of spare materials 
for fast repairs
binary; time needed to bring on 
site spare materials
yes/no; t < 1 day/ several days
Availability of personnel for 
repairs
location and number of 
technicians
on site/in distant areas; number of 
available technicians with respect 
to expected need
Existance of protocols to 
proceed with repairs requiring 
inter-lifelines interventions
degree; number of different 
stakeholders to be coordinated 
in repair efforts
yes/partial/no; one main
stakeholder/several stakeholders
Temporary transferability of 
production in case of need
binary applicable/not applicable
Existance of funds for fast 
repairs
binary yes/no
Existance of inspection and 
guiding personnel for correct 
repairs
binary 
yes/no/forecasted in the recovery 
plans
Economic sectors
Diversified or concentrated on 
few sectors
Few/many different economic
sectors in the area
Availability of psychological 
support for adults and children
binary yes/no
Availability of private resources 
to resettle/repair
binary; support by public 
agencies; rapidity of 
compensation process
yes/no; available/not available; 
rapid/slow
Access to insurance binary and coverage yes/no; percentage of coverage
Age structure Areas vitality Aging population; low fertility rates
Local condition of aged 
population
binary
autonomous/not autonomous; 
relatively healthy/not healthy
Employment rate degree high/medium/low
Annual population growth rate 
(over the last five years)
degree high/medium/low/negative
Immigration index degree high/medium/low/negative
Social networking degree high/medium/low/negative
Criminality rate degree high/medium/low
Conflict among social/ethnic 
groups
degree high/medium/low
Degree of trust in institutions degree
high/medium/low (from 
sociological surveys when 
available)
Transparency in funds 
allocation
Existance of public information 
and independent control 
mechanisms
yes/no
Long term vision
Existance of strategic 
development/land use plans
yes/no
Insurance coverage binary and coverage Yes/no;percentage
Construction industry
level of development and 
modernization
high/average/lowEconomic stakeholders
Capacity and willingness of stakeholders  
to reinvest in affected areas
In
fr
a
s
tr
u
c
tu
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n
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u
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n
 s
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Availability of tools to recover production 
sites rapidly and at low costs
Production sites
Availability of tools to recover critical 
infrastructures rapidly and at low costs
Critical infrastructures
S
o
c
ia
l 
s
y
s
te
m
 (
a
g
e
n
ts
)
Transparency, reliability and trustability of 
institutions in charge of reconstruction
Institutions
N
a
tu
ra
l 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
Natural ecosystems 
Community
Affected community's resilience to the 
consequences of a catastrophe
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Urban fabric/built environment capacity to 
recover reducing pre-event vulnerability
B
u
il
t 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
People's resilience in the face of the  
catastrophe induced trauma
People/individuals
ENSURE Project (Contract n° 212045) Del. 4.1 
- 86 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matrix to assess mitigation capacity to seismic risk 
 
Risk: seismic First Matrix: Resilience: Mitigation capacity 
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories
Application or comments from 
case studies
Hazard mapsincluding map for 
fault rupturing at the ground 
surface availability
Geological map of quaternary 
formation
Map of topographic 
amplification zones
Hazard monitoring
availability of seismographs 
and accelerometers networks
binary and density
yes/no; dense/only individual
sparse points
In Italy before the 70s the
seismograph and accelerometers
networks were significantly
underdeveloped/absent in several
zones
Availability of maps of 
landslides and estimation of 
their potential movement 
consequent to earthquakes
binary; quality
yes at appropriate scale/no; quality
with resepct to international
standards
Map of potential liquefaction 
zones
binary; coverage
yes/no; only spot like/covering the
entire area of concern
Map of tsunami hazard binary yes/no
Tsunami monitoring network binary yes/no
Vulnerability assessment of 
exposed built stock
binary; frequency
yes/no; updated at the same rate
of urban growth/not updated
In Italy for example extensive
vulnerability survey campaings have
been carried out in several regions
Risk maps and scenarios, 
including enchained events
binary yes/no
Vulnerability and exposure 
assessment considered in 
ordinary plans (example land 
use)
binary; mode of inclusion
yes/no; only formally/substantially 
with limitations in amplification 
zones and specific building 
requirements
Unfortunately available vulnerability
assessment, including the
assessment of all public buildings
vulnerability in Southern regions is
not considered in
development/restoration plans in the
majority of Italian regions
Building codes/rules binary; quality
yes/no; updated according to state
of the art/old
Various cases, like the Kocaeli
earthquake have shown the
importance of cosndiering the year
when building codes were issued
Traditional building practice 
based on hazard knowledge
binary; capacity to re-produce 
traditional techniques correctly
binary; judgement about the
capacity to conform to the "code of
practice"
Maintenance of built stock binary yes/no
Specific provisons for 
retrofitting
binary
economic incentives promoted/not
promoted
Land use plans embedding 
risk mitigation and vulnerability 
reduction
binary/ expert quality 
judgement
yes/no; sectoral/comprehensive; 
specific/generic
Implementation capacity
binary; frequency of
inspections; availability of
trained personnel for
inspections
yes/no; frequent/rare; yes/no and
number/total of construction sites
every year
In several recent earthquakes
(Gujarat, 2001; Turkaey, 1999;
Algeria, 2003; L'Aquila 2009 poor
compliance was one of the main
casuses of recent buildings failure
Integration to other measures
(insurance)
binary yes/no
Vulnerability assessment of 
critical infrastructure
binary ; updating frequency
yes/no; each time new projects are
drawn/only occasionally
Relevant in California
Maintenance programs 
embedding mitigation
binary ; updating frequency yes/no
New projects based on 
hazard/risk assessment 
binary yes/no
Level of coordination among 
stakeholders
degree low/medium/high
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites
binary ; updating frequency
yes/no; each time new plants or
transformation of existing ones
occurs
Retrofitting measures for 
existing production sites
binary yes/no
New projects based on risk 
assessment 
binary
yes/no; special provisions for 
hazardous plants/generic rules
Na-tech explicitly accounted 
for in hazardous installations 
emergency plans
binary; expert judgement on 
quality
yes/no; good/poor quality
Existance of emergency plans 
that expliclty take into account 
erthquakes as  threat to be 
prepared for
binary; expert judgement on 
quality
yes/no; good/poor quality
Risk perception/ awareness degree inexistant/average/good
Individual preparedness
regarding specific self 
protective measures; regarding 
measures included in 
emergency plans
low/average/high
Even in Kobe the individual
preparedness proved to be poor
despite national programs; few
people had radio working with
batteries; few had a bottle of water
and basic commodities ready for
evacuation
Participation in development 
and prevention/mitigation 
strategies
degree low/average/high
binary; frequency
yes/no; every two years/only 
occasionally
embedded in school programs
yes/no; every two years/only 
occasionally
Coordination and cooperation 
among institutions in charge of 
risk prevention/ mitigation 
degree low/average/high
GDP; GVA (Gross added 
value, measure of productivity 
and size of economcy)
level rich/average/poor country
extent of marginalized groups
dimension of 
poverty/marginalization
percentage of people living with 
less than x/year
At the following scales: country 
level;                       regional 
and provincial;                                  
lower scales
yes/no; quality as judged with 
respect to international standards 
and updated to new knowledge 
and technologies
Induced/triggered hazards consideration in 
hazard monitoring systems
Education programs & media 
campaigns 
Evaluation of the  involvement of a 
community into decision-making processes 
related to risk prevention and mitigation, 
the capacity of Instituions of improving risk 
awarenees through information and 
education campaigns and the level of 
cooperation among different institutions in 
charge of risk prevention/ mitigation.
Rules and tools for risk 
mitigation
Inclusion of vulnerability and exposure 
assessments in land use plans
N
a
tu
ra
l 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
Natural Hazards
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Is exposure and vulnerability considered 
and acted upon in plans?
B
u
il
t 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
Natural hazards identification and mapping
Community and 
Instituions
Economic stakeholders
Economic capacity to mitigate of the 
various stakeholders; the access to 
financial resources for mitigation
S
o
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l 
s
y
s
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m
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n
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)
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Existence of vulnerability assessments for 
production sites; consideration of na-techs
Production sites
Existence of vulnerability assessments for 
critical facilities; level of consideration of 
vulnerability in programs regarding critical 
facilities
Critical infrastructures
Capacity of individuals living in prone 
hazard areas of coping with hazardous 
events, which largely depends on the 
perception and awareness of risk 
conditions 
People/individuals
In the Alaska case (earthquake
1964) geological hazards connected
to seismic were well known and
mapped, though not embedded in
metropolitan master plans of
Anchorage for example
Induced and triggered hazards have
been the object of study only
recently; many regions though have
developed such knowledge in the
last ten/15 years
Expertise has been developed in
Italy for example regarding the issue
of "code of practice" connecting
traditional local knowledge and
earthquake resistance capacity;
provisions for retrofitting have been
attached to the financial law after
earthquakes
Only in Turkey after the 1999
earthquake the program funded by
the World Bank connects insurance
to antiseismic development
In California there is a tradition that
permitted the seismic upgrading of
lifelines in ordinary maintenance
and new projects
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Matrix to assess physical vulnerability to seismic risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk: seismic Second Matrix: Physical vulnerability: Vulnerability to stress (hazard)
System Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment Descriptors
Application or comments from case 
studies
extent of potentially flooded 
zones by tsunami
degree and relevance of 
impacted zones
extended areas/few zones; urban
areas impacted/remote areas
extent and location of triggered 
landslides
degree and relevance of 
impacted zones
extended areas/few zones; urban
areas impacted/remote areas
Average vulnerability at the 
municipal scale, considering 
settlements(rural)  or urban parts
Considering parameters provided 
in the attached specific  table
Low-medium-high vulnerability
Vulnerability assessment of  
historic buildings/monuments
Specific vulnerability indicators 
depending on the type of 
building/structure
Low-medium-high vulnerability
as for residential buildings
internal machinery vulnerable 
to shakes
yes/no; adapted to seismic
shaking/not adapted
vulnerability assessment of 
structural built aggregates
on the basis of: regularity;
presence of strong inclination;
presence of structural
disomogenity
relationship between built and 
open areas
large spaces between buidlings 
and open spaces availble/dense 
and narrow built zones
electricity (including nodes like 
power stations, 
derived from e.g. network
caracteristics (buried/aerial, 
communication (including 
nodes like base transceiver 
station,...)
derived from e.g. network
caracteristics (buried/aerial,! ),
conditions (age, degree of
maintenance), network
redundancy
gas network (including nodes 
like production facilities, tank 
farms, stations,...)
derived from e.g. network
caracteristics (rigid/ductile
material, existence of shut-off
valves/circuit-breakers! ), 
conditions (age, degree of
maintenance), network
redundancy
water, drinking water and 
sewerage network (including 
dams, treatment plants, 
pumping stations, ...) 
derived from e.g. network
caracteristics (rigid/ductile
material, existence of shut-off
valves/circuit-breakers! ), 
conditions (age, degree of
maintenance), network
redundancy
transport lines: roads, railways 
for instance (including bridges, 
tunnels, 
embankment/slopes! )
derived from e.g. network
caracteristics (type of material, ! ),
conditions (age, degree of
maintenance), network
redundancy
Presence of dams
binary; assessed vulnerability 
to earthquakes
yes/no; low/medium/high
Vulnerability due to physical 
interaction among lifelines
lifelines degree of connection low/high
Vulnerability due to lifeline 
connections physical 
interaction with to vulnerable 
buildings
lifelines close and attached to 
resistant/vulnerable buildings
yes/no
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites
as for public facilities
Potential na-tech due to stored 
materials, types of processes
binary and number of workers, 
types of processes
yes/no; small/large firms ,
processes types
Vulnerability due to 
dependency on lifelines
dependance on lifelines 
low/medium/high (existence of
alternative solutions)
People concentration in 
different zones in the hours of 
the day
degree of concentration in 
vulnerble locations/buildings
low/medium/high
Preparedness previous training yes/no
Age; mobility impairment, other 
impairment
difficulties to comply with 
evacuation orders; difficulties 
in escaping
yes/no, number of people
Existance of emergency plan 
and quality
binary; quality
yes/no; as judged by involved 
institutions
Availability of resources for 
search and rescue (lamps; 
cranes, special devices)
binary; number with respect to 
potentially damaged areas
yes/no; imemdiately 
accessible/remote; sufficient/not 
sufficient
Vulnerability assessment of 
public facilities
Vulnerability of the urban fabric
Vulnerability assessment of 
lifelines
Factors that may lead to injuries and 
fatalities
People/individuals
Community and 
Instituions
Factors that may lead to large number of 
victims
In
fr
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Factors that make production sites 
vulnerable (including na-tech potential)
Production sites
Factors that make critical infrastructures 
vulenrable (mainly lifelines
Critical infrastructures
S
o
c
ia
l 
s
y
s
te
m
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n
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)
N
a
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l 
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n
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n
t
Natural ecosystems 
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Factors that make buildings, the urban 
fabric and public facilities vulnerable to the 
stress
B
u
il
t 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
Fragility of natural ecosystems to 
hazard(s)
The Kobe eartheuake is an example of vulnerable
residential buildings where many people died; the
Alaska earthquake just the opposite, as many more
people would have died were the people working in the
central district heavily affected by landlsides
In several cases the lack of basic SAR tools
has casued the increase of victims trapped
under debris. Studies show that in the first 24
hours the same victims are the first reponders
The urban fabric is not the simple addition of
buildings, particularly in historic centres where
a set of buildings sharing structural
components like walls manifest a rather
different behavior to shaking than if the
buildings were not connected. This behavior
has been surveryed in several earthquakes in
Italy and elsewhere
Earthquake lifelines engineering is a branch of 
civil and seismic engineering devoted to the
understanding of lifelines behavior under
shaking and induced stresses (liquefaction,
landslides, etc.). First extensive reports go
back to the Northridge earthquake in 1994,
the Kobe earthquake in 1995 and all following
earthquake. Studies are polarized between
very technical issues regarding the behavior
of individual components, like bridges, valves,
joints, pipes on the one hand and the
systemic functioning of lifelines on the other.
Na-tech have been only recently the object of
systematic studies; in the seismic field in
particular after the Kocaeli earthquake in 1999
where an important refinery exploded and
burned as a secondary consequence of the
earthquake
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Vulnerability parameters for individual buildings
Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Descriptors (in order of 
higher vulnerability) weight
score 
(1=high; 
5=very 
low) Comments
roof connection to the 
building structure
good/mediocre/poor
roof weight light/heavy
structural material
iron, r.c. antiseismic,
timber/masonry/stone,un
cooked earth
connection among walls and 
building parts
good/mediocre/poor
floors rigidity flexible/rigid
foundation depth and type
deep/superficial/non 
existent
position with respect to soil 
type
non amplification
zones/amplification 
areas/liquefaction zones
spans between resistant 
elements (mainly masonry)
d < 3 m/d > 3 m
openings
part of the
structure/create 
structural discontinuity
regularity in plan
regular/asymmetric 
distribution of forces
regularity in elevation
regular/asymmetric 
distribution of forces
added parts (balconies, 
chimneys)
attached/loosely 
connected to structure
maintenance good/poor
retrofitting programs
available/not available;
good/poor
What are the factors that 
make buildings and public 
facilities vulnerable to the 
stress?
Vulnerability 
assessment of 
residential buildings 
and public facilities
Those parameters are quite well
established in the international literature,
unlike for other hazards. The process of
identifying correlations between damage-
acceleration-vulnerability is quite
developed in several countries, with
large damage database that permit to
identify the main causes of failures of
ordinary structures. Special facilities likfe
hospitals, theaters, churches hav been
less studied and only recent reports
permit to establish the vulenrability of
special buildings and stored
machinery/goods. After the Northridge
earthquake some articles report the
vulnerability of hospitals and special
equipments incuding generators
ENSURE Project (Contract n° 212045) Del. 4.1 
- 89 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matrix to assess systemic vulnerability to seismic risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk: seismic Third Matrix: Systemic vulnerability: Vulnerability to losses
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories Comments from case studies
forms pre-prepared and 
shared among all teams
yes/no
information computerized yes/no
rapid damage assessment 
map obtained in few weeks
yes/no
Quality of temporary shelters 
(first emergency)
with heating or conditioning; 
sanitation; density
yes/no; a>1/50 people/ a < 1/50
people; d < 1tent per family/d > 20
persons/tent
The availability of human conditions
in temporary camps is essential for
peple's recovery, particularly when
the earthquake strikes in winter
Quality of more permenent 
temporary shelters
dimension; availability of 
services
d > 14 mq/4 persons/ d < 10 mq/4
persons; yes/no
Accessibility to potentially 
damaged areas from 
temporary shelters
on foot; transportation
d < 500 m/ d> 500 m; available/not
available; frequent/not frequent
Accessibility to work sites from 
temporary shelters
on foot; transportation
d < 500 m/ d> 500 m; available/not
available; frequent/not frequent
Accessibility to public facilities on foot; transportation
d < 500 m/ d> 500 m; available/not 
available; frequent/not frequent
Redundancy in lifelines 
systems
degree low/high
Degree of interdependance 
among lifelines
degree low/medium/high
Availability of emergency 
devices
binary (generators; tanks, etc) yes/no
Continuity plan for lifelines, 
individually and in a 
coordinated fashion
binary and quality
yes/no; considers also induced
hazards/ does not
Degree of dependance of 
critical public facilities from 
lifelines
degree low/medium/high
Degree of dependance of 
production sites from lifelines
degree low/medium/high
Accessibility to the plant and to 
markets
redundancy; quality of roads; 
usability; expected increase in 
travel time
redundant/not redundant;
open/close roads; t.inc < 30 min/
t.inc > 30 min
Contingency plan for na-tech binary
yes/no; considers all potential 
threats/does not
Business continuity plan binary yes/no
Access to understandable 
information
binary
yes/no; centralized /at each group 
level (for example in each 
temporary camp)
Trust in information provisers degree low/medium/high
Preparedness to evacuation individual plan yes/no (like going to relatives)
Presence of impaired groups 
(elderly, sick persons, etc.)
binary and quality of caring
yes/no; capacity to provide 
treatment in temporary camps/or 
not
In the l'Aquila case an accurate
survey of people needing care for
cronic deseases whas conducted
and patients were given thier
treatment since the first days
Existance of contingency plan 
fro threats at stake
binary; date of last production 
or update
yes/no; recent/old
availability of quick post event 
scenarios to be checked and 
used as a guidance in crisis 
management
binary and quality
yes/no; considering also
enchained effects and systemic
damage/restricted to physical
damage
Comfort (1999) refers to the
Northridge earthquake when
repsonders could count on available
pre-set scenarios for rapid damage
estimation
Training using the contingency 
plan
binary; frequency of training
yes/no; every two years/only 
occasionally
Overlapping responsiblities 
among agencies
degree Low/medium/high
Overlapping responsibilities between the
firemen and other technicians of the civil
protection in usability surveys and first
shoring have sometimes delayed surveys
and return of people to undamaged houses
in the l'Aquila case
Established protocols for 
information sharing
binary yes/no
Established protocols for use 
of resources to manage the 
crisis
degree yes/only partially/high
Factors that may reduce coping capacity 
during crisis
People/individuals
Community and 
Institutions
Factors that may hamper effective crisis 
management
In
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Factors that may lead to halting productionProduction sites
Factors that make critical infrastructures 
stop functioning
Critical infrastructures
S
o
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l 
s
y
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m
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)
The l'Aquila case showed that the existenc
of various forms reduces the efficiency of
usability srveys, as well as the lack of
comuterized systems for their fast recovery
and particularly georeferencing.
As temporary shelters in seismic hit
zones are expected to last some
years, they must be provided with a
minimal level of commodities. In the
meantime accessibility to working
places and homes is essential for
victims
The capacity to isolate priority nodes for
fast recovery of lifelines; the availability of
tanks, generators and any other means to
make lifelines and critical facilities work at
least partially after the event is clearly
crucial also for carrying out emergency
operations. The Kobe and the Northridge
earthquakes showed clearly that such
availability is much less available than
thought and than what would be required
and possibile thanks to modern technologies
Availability of rapid post 
seismic buildings usability 
assessment
N
a
tu
ra
l 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
Natural ecosystems 
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Factors that make buildings, the urban 
fabric and public facilities vulnerable to 
losses
B
u
il
t 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
Fragility of ecosystems  to  potential 
secondary effects of hazard(s)
areas affected by landslides number and extent
few/many; in remote areas/in 
crucial-central zones
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Risk: seismic Fourth Matrix: Resilience: response capability in the long run
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories Comments from case studies
Temporary transferability of 
facilities relevant for the 
settlement/city community life 
and economy
binary; type of relocation yes/no; temporary/permanent
In the l'Aquila case all public services
located in the historic centre were
transferred to the School of the Financial
Police in an external quartier nearby. The
problem of leaving a centre empty of
functions for a long while must be carefully
considered
Existance of plans for 
reconstruction in case of 
severe destruction scenarios 
binary yes/no
Reconstruction plans 
considers lessons learnt from 
earthquake (including 
amplification zones)
binary and quality
yes/no; seismic zonation map
made available for
reconstruction/not available
In the Umbria Marche case (1997)
provision of compensation was
granted on the basis of a seismic
zonation map showing the most
critical amplification zones
Existance of skilled 
workers/firms for repairs and 
reconstruction (example 
historic sites)
binary; quality
Yes/no; availability with respect to 
expected need
In the Umbria Marche case, the lack of
firms with workers skilled in the restoration
of historic centres and in the meantime
seismic retrofitting required careful
consideration and creation of technical
consultancy by the two regions
Level of sharing among 
stakeholders of reconstruction 
plans
degree High/low; only formal/substantial
The Umbria Marche case showed a good
level of integration between the central
government and the two regions.
Level of integration of physical 
reconstruction with community 
healing processes
degree
High/low; room for interpreting in 
the new/restored setting the 
meaning of the destruction
Relevance of potentially 
affected settlements in 
geographic/economic terms
level of importance Central/peripheral
Computerized mapping 
systems of infrstructures
binary yes/no
In site devices for quick survey 
of damaged parts
binary yes/no
Availability of spare materials 
for fast repairs
binary; time needed to bring on 
site spare materials
yes/no; t < 1 day/ several days
Availability of personnel for 
repairs
location and number of 
technicians
on site/in distant areas; number of 
available technicians with respect 
to expected need
Existance of protocols to 
proceed with repairs requiring 
inter-lifelines interventions
degree; number of different 
stakeholders to be coordinated 
in repair efforts
yes/partial/no; one main
stakeholder/several stakeholders
Temporary transferability of 
production in case of need
binary applicable/not applicable
Existance of funds for fast 
repairs
binary yes/no
Existance of inspection and 
guiding personnel for correct 
repairs
binary 
yes/no/forecasted in the recovery 
plans
Economic sectors
Diversified or concentrated on 
few sectors
Few/many different economic
sectors in the area
Availability of psychological 
support for adults and children
binary yes/no
In the l'Aquila case provision of
psychological support for victims was
extensive and helped to solve several
problems in temporary tent camps
Availability of private resources 
to resettle/repair
binary; support by public 
agencies; rapidity of 
compensation process
yes/no; available/not available; 
rapid/slow
Access to insurance binary and coverage yes/no; percentage of coverage
Age structure Areas vitality Aging population; low fertility rates
Local condition of aged 
population
binary
autonomous/not autonomous; 
relatively healthy/not healthy
Employment rate degree high/medium/low
Annual population growth rate 
(over the last five years)
degree high/medium/low/negative
Immigration index degree high/medium/low/negative
Social networking degree high/medium/low/negative
Criminality rate degree high/medium/low
Conflict among social/ethnic 
groups
degree high/medium/low
Degree of trust in institutions degree
high/medium/low (from 
sociological surveys when 
available)
Transparency in funds 
allocation
Existance of public information 
and independent control 
mechanisms
yes/no
The Friuli earthquake in 1976 was a good
example of transparency a sort of collective
control over money expenditure was
developed; on the contrary the Irpinia
reconstruction after the 1980 earthquake
was object to several court and parlamentary
trials for briberies etc.
Long term vision
Existance of strategic 
development/land use plans
yes/no
Insurance coverage binary and coverage Yes/no;percentage
Construction industry
level of development and 
modernization
high/average/low
Economic stakeholders
Capacity and willingness of stakeholders  
to reinvest in affected areas
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Availability of tools to recover production 
sites rapidly and at low costs
Production sites
Availability of tools to recover critical 
infrastructures rapidly and at low costs
Critical infrastructures
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Community
Affected community's resilience to the 
consequences of a catastrophe
Transparency, reliability and trustability of 
institutions in charge of reconstruction
Institutions
The Kobe earthquake has shown
that recovery time is strongly
connected to the availability of
personnel, maps of systems,
material for repairs, capacity to
handle car traffic in areas where
repairs must be carried out
After the Friuli earthquake in 1976,
several centres were rebuilt in areas
that had experienced high levels of
abandonment: several empty
buildings can be found nowadays in
the rebuilt zone.
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Urban fabric/built environment capacity to 
recover reducing pre-event vulnerability
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People's resilience in the face of the  
catastrophe induced trauma
People/individuals
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Matrix to assess mitigation capacity to forest fires 
 
Risk: forest fire First Matrix: Resilience: Mitigation capacity 
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories weight
score (1=high; 
5=very low) Scale
Hazard maps availability
Maps of areas prone to fires; 
map of inflammability of 
vegetation
yes/no; quality as judged with
respect to international standards
1
Do hazard assessment 
consider climate change
binary yes/no 0.5
Available knowledge updating Hazard maps updating Frequency of updating
every 2 years and after each
event/rarely 
0.5
technical monitoring systems 
linked to operation centre
yes/no 1
permanent staff dispaced in 
critical areas for direct 
monitoring and immediate 
intervention
yes/no 0.5
Connection of monitoring devices to 
modelling systems
Availability, quality of early 
detection systems and models
binary; quality of early 
detection and propagation 
estimation models
yes/no; models tailored to the
geographical context/not tailored
0.5
Structural defence measures
Existence of defenses for 
breaking the fire lines
binary yes/no 1
Vulnerability assessment of 
exposed built stock
binary; updating frequency
yes/no; every time new building
permits are given/only
occasionally
1
Risk maps and scenarios, 
including enchained events
binary; year of production yes/no 1
Vulnerability and exposure 
assessment considered in 
ordinary plans (example land 
use)
binary; mode of inclusion
yes/no; only formally/substantially 
with limitations and specific 
requirements
1
Building codes/rules binary; updated
yes/no; rules efficacy checked
after each event/rarely tested
0.5
Property regime of houses owned houses versus tenants owners ow < 50%/ ow > 80% 0.5
Traditional building practice 
based on hazard knowledge
binary; capacity to re-produce 
traditional techniques correctly
yes/no; judgement about the
capacity to conform to the "code of
practice"
0.5
Maintenance of fire 
suppression devices and 
clearing vegetation around 
houses
binary yes/no 1
Land use plans embedding 
risk mitigation and vulnerability 
reduction
binary; specific indications for 
vulenrable locations
yes/no; specific rules for the
wildland-urban interface and for
accessibility
1
If previous paramters yes, then
Implementation capacity
binary; frequency of
inspections; trained personnel
for inspections
yes/no; every year/seldom 1
If previous paramters yes, then
Integration to other measures
(insurance)
binary yes/no 1
Vulnerability assessment of 
critical infrastructure
binary, particularly for roads 
and water for firefighting
yes/no 1
Maintenance programs 
embedding mitigation
binary yes/no 1
New projects based on 
hazard/risk assessment 
binary yes/no 1
Level of coordination among 
stakeholders
degree low/medium/high 1
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites to wildfire
binary yes/no 1
Retrofitting measures for 
existing production sites
binary yes/no 1
New projects based on risk 
assessment 
binary yes/no 1
Na-tech explicitly accounted 
for in hazardous installations 
emergency plans
binary
yes/no; expert judgement on 
quality
1
Risk perception/ awareness Degree strong/average/low 0.5
Reliance on institutional 
firefighting capabilities
Degree strong/average/low 1
Felt responsibility for 
firefighting and fire mitigation
Degree strong/average/low 1
Tools and plans to guarantee 
early warning reach the 
communities
Binary yes/no 1
Individual preparedness 
regarding specific self 
protective measures; regarding 
measures included in 
emergency plans
hydrant available/not available; 
escaping routes known/not 
considered
1
Contingency plans for 
firefighting
binary yes/no 1
Effectiveness of measures 
included in contingency plans
degree strong/medium/low 1
Participation in development 
and prevention/mitigation 
strategies
degree strong/medium/low 0.5
binary; frequency yes/no; every year/only seldom 0.5
tailored to the community 
features
yes/generic 1
Inclusion in school programs yes/no 1
Economic access to resources 
for firefighting
degree vewry low/low/average/high 1
Coordination and cooperation 
among institutions in charge of 
risk prevention/ mitigation 
degree strong/medium/low 1
Natural hazards identification and mapping
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Natural Hazards
Hazard monitoring systems
Existence, distribution and 
quality of monitoring networks
Evaluation of the  involvement of a 
community into decision-making processes 
related to risk prevention and mitigation, 
the capacity of Instituions of improving risk 
awarenees through information and 
education campaigns and the level of 
cooperation among different institutions in 
charge of risk prevention/ mitigation.
Education programs & media 
campaigns 
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Inclusion of vulnerability and exposure 
assessments in land use plans
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People/individuals
Capacity of individuals living in prone 
hazard areas of coping with hazardous 
events, which largely depends on the 
perception and awareness of risk 
conditions before the event occurs.
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Existence of vulnerability assessments for 
production sites; consideration of na-techs
Production sites
Existence of vulnerability assessments for 
critical facilities; level of consideration of 
vulnerability in programs regarding critical 
facilities
Critical infrastructures
Rules and tools for risk 
mitigation
Availability, quality and efficacy of 
mitigation rules
Community and 
Institutions
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Matrix to assess physical vulnerability of built environment to forest fires 
 
 
 
Risk: forest fires; Second Matrix: Physical vulnerability: Vulnerability to stress (hazard)
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories weight
score (1=high; 
5=very low) Scale
Surface fuels
Only needle or leaf litter on the ground;
sparse low vegetation; tall dense phyrgana
or shrubs
1
Existence and cover of tall tree 
crowns 
No tree crowns; tree crown cover of
<40%; tree crown cover >= 40%
0.5
Type of trees (see next page for 
details)
according to the classification
provided by Dimitrakopoulos and
Papaioannou, 2001
1
Vulnerability of ecosystems to mitigation 
measures taken during emergency
 can natural ecosystems may 
be impacted by mitgiation 
measures?
Binary Yes/no 0.5
Average vulnerability at the 
municipal scale, considering 
settlements(rural)  or urban parts
Considering parameters provided 
in the attached specific  table
Low-medium-high vulnerability 1
Types of dangerous uses within or 
in proximity to the building unit 
of reference (either in the 
horizontal or vertical sense)
Flammable storage inside or close to
residential areas 
Absent/present 0.5
Morphological features of 
settlements
Influence of the slope of the 
surrounding area 
Slope i <5%/  5% <= i < 20 / Slope  
>= 20% 
0.5
Historic sites (archeological) and 
buildings (monuments and 
museums) in the hazardous areas
Binary; extent and relevance
no/yes; dimension; minor/relevant/very 
relevant
1
If previous parameter YES, then 
Level of protection
Binary and quality
yes/no; effective/uneffective 1
Built pattern (follwoing Lampin-
Maiillet et al., 2009)
Building density and proximity is 
an indicator for assessing  
potential sources of ignition and 
surface to be cleared from 
vegetation
very dense; dense, scattered; isolated
1
water system pressure
normal/ too low pressure for
hydrants
1
self eater tank available/not available 1
roads interaction with fuel
large road sections in open
zones/in the middle of fuel areas
1
Vulnerability assessment of 
production sites
as for buildings, but including 
attention to storage of hazmat
structurally vulnerable/low
vulenrability; large storage/no
storage
1
Vulnerability due to 
dependency on lifelines
depending on the degree of 
dependance upon external 
vulnerable lifelines
self eater tank available/not
available
1
Sparse population
ratio between population living 
in isolated buildings and 
remote settlements and total 
population
r <5%; r > 20% 1
self protection means hydrants at home/lack of hydrants 1
self protection against smoke availability of masks/lack of 1
Age; mobility impairment, other 
impairment
difficulties to comply with 
evacuation orders; difficulties 
in escaping
> 65; number of handicapped 1
Distance from firefighting 
resources
time of arrival within 30 min; > 1 hour 1
Availability of trained 
personnel
professional training in the 
community
firefighters 
(professional+volunteers)/only 
professional
1
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Production sites
Critical infrastructures
People/individuals
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Factors that make buildings, the urban 
fabric and public facilities vulnerable to the 
stress
Preparedness
Fragility of natural ecosystems to 
hazard(s)
land cover inflammability 
Community and 
Instituions
Factors that may lead to large number of 
victims
Factors that make production sites 
vulnerable (including na-tech potential
Factors that make critical infrastructures 
vulenrable (mainly lifelines)
Factors that may lead to injuries and 
fatalities
Vulnerability assessment of 
critical infrastructure
Vulnerability parameters for individual buildings
Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters value/ 
categories weight
score 
(1=high; 
5=very 
low)
Application to the Ilia 
case study
Minimum distance between the 
forest fuel and the house
Distance d >= 20 m; d< 
20m
Heat tolerance of the roof
Non flammable 
roof/flammable roof
Influence of the slope of the 
surrounding area 
Slope i <5%;  5% <= i 
< 20;  i  >= 20%
Heat tolerance of the walls
Non burnable walls/ 
flammable walls
Heat tolerance of the shutters
Metal shutters/wood or 
plastic shutters
Number of floors
Only ground floor/2 
floors/ > 2floors
What are the factors 
that make buildings 
and public facilities 
vulnerable to the 
stress?
Vulnerability 
assessment of 
residential buildings 
and public facilities
Post-fire case studies
revealed that ~90% of
home survival depended
on two factors: a non-
flammable roof and
vegetation cleared within
10 m of home (Foote,
2006)
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Risk: forest fire; Third Matrix: Systemic vulnerability: Vulnerability to losses
System Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment Descriptors weight
Score
1 (high) - 5 (low)
Comments
Natural ecosystems soil deterioration increase of erosion 
<= 30 %; 30 x x < 50%;
x>= 50%
1
landslide hazard
degree of increase of landslide 
potential based on survey and 
exprt judgement 
low/medium/high 1
Existence of public facilities 
and resources to face the 
emergency
Availability of movable fire 
fighting equipment or of an 
automatic fire-fighting network 
(E3)
yes/no 1
Buildings density and proximity  
(follwoing Lampin-Maiillet et al., 
2009)- total perimeter to be 
protected
very dense; dense, 
scattered; isolated
1
Type of roads serving the
various settlements
Plain roads/mountain roads
Signs in roads and streets (names,
numbers, etc.)
yes/no
existence of public facilities in the
area
yes/no
expected travel time t > 30 min/ t <= 30 min
road network to public facilities
as for accessibility to 
vulnerale areas
Yes/no; in sufficient
number/insufficient
1
Existence of a swimming
pool or a water tank of
more than 3 m3 in the plot
0.5
Degree of dependance of 
production sites from lifelines
water for fighting
existence of tanks and
devices for firefighting
Accessibility to the plant and to 
markets
redundancy; quality of roads; 
usability; expected increase in 
travel time
as for roads network to
vulnerable areas
Contingency plan for na-tech binary yes/no
Business continuity plan binary yes/no
Access to understandable 
information
binary yes/no 1
Trust in information provisers binary yes/no 1
Tenants, landowners and 
neighbours have been trained 
in fire-fighting
binary and frequency of 
training
yes/no; every x 
months/only occasionally
1
Voluntary fire fighers binary; number
yes/no; number 
/neighborhood
1
If previous yes, then Training
degree of training and means 
availability to volunteers
good/average/low 1
Presence of impaired groups 
(elderly, sick persons, etc.)
binary; number and 
accessibility to leaving areas
yes/no; 
numbr/neighborhood and 
accessibility
1
Existance of contingency plan 
fro threats at stake
binary; date of last production 
or update
yes/no; recent/>2 years 
with no updating
1
If previous yes, Training using 
the contingency plan
binary; frequency of training
yes/no; every year/only 
occasionally
1
Overlapping responsiblities 
among agencies
degree Low/medium/high 0.5
Established protocols for 
information sharing
binary yes/no 0.5
Established protocols for use 
of resources to manage the 
crisis
degree yes/no/partial 0.5
Accessibility to vulnerable 
areas
Availability of water for
firefighting
Factors that may reduce coping 
capacity during crisis
People/individuals
Accessibility to public facilities
Existance of lifelines
Roads characteristics
Factors that make buildings, the 
urban fabric and public facilities 
vulnerable to losses
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
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Community and 
Instituions
Factors that may hamper effective 
crisis management
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Factors that may lead to halting 
production
Production sites
Factors that make critical 
infrastructures stop functioning
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Critical infrastructures
Fragility of ecosystems  to  potential 
secondary effects of hazard(s)
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Matrix to assess resilience to forest fires 
 
Risk: forest fires Fourth Matrix: Resilience: response capability in the long run
System Component Aspect Aspect Parameters Criteria for assessment
Parameters values and/or 
categories Weight
Score
1 (high) - 5 (low)
Comments
 recovery capacity of burnt 
areas
extent of damage to vegetation Resprouting likely/unlikely 1
Fire interval
Elapsed time between two 
consecutive fires (The study by 
Delgado etal 2002 is used as 
reference. They evaluated 
resilieance of vegetation in the 
Mediterranean context, using 
Catalonia as a case study. The 
type of vegetation studied 
should be similar for many 
mediterranean ecossystems. 
They measure plant cover 
recovery 38 months after the 
second fire).
Days 1
Fire recovery Post fire vegetation re-growth
South facing slopes/North facing 
slopes
0.5
logging procedures
immediate logging after 
fire/delayed logging (see Spanos 
et al., 2010)
0.5
plants used for reforestation
use of endemic species for 
reforestation/use of fast growing 
vegetation
1
Structural and non structural recovery 
measures
availability of maps and 
pictures to document 
regeneration
binary yes/no 0.5
Existance of plans and 
provisions to encourage 
mitigation in buildings and 
surrounding zones
binary yes/no 1
Creation of emergency access binary yes/no 1
Level of sharing among 
stakeholders of reconstruction 
plans
degree low/average/high 1
Level of integration of physical 
reconstruction with community 
healing processes
Room is given for interpreting 
in the new/restored setting the 
meaning of the destruction 
(After Valen and Campanella, 
2005)
High/low 0.5
Existence and strength of 
norms prohibiting building in 
burnt areas
binary; degree of 
compliance/inspection 
capability
yes/no; low/high
Water system for firefighting 
level of improvement after 
disaster
low/high 1
In site devices for quick survey 
of damaged parts
binary yes/no 1
Availability of spare materials 
for fast repairs
binary yes/no 1
Availability of personnel for 
repairs
binary yes/no 1
Existence of protocols to 
proceed with repairs requiring 
inter-lifelines interventions
binary yes/no 0.5
Relevance of the area as a 
tourist attraction
degree low/average/high 1
Activities depending on the 
existence of woods
binary yes/no 0.5
Economic sectors
Diversified or concentrated on 
few sectors
Few/many different economic
sectors in the area
1
Availability of psychological 
support for adults and children
degree
yes/no/making part of ordinary 
practices
Availability of private resources 
for recovery
degree yes/no
Availability of private resources 
for recovery
Income/per capita high/average/low
Access to insurance binary; coverage yes/no; percentage of coverage
Age structure
Aging population; low fertility 
rates
indexes
Local condition of aged 
population
autonomous/not autonomous; 
relatively healthy/not healthy
autonomous/not autonomous; 
relatively healthy/not healthy
Employment rate degree high/medium/low
Annual population growth rate 
(over the last five years)
degree high/medium/low/negative
Immigration index degree high/medium/low/negative
Social networking degree high/medium/low/negative
Criminality rate degree high/medium/low
Conflict among social/ethnic 
groups
degree high/medium/low
Trust in institution degree
high/medium/low (from 
sociological surveys when 
available)
Transparency in funds 
allocation
Existance of public information 
and independent control 
mechanisms
yes/no
Long term vision
Existance of strategic 
development/land use plans
yes/no
Insurance coverage binary; coverage Yes/no;percentage
Dependance of economic 
actors on loss of 
environmental goods
Prevalent tourist acitvity; 
agricultural activity
percentage
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Natural ecosystems 
Community
Affected community's resilience to the 
consequences of a catastrophe
Exposure and
vulnerability of built
environment
Urban fabric/built environment capacity to 
recover reducing pre-event vulnerability
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Transparency, reliability and trustability of 
institutions in charge of reconstruction
Critical infrastructures
People/individuals
People's resilience in the face of the  
catastrophe induced trauma
Institutions
burnt areas management
Ecosystems capacity  to recover from 
damages
Economic stakeholders
Capacity and willingness of stakeholders  
to reinvest in affected areas
Availability of tools to recover production 
sites rapidly and at low costs
Economic activities
Availability of tools to recover critical 
infrastructures rapidly and at low costs
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